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Abstract:  
 
This study explores how Bourdieusian structural constructivism contributes to our 
understanding of state identity in international relations. While there has been a significant 
concentration of constructivism on the description and understanding of state identity, 
constructivist approaches still have not comprehensively answered all the controversial 
questions of structural theories. The aim of the dissertation, thus, is to improve understanding 
of state subjectivity and identity by means of Bourdieusian sociological approach, which 
provides a basis to form a middle-way between the structuralist and constructivist 
perspectives on the issues of identity and state.   
The dissertation is based on two fundamental objectives. The primary objective of the 
thesis is to utilize Bourdieusian sociological research and terminology to improve our 
understanding regarding the formation and change of state identity. Secondly, the dissertation 
purposes to contribute to the existing constructivist understanding of state identity in line with 
Bourdieusian structural constructivism. In this way, the study theorizes that the state as a 
social entity – which is therefore subject to unconscious symbolic violence before it forms 
and embodies the physical understanding of fear and anarchy in the interactive processes of 
international relations.  
The methodology is structured around Bourdieusian terminology and research. In this 
respect, the project is separated into two logical stages. As the descriptive stage of the thesis, 
the first stage discusses the theoretical foundation of the problem of state identity and useful 
theoretical tools of Bourdieu with regards to the problem. It firstly identifies weaknesses of 
the existing literature regarding the understanding of agent and structure relations. Then, it 
describes how this Bourdieusian perspective improves our understanding with regards to 
structure, subject, and identity. The second stage would fundamentally conduct a prescriptive 
stage, which tests the applicability of Bourdieusian terminology in the different fields of 
political, economic, cultural, and social capital. In order to illustrate the theoretical findings of 
the research in a more comprehensive way, the chapters in this stage utilize distinctive 
methodological concepts of globalisation, neoliberalism, democratisation and the developing 
state, respectively. These methodological concepts are the substantiating methods of 
theoretical findings, which improve the harmony and content integrity of the chapters. 
Ultimately, the study determines how Bourdieusian structural constructivism improves the 
theory of international relations beyond the existing borders of constructivism.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research question 
Questions on the identity of the political subject in international relations have been an 
ongoing research process. Identity has been studied from nearly all of the prominent 
perspectives in international relations. At the same time, the identity of the political subject – 
the state – has been transformed over time into an intertwined and even ambiguous set of 
meanings. Early examinations of identity were based on theoretical approaches of realist and 
rational theories of state identity. However, these realist and rationalist approaches identified 
the identity of the political subject within the context of nations existing in the international 
arena. Realist and rationalist theorizations of nations’ similar interests and fears stereotype 
state identity, because structure uniforms the characteristics of national identity as a set of 
behaviours. In other words, realist and rationalist motivations regarding structure marginalize 
state identity and its social and cultural relations and characteristics.  
After the social and cultural turn in international relations, the identity of the political 
subject attracts considerable attention from international relations scholars. In particular, the 
cultural expansion of constructivism brings social relations and normative definitions into the 
study of identity. Constructivism distinguishes the existence of fear or anarchy from an 
ontological standardization of state identity. Constructivism rests on the existence of norms in 
the international arena, and, as a result, it observes that state identity is a result of social 
relations and intentional motivation on the existence of norms. Social interactions are 
becoming a prominent element in explaining the existence of state identity. The state’s 
perceptions of itself and other states are evaluated as the fundamental basis of identity 
construction in international relations. This illustrates a shift in classical rationalist thinking 
because it takes into consideration the state’s internal perception in addition to the external 
structural effects on identity formation. Ideas and identities gain incredible importance 
because states construct conscious relations with others in order to make sense of their 
identities. Consciousness with the existence of anarchy leads to the normative consideration 
of living in the same international space. Here, constructivists rely on creations of norms and 
rules in order to operate in the international field. However, the stressing of norms in 
international relations turns into discussions of basic normative nature, especially discussions 
of sovereignty. This great stress on the norms of sovereignty trivializes states’ structural 
inequalities to reach the identical knowledge of conscious interpretations. As a result, 
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constructivism improves unilateral definitions of identity, but, by attributing great importance 
to the normative nature of identity, it renders state identity unambiguous in a constructivist 
normative approach to the problem of structure and agency. In short, constructivists have not 
dealt with the intertwined and equiponderant effects of material and ideational structures on 
the formation of state identity. 
Indeed, the formulation of identity relies upon discussions, representing the 
methodological preference between structures and norms. Agency–structure relations come 
down to the identification of state identity or, in a broader sense, the identity of political 
agency; scholars then make a pragmatic preference between the material nature of structure or 
the ideational norms of social relations. In fact, both the material nature and the ideational 
nature of agency–structure relations explain how states’ identities are structured rather than 
how they are formed. The constructivist inclusion of structure via anarchy in international 
relations does not do enough to reach a comprehensive definition of state identity in relation 
to structure–agency discourses. In constructivist discussion, the state’s socially constructed 
identity depends on the state’s consciousness regarding its ontological existence. However, it 
is not so persuasive that the state’s perception of its own ontological nature always creates 
conscious ideational actions which meaningfully try to explain its nature to the other states. At 
least, as long as all states do not reach the same normative values and maturity in international 
relations, they cannot be seen as equally conscious actors to create the social realities of their 
identity formation. Without understanding these mutual and intertwined existences of 
structures and normative ideations of the formation of state identity, the constructivist 
perspective renders identity a derivative of sovereignty.  
Here, social sciences and anthropology are good sources to improve the constructivist 
normative approaches. I will move beyond methodological approaches regarding sovereignty 
and integration. In line with sociological references, this research considers states as living 
social organisms, with habitus, emotional reflex and embodied culture in a wider societal 
space. Similar to the individuals in society, states may have invisible structural constraints, 
which can be a pre-existent habitual embodiment of the state’s identity. Therefore, state 
consciousness of the production of norms can be related to the state’s habitual characteristics 
or the inadequacy of cultural accumulation, which affect the roles and positions in social 
relations. It is claimed here that the state as a social entity is subjected to predisposed habitual 
structural dispositions before it produces its identity into conscious socially constructed 
relations. In this respect, I depict the mutual and intertwined existence of unconscious 
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historical structure and conscious normative productions into the composition of state 
identity.  
In this research, I focus on Bourdieusian sociological approaches as the main 
theoretical theme. Bourdieu has received a considerable amount of discussion of his 
illustration of how individuals form their entities in society and the way in which the 
socialization process pre-influences individuals’ unconscious characteristics. If we examine 
the state as a social actor in a wider social space, it is possible to illustrate same constraints 
and habitual influences on states’ identity. Bourdieu here helps to explain the state’s 
ontological presence and the production of conscious norms and rules in practice. The 
ontological presence of states may be related to the pre-existence of habitus of accumulated 
history, which produces relevant dispositions in international relations. This Bourdieusian 
perspective questions constructivist socially constructed state identity, because social 
construction in his sense is achieved by the existence of accumulated structural history in the 
agent’s identity. Therefore, the Bourdieusian perspective theoretically helps this study to 
manifest the mutual existence and function of structure and construction on the formation of 
state identity. 
To sum up, my fundamental question in this thesis is: 
How does Bourdieusian structural constructivism contribute to our understanding of 
state identity in international relations? 
Existing international relations theories have not achieved a comprehensive 
explanation for the formation and change of political identity in international relations. The 
emergence of new cultural and sociological approaches in international relations indicates that 
neither structure nor ideation precedes the formation of state identity. In order to understand 
the presence of agency and identity in international relations it is more important to see the 
intertwined links of structures and ideas in cultural and social perspectives. By using a 
Bourdieusian study, I can show whether and how the identities of political subject/state are 
formed and transformed. Therefore, this study highlights the distinguishing tools of the 
Bourdieusian sociological approach, which refuses the methodological separation of ideas 
from structures.  
 
Background to the research question 
Scholars involved in international relations debate widely on the meaning of international 
relations. These discussions concentrate on the relations of political objects over time and 
history. In this aspect, the English School claims that international relations are the realm of 
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‘recurrence and repetition’.1 By contrast, constructivist approaches claim that international 
relations mean discontinuity, progress and change (Ruggie, 1993).2 These different 
perspectives and views do not only explain the roots of international relations, but also define 
the characteristics of the international system. Thus, when one defines what the meaning of 
international relations is, that person also defines the meanings, the roles (and scopes of rules) 
and the norms which identities of political actors are subject to. Therefore, it is not easy to 
define the identities of political subjects without clarifying their relational characteristics, 
which are derived from time and their historical processes.  
The defining characteristic of the modern international system of relations is based on 
the norm of sovereignty and the rule of mutual recognition. However, in line with the debate 
on the meanings of international relations, both how sovereignty emerged as the definitive 
characteristic of political subjectivity and how it will lose ground are controversial. According 
to the English School theorists, the historically grounded system of sovereign states describes 
the nature and rules of the system and how these rules repetitively evolve (Anderson & 
Hurrell, 2000). In the theorization of the English School, fundamentally, a principle is 
demanded by the system’s actors, and then it becomes more established. This more 
established principle gains a moral value, and it eventually becomes an object of a more 
constituted and formal convention (Linklater & Suganami, 2006). That is why the norms, 
agents and rules of the modern world history or the international system are subject to 
repetition and recurrence.3 As a result of this, the classical English School perspective tries to 
explain a formation of repetitive interactions between the political subjects within an 
international society rather than the formation of the political subject and its identity. 
In a similar way to the English School, realist and rationalist thinkers focus on the 
continuity and discontinuity of the system rather than on the identity of actors within the 
system. They generally explain the continuity or discontinuity of the system in terms of an 
                                               
1
 This is mostly claimed and supported by the English School scholars; for further information, see 
Linklater & Suganami (2006). 
2
 Also, some scholars claim that international relations is originally the area of change, but when it 
reaches a particular stage it transforms into the place of repetition as the end of history. For further information, 
see Fukuyama (1993). 
3
 It is important to mention that the English School thinkers do not all agree on the nature of norms and 
principles. For example, Bull separated Wight’s pure ‘recurrence and repetition’ and he sometimes implies the 
change in norms. For further information, see Anderson & Hurrell (2000). 
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‘identifiable regularity’ (Bartelson, 1995, p. 86), segmenting history, which produces 
practices according to sovereign subject and its knowledge. As long as the subjects/actors of 
the system think that rules of the system are necessary for their benefit, the system continues. 
If this regularity of rules or definition of sovereignty is not beneficial for the actors, 
discontinuity comes into existence. In a rationalist sense, change or continuity depends on 
material reasons. Originally, the modern state was divided into ‘internal’ and ‘international’ 
arenas, and it is theorized that ‘the internal’ is the place of security, and ‘the international’ is 
the place of anarchy (Pettman, 1996). This provides the state with a ‘mutually exclusive 
space’ (Ruggie, 1993 p. 151) in order to differentiate its own national identity from others’. In 
this way, the modern state constructs its ideational and identity-based domination within the 
territory. The state establishes its national interests as the common goods and missions for 
every citizen to reach. In order to reach and defend national interests, the modern state 
concretizes rules of power politics in institutions such as national security, national markets 
and national borders. In addition to the identity, rules and concrete institutions, the nation 
states also monopolize force and the right of violence (Tilly, 1985).  
Rational explanations do not rely on any moral constitution of norms and rules, and 
that is why they have significant deficiencies in explaining changes in norms, principles and 
rules. Institutional liberal thoughts generally try to overcome these moral deficiencies of 
realists. According to institutional liberals, because of a lack of institutionalization the system 
is subject to challenge and change. The challenge for certain norms changes in line with 
which set of norms is preferred (Krasner, 1999). Accordingly, the norms of a system may 
change when certain institutional and moral deficiencies exist. In this respect, the continuity 
of sovereignty, as a fundamental norm of the nation state system, depends on a certain set of 
expectations and institutions.4 Consequently, both realist and liberal rationalists define 
changes in international relations independently of identities of the system’s political subjects. 
More precisely, they do not focus on the existence of political subjectivity (or state identity in 
modern history) before a system of political relations forms institutions or rules to organize a 
definitive language of state subjectivity in international relations.  
In line with the constructivist cultural turn to the problem of identity in international 
relations (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996), the normative side of political subjectivity becomes a 
                                               
4
 Some scholars make a moral preference between the different kinds of sovereignty. For example, 
Krasner (1999) separates sovereignty as domestic independence, international legal and Westphalian 
sovereignty, and makes a moral preference that international legal sovereignty is better.  
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more prominent theme, which supposes potential normative changes and its effects on the 
objective relations of political subjects. Therefore, constructivists stress that the modern 
system of states is likely to progress to a stage of discontinuity and change. The shift between 
the modern nation state system and a postmodern system is not only related to players and 
‘the play of power politics but [also] of the stages on which that play is performed’ (Ruggie, 
1993, pp. 139–140). Originally, the state was based on the rights of legitimate sovereign-
based domination (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the legitimate domination of the state originated from a 
well-defined hierarchy of society, and the state provides common goods for all parts of this 
hierarchy (Guéhenno, 2000). This moral turn of constructivism considerably improved the 
questions on and interests in the formation of political identities and subjects. In this respect, 
the modern state does not only claim sovereignty for itself, but it also recognizes that other 
states have the same rights (Wight, 1977). Thus, the modern state forms its practices on the 
ground of mutual recognition. This ground guarantees that the state’s territory is free from 
outside intervention, except from the state’s own right to intervene within its territory. Mutual 
recognition between the states guarantees a legitimate state identity that is based on the 
socially constructed existence of sovereign norms. Therefore, the state’s sovereign identity 
will be legitimate as long as relations between states do not produce other norms to mutually 
define its political identity (Weber, 1995). The state and its identity, norms and institutions are 
only peculiarities of a particular time and place (Ibid.). As a result, states’ socially constructed 
identities are always subject to change in accordance with changing normative constructions 
of relations in international relations.  
An important question here is how to define political subjectivity which forms actors 
in international relations. From a Weberian perspective, the classical way is to refer to 
political subjectivity in the presence of state and its central governmental authority. Beyond 
this, the state also refers to a territorially identified related unit which is able to construct 
politico-institutional relations in international space (Buzan, 2008). However, the new 
dynamic process of globalization changed these conservative forms of political subjectivity 
regarding the state. State functionality is challenged by new kinds of political authorities, 
which form a new political subjectivity beyond state territorial borders. These new political 
authorities undermine state territorial unity at both the micro level within the state borders and 
the macro level beyond the territory. Indeed, in a similar way to the existing political 
subjectivity of family, clan or medieval king, a state-based political entity is always liable to 
change and erode (Bartelson, 2001). The state is only a specific type that identifies regularity 
in the modern historical term. Consequently, an understanding of political subjectivity refers 
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to a broader understanding in this research despite the fact that it will primarily put state 
identity at the centre of research as a historical narrative of the contemporary modern world. 
The state is certainly a determinative political identity of the modern era, but it is itself a 
substitution for a predecessor form of political subjectivity and it may in the future be 
substituted by a different political subjectivity in a new historical regularity.  
The question regarding how we can define the political subject prompts us to think 
about how we can define the political subject–structure relation, which is an essential aspect 
for understanding political identity in international relations. Discussions on agency–structure 
relations inevitably rely on an ontology regarding how agents define behaviours and actions. 
Theories mostly focus on two general resources of state behaviours. Structural approaches 
emphasize the material necessities and interests of agents, which form the main characteristics 
of agent–structure relations. Interactional approaches mostly depend on the activities of 
societies which produce ideas and shared thoughts. Therefore, ideational factors are 
fundamental for interactional approaches in international relations. Indeed, as is implied 
above, all of these characterization struggles within international relations theories must 
consider ontologies regarding the nature of the political subject. Some prioritize structure and 
think that agents are players whose identities are influenced by structure. Others give primacy 
to actors and think that agents are able to produce conscious ideas to govern their interactions 
with structures. Both approaches can be supported and refuted by many different practical 
examples in political subjects. More essentially, an ontological theorization of agency–
structure relations does not illustrate the intertwined coexistence of ideational and material 
factors in the bases of agent–structure relations. In this aspect, actors’ conscious ideational 
products may be influenced by structural material characteristics or vice versa.  
In order to understand agency–structure relations, it is plausible to think of different 
types of political subjectivities in a different historical period. These help us to understand the 
main peculiarity of all of these different subjectivities of political identity in different 
historical periods. When one looks at the common points of these different political subjects, 
from family and clan to state, they can realize that all of these subjects have originated from a 
fundamental norm characterized by sovereignty. Although sovereignty is defined in different 
forms, all political subjects inevitably have a sovereign space in which political identity is 
constructed. Therefore, it is plausible to say that continuation and change in political identity 
take place in accordance with fundamental norms of sovereignty. Any change in sovereign 
norms transforms political subjects, which shifts the existing identities and interests of the 
political subjects.  
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The construction of the political subject via sovereign norms is always followed by a 
construction of identity. Sovereign subjects try to understand themselves by looking at others 
in the same field. These observations are translated into normative behaviour schemas for 
political identity. These normative schemas are interpreted differently in different approaches. 
Rationalist approaches think that norms exist because they serve the interests of the state. 
Indeed, constructivists evaluate that, beyond the self-interests of political subject/state, norms 
become consciously bounded rules in a specific culture of identity because this gives 
legitimacy and recognition to the subjects (Katzenstein, 1996; Zehfuss, 2002). Therefore, 
constructivists consider norms not only as utilitarian tools for the state, but as an ideational 
and conscious consensus on the legitimate basis of political identity. In this way, sovereign 
subjects are subject to a kind of socialization process which creates common beliefs and 
norms regarding the interests of the political subject. The interactive process of sovereign 
subjects creates normative behaviour schemes which objectify the institutional embodiment of 
political identity (Tidy, 2012). Therefore, norms are an inseparable part of the definition of 
identity in constructivist approaches. Indeed, to have a political identity spontaneously 
improves certain norms, because every political identity is based on actions in accordance 
with expected behaviours which are constituted by norms (Shannon, 2000).  
In line with this involvement in political identities, definitions and contents of political 
identity have been an important issue of international relations approaches. In particular, after 
the constructivist rise in international relations there have been a number of definitions trying 
to explain how to understand state identity and its components. In Wendt’s theorization, 
identity is seen as a blueprint for states’ interests, which organizes styles of objective actions 
in the international field (Wendt, 1999). Wendt’s definition of identity is based on 
international factors beyond the internal existence of political identity. Wendt is generally not 
interested in internal clashes and situations, because he still contributes unit base 
characteristics of political subjectivity. Lynch also refers to the normative content of identity 
and argues that identity is a set of normative beliefs which objectifies the aims and interests of 
states in legitimate practical actions (Lynch, 1998). Barnett and Telhami refer to the 
interactional side of identity constructions. They think that identity is socially and corporately 
constructed in the process of interactions, which relies on functional productivity and the 
distinction of state apparatus (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). However, Guzzini and Leander 
criticize the definition of identity with external factors beyond the internal self-organization of 
the state. They claim that ‘states are internally structured processes that can persist even if 
they are not recognized by their fellow’ (Wendt, 2006, p. 205). They rely on differences 
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between the state systems and states and think that the interactional definition of states 
explains the state system but that the internal structure of states provides a spatial identity for 
themselves before external structures create differentiation from others. Lastly, some 
approaches indicate that the post-structural perspective evaluates state identity as a 
performative feature which should be reproduced continually by foreign policy. In this way, 
identity cannot create external relations before foreign policy defines the characteristics of 
identity (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011). Therefore, identity is a product of performances 
which is constituted by foreign policy practices.  
Another interesting aspect of political identity in international relations is the 
understanding of relations between state identity and national identity. In theory, national 
identity relies primarily on a social group of people who share the same historical 
experiences, culture, language, specific symbols of togetherness (Smith, 2008) or even a 
collective psychology which is derived from collective fears, sadness or victimization (László, 
2014). On the other hand, state identity is related to the existence of conscious knowledge 
regarding self and otherness. In other words, in order to define state identity, how a collective 
body defines its interest in relation to other collective bodies must be considered and, 
therefore, state identity is a product of interactive processes between the subjects (Zehfuss, 
2002). There are a couple of definitive characteristics which can be found in these 
approaches. In particular, national identity, referred to collectively, does not need to objectify 
itself via the existence of another national identity. The definition of national identity is 
mostly independent from a foundation of otherness. Besides this, national identity refers to the 
internal societal structure of a political community. However, state identity generally explains 
a position in international society which is related to external processes. Thus, state identity 
cannot be defined only by international norms and its interactive process because it is 
determined by how the state evaluates others and, simultaneously, how others describe the 
state.  
Theoretically, there is no certain consensus on whether state identity is formed by 
internal or external factors. In fact, internal factors rely on a common representation of self 
which is organized by dominant groups of the society of the particular state. External factors 
not only refer to common beliefs of self-representation but also emphasize international 
norms which illustrate how others interpret identity in interactive processes. However, state 
identity can only be objectified by particular actions. These actions also include determinants 
of states’ interests in relation to others. Internal elites or groups who define ideations for 
actions fundamentally aim to affect the external identity of the state by way of setting the 
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state’s preferred interests. On the other hand, external dimensions try to influence the internal 
interpretation of self via the shared or imposed normative tools. In practice, it is more 
plausible to see that internal and external dimensions of state identity are intertwined and 
mutually existent determinants of identity (Putnam, 1988; Alons, 2007). Prioritizing external 
or internal dimensions actually starts a vicious circle in structure–agency discussions. In this 
respect, this research aims to answer this intertwined existence of internal and external 
dimensions via a Bourdieusian ideation of structure and habitus engagement in the practical 
actions of political identity in the following parts. 
As both descriptive and normative discussions touch upon norms, rules and 
institutions of international relations, this thesis will draw upon the constructivist theoretical 
approach which offers important insights to the subject and allows for a rich and dynamic 
social context.5 Constructivists rely on not only the material world, but also ideational 
meanings and interpretations of the material world, because the material world is organized 
by means of human actions that are based on an ideational interpretation of the material world 
(Adler, 1997; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). As Alexander Wendt explains, ‘material resources 
only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which 
they are embedded’ (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). This means that the world is not based on a static 
reality, but the reality is continually reconstructed by the identities, interests and ideations of 
political actors, which shape actions and interactions (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). Thus, the 
norms are constituted and they change in accordance with the political actors’ interests, 
identity construction and interpretation of the material world.  
In general, there are three fundamental assumptions of constructivism that help to 
understand the construction of state identity and its normative aspect: ideas and interpretations 
are important to understand the real world; interests and actions are determined by identities; 
and ‘agents and structures are mutually constituted’ (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 266–267). 
Firstly, ‘ideas – understood more generally as collective knowledge, institutionalised in 
practices – are the medium and propellant of social action’ (Adler, 2005, p. 94). That is why 
this thesis examines the role and influence of ideas within the emerging norms of structures in 
international relations. In this respect, ideas are fundamental to understanding sovereignty, as 
the constitutive norms of modern world, and the material world where sovereignty practises. 
                                               
5
 For an overview of the rise of constructivist international relations theory, see Reus-Smit (2001a). 
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In this aspect, ideas, interpretations and self-understanding are very important to 
understanding how norms and constructed identities are reproduced.  
Secondly, as the project of modernity, state identity is seen as identical to the identity 
of the nation.6 In line with the constructivist theorization, these national identities are not 
stabilized forms, but rather they are reproduced in accordance with the new interpretations 
and interests in new material environments. That is why, in contradiction with the rational 
theories,7 there is no fixed international structure based on state sovereignty or an advanced 
institutional composition for agents (Reus-Smit, 2001c). National interests, institutional 
representations and structures are subject to change. Interests are the products of a certain 
material composition in which identities reproduce. This means that material changes result in 
changes within the state’s interests that mean a shift in the social preferences because 
‘material facts acquire meaning only through human cognition and social interaction’ 
(Finnemore, 1996b, p. 6). In order to construct modern state identity, states have produced 
numerous boundaries and these boundaries are strengthened by concrete borders and the 
notion of nation (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). This means that the state produces and 
reproduces a fixed definition of nation in terms of internal and international boundaries in 
order to ‘distinguish a specific political community – the inside – from all others – the 
outside’ (Doty 1996, p. 122).8 These boundaries are constructed by sovereignty, as a supreme 
internationally recognized norm, which is a definitive element of the whole structure. Without 
sovereign rights, the modern state never constitutes its legitimacy as the possessor of a certain 
national identity. Thus, representation of sovereignty is crucial to forming an objective reality 
on which the boundaries are constructed in order to legitimize the right of state sovereignty 
(Ashley & Walker, 1990). For example, in contemporary world, the modern state has been 
losing its legitimacy in some arenas such as humanitarian space. Thus, normative changes in 
international relations continually reinterpret and change the definition of political subjects 
and its identity construction.  
Thirdly, ‘just as social structures are dependent upon and therefore constituted by the 
practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal powers and interests of those agents, 
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 For further discussion, see Barkin & Cronin (1994).  
7
 For these rationalist claims, see Waltz (1993) and Keohane (1989). 
8
 Meanwhile, importantly, the de-constructivist theorists claim that one needs to think the genealogy of 
the normative justification and ontological construction of sovereignty. For further information, see Bartelson 
(1995). 
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are constituted and therefore explained by structures’ (Wendt, 1987, p. 359). Because of this 
mutual construction between structures and identities, norms vary, change and transform into 
new forms in accordance with interpretations and interests of agents.9 As Katzenstein 
described, 
The authors use the concept of norm to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of 
actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an 
actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize 
a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of 
an already defined identity. In such instances norms have ‘regulative’ effects that specify standards of 
proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, 
or they do both. (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5)  
The modern state constituted its identity by way of monopolizing some functions of structure, 
and it regulated behaviours by means of these monopolizations. In order to construct national 
identity, the modern state firstly eliminated other centres of violence and constructed its 
monopoly of violence as an internationally recognized norm (Thomson, 1994). Besides this, it 
had the right of taxation in order to establish a bureaucracy and armies (Linklater, 1996), 
which are operational functions of states used to construct conscious interactions with other 
states on the bases of a definitive rule of sovereignty. Thirdly, the state has a monopolistic 
role to define political identity, social separation and otherness. Lastly, the state monopolizes 
the legal borders of its society by way of the law (Ibid.).  
The constructivist theoretical positions also characterize changes of social structures 
beyond materialist structural repetition. According to the constructivist theorization, ‘social 
structures have three elements: material resources, shared knowledge, and practices’ (Wendt, 
1995, p. 73). Power was originally considered a product of the modern state’s physical 
capacity, but modes of information have become the most important elements of power 
consideration (Ibid.). As a result, the modern state identity is defined by a ‘bifurcation in 
which the state-centric system now coexist with an equally powerful, though more 
decentralised, multi-centric system’ (Rosenau, 1990, p. 11), which gets it free from classical 
definitions of interests, anarchy, borders and the sovereignty of rationalism. Besides this, the 
classical relation between territoriality and political subject/state is changing in accordance 
with normative changes in the definition of sovereign subjects. For example, ‘the right to 
environmental protection … requires the action of institutions that transcend the nation states, 
                                               
9
 For a good discussion on this subject, see Wendt (1994). 
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which are incapable of effectively guaranteeing them’ (Rocco & Selgas, 2006, p. 146). In this 
respect, the ‘transnationalisation of life … requires the use of means that go beyond the 
national state … [therefore] environmental rights cannot be understood outside a transnational 
context’ (Ibid, p. 145).  
More essentially, in the constructivist agenda, the ‘identities, interests and behaviour 
of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings and interpretations and 
assumptions about the world’ (Adler, 1997, p. 324). Therefore, in order to understand how 
identity is constructed, norms are the fundamental elements to research. The modern nation 
state system is based on a fundamental norm called sovereignty (Reus-Smit, 1997). 
Sovereignty depends on recognition within determined concrete borders, which are governed 
by a totalized notion called nation. Institutions are based on defined norms and principles in 
which the identity of a particular institution is rooted (Reus-Smit, 1999). Norms do not only 
define and legitimate the institutions, but they also define the rightful actions of institutions 
(Ibid.). Thus, there is no certain rational principle to idealize the nation state and its totalizing 
identity. In this respect, every identity creates its own structure and actors in line with a 
defined set of rules and norms.  
Contrary to the realist and rationalist theorization, identity creation seeks to reproduce 
and transform the structures (Wendt, 1994) from the early point of the modern state to the 
contemporary world. In particular, the construction of identity can be originated from 
domestic or international society (Ibid.). However, according to the constructivist approach it 
is not persuasive to seek a concrete difference between internal and international identity 
creation. Thus, the state’s identity and interests are created and transformed in line with the 
corporate coexistence and influence of internal and international structures. In the early period 
of the modern state, as the dichotomy between the internal and international increased, the 
identity creation of the state gradually became an exclusionary process (Linklater, 1998). 
Historically, formations of norms and identity have always had a totalizing character that 
wants to include and transform all the actors of the system. In this way, the identity and 
constitutional norms of the system have been transformed in accordance with the expectations 
of the state system in the modern state era. Firstly, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the Christian community, which was based on heterogenic and disorganized institutions, 
gradually transformed into the sovereign rights of monarch and its unity. The main 
institutional basis of this transformation was achieved by the Treaty of Westphalia, which 
determined the fundamental norms of the state system (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). In this 
way, the non-intervention of sovereign states became a fundamental norm of the state system. 
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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the absolutist rights of monarchs were replaced by 
the positivist rights of the nation and the homogenous nation-state identity (Reus-Smit, 1997). 
The formation of identity gradually created a new set of norms regarding sovereignty and 
recognition. The recognition of national borders and the absolute control of nations within 
their borders became fundamental rules of the nation state system. Although the provision of 
the Wien Conference tried to defend the status quo, the institutions inevitably complied with 
the norms of state sovereignty and identity of the nation state. In this way, the interests of 
nation states became more important than anything else. In the same way, in the first period of 
the twentieth century, the institutional improvements were in accordance with the nation state 
system of sovereignty. The principle of self-determination was a concrete implementation of 
the norms and identities of the sovereign nation state system. Interestingly, although some 
normative and humanitarian improvements, such as the Hague codifications and the abolition 
of slavery, were carried out, nation state identity was still determined and strong in that 
historical period. That is why the state still had the unrestricted right to decide how it behaved 
towards its citizens in the early twentieth century.10  
After the Second World War, the normative bases of the nation state system 
transformed considerably. The interests of the state became no longer the primary or sole 
motivation of states, but instead many other things, such as human security and human rights, 
became definitive characteristics in the international field.11 For instance, after the Second 
World War, for the first time in history a nation was legally sentenced for genocide. This was 
not the first example of genocide in history, but there was no recognized norm for sanctions. 
However, after the declaration of the UN Genocide Convention, genocide was no longer seen 
as an internal problem for sovereign states and it was deemed a crime. Crimes against 
humanity were recognized and offenders were sentenced by an international court. Here, the 
developing political subjectivity of globalization is being practised without having a global 
government. The term ‘international community’ has often been repeated, and its power has 
been increasing compared to national identities. To sum up, moral and structural changes 
continually transform the identity of political subjects/states into different moral and 
normative bases. Consequently, how to define the identity of political subjects and to 
understand how to change these political identities are still vivid and ongoing questions to 
answer in international relations.    
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 For further information, see Finnemore (1996a). 
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 For further information, see Donnelly (1995). 
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Aims of this thesis 
This thesis proposes to use Bourdieusian thoughts in order to rethink state identity – or, more 
broadly in a historical context, the identity of the political subject in accordance with the 
research question identified above. In doing so, it has two fundamental aims:  
To utilize Bourdieusian terminology in order to improve a structural constructivist 
approach that contributes continuation and change in the identity of political subjectivity in 
international relations. 
In accordance with this aim, this thesis offers a conceptual framework which aims to 
show the mutual and relatively equal existence of structure and ideation in the formation of 
the identities of political subjects. In this way, I try to utilize key Bourdieusian terminology to 
understand the intertwined foundation of objective and normative structures in state identity. 
By looking at the state as a social entity, I pursue the idea that states are social entities 
embodying certain cultural and social capital which link them to certain structural spaces. In a 
similar way to the individuals in a society, this study focuses on how states are affected by the 
embodiment of existing historical structures rather than the structure in which they live. In 
this way, I try to reinterpret the meaning of violence in international relations. Therefore, this 
study puts great emphasis on the construction of violence. Beyond the rationalist and 
constructivist understanding of anarchy, this study aims to theorize that the identity of state is 
exposed to symbolic or non-physical violence rather than the physical existence of violence. 
By evaluating the state as a social entity, I have translated a Bourdieusian understanding of 
dominance and hierarchy, which helps me to characterize symbolic violence and the 
differentiation of state positional distribution in international relations. This perspective also 
helps us to define the meaning and style of continuation and change in the characteristics of 
political subjects. In particular, I attempt to research the foundation of norms and symbolic 
violence relation which maintains and changes the characteristics of hierarchy and 
dominance. 
To contribute and develop existing constructivist understanding of state/political 
subject via Bourdieusian sociology and terminology.  
In fact, a constructivist approach has made considerable contributions via 
comprehensively evaluating and emphasizing state identity as an important element to 
understand the nature of international relations and the changes in this nature. However, there 
are some weaknesses in the theoretical orientation of constructivism which can be achieved 
by a Bourdieusian perspective. Constructivism is mainly based on a state awareness regarding 
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its ideational production, which creates interactions and norms in international relations. 
Social interactions do not promise a comprehensive answer to the dilemma of the existence of 
anarchy and norms simultaneously. Indeed, how to form awareness-creating ideas and norms 
are an uncertain point in the constructivist evaluation. At the least, without a self-reflective 
look at the state and its own identities it is ambiguous whether the state’s awareness is 
independent from any structural causation. States’ normative beliefs are organized by social 
interactions, but a historical and structural distribution of state positions does not provide an 
international field which depends on equal and similar conditions for the creation of conscious 
ideas. Indeed, the identity of the state cannot create something beyond the sum of its potential 
ideational arsenal, which is bordered in a Bourdieusian understanding by its habitus. 
Therefore, the existence of anarchy may be a more cultural and social metaphor beyond the 
awareness of state identity. At this point, Bourdieu provides us with some theoretical tools to 
understand the unconscious historical foundation of anarchy in the process of conscious 
identity construction. This point is explained by constructivists, who claim that the existence 
of anarchical characteristics of the international system depends on a degree of internalization 
regarding norms. Because of the lack of a self-reflective mechanism regarding identity, state 
internalization is most likely to require a structural constructivist approach which reflects the 
intertwined relations of identity, anarchy and norms in a more comprehensive way.  
Beside this, Bourdieu contributes a constructivist identity study by way of improving 
ambiguity about change in state identity. Explaining the change in identities via social 
interactions does not reflect the whole characteristics of changes in international relations. 
Constructivists generally emphasize collective cognitive processes, which leads to norms that 
create institutional changes in practices. Despite the collective cognitive process, the existence 
and risks of anarchy impair the understanding of changes in identity construction. Here, 
Bourdieu also provides a good resource to distinguish the cognitive processes from the 
existence of the restricted habitual arsenal of states. Bourdieu reminds us that not every actor 
in the same society has the same subjective infrastructure to join the same cognitive learning 
process and channels. More precisely, subjects of international society objectively participate 
the same cognitive normative process, but they cannot have the same degree of cognitive 
embedded knowledge, which results in differentiation of awareness. Indeed, there are two 
main tendencies to explain cognitive normative processes in the constructivist ideation. One 
way is for international society to form norms which define and change state identities. 
Secondly, internal societal evaluations of state subject shape the identity of states in 
international society. Bourdieu sits in between these two constructivist explanations and helps 
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us to understand the intrinsic coexistence of internal and international society in state identity. 
Indeed, Bourdieu combines constructed effects of international society and historical 
structural processes of internal society in order to theorize the identification and changes of 
state political identity in international relations.  
  
Methodology 
This research is divided into two logical stages, which are researched throughout the six 
chapters. The first stage of this thesis is the understanding of the theoretical and 
terminological applicability of Bourdieu, especially his symbolic capital concept, to the field 
of political identity and subjectivity in international relations. The second stage is the 
interpretation of relations between the construction of political subjectivity, especially state 
identity and different types of capital, as political, economic, cultural and social capital 
respectively. In the first stage, I try to discuss generally all of Bourdieu’s relevant theoretical 
materials, which help us to understand the identity of political subjectivity in international 
relations in distinctive ways. In the second stage, I focus on the specific theoretical orientation 
of identity, capital and field relations. In this way, I support my theoretical research with 
conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis contributes to this research by making a meaningful 
explanation of the formation of categorization, vision and division of identity. Therefore, in 
each specific chapter of the second stage, I critically apply different methodological concepts 
that are practically interconnected with each other. The reason why I rely on conceptual 
analyses and combine conceptual analysis with my theoretical analysis is that perspectives are 
important, such as in the following statement: 
[Identity is] an actor’s experience of a category, tie, role, network, group or organization, coupled with a 
public representation of that experience; often takes the form of a shared story, a narrative. (Tilly, 1996, 
p. 7)  
Identity is a categorization and division which promotes and imposes a representation of 
collective history in the experiences of previous subjects in the former structural divisions. 
Therefore, this study’s emphasis regarding how a vision of division in political subjectivity, 
particularly in modern state identity, is produced is related to an unconscious representation of 
previous structures into the collective bodies of states. This hypothesis relies on structural 
deficiencies which create epistemological and discursive inadequacies between political 
subjects regarding the self-reflexivity of their divisions in identities which will be discussed in 
this dissertation. In order to focus on how to produce relevant transition from the sociological 
terminology of Bourdieu to the constitutive terminology of Bourdieusian international 
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relations, I consider the interrelations between objective structures and subjective structures of 
Bourdieu, which indicate an intertwined cohabitation of dispositions in the field. Following 
this, these general practice of Bourdieusian theory is transferred into specific fields of capital 
production which define the characteristics of produced identity. In this way, I theoretically 
examine the validity of Bourdieusian terminology within the specific capital allocation of 
identity. Lastly, I research how a methodological concept subjectively produces and 
reproduces a distinctive sense of vision and division in different fields of capital. 
Another methodological differentiation in the stages of this research is based on how 
the distinction of Bourdieu is defined in the description of state identity in international 
relations. The first theoretical stage fundamentally discusses the descriptive part of Bourdieu 
in identity understanding. This study defends the idea that Bourdieusian study in international 
relations is very productive theoretical ground for understanding the representation of political 
subjectivity in international relations. In relation to this presupposition, I present all 
Bourdieusian terminology in this part. I critically conduct a study to illustrate how Bourdieu 
helps to produce a distinctive explanation of the key issues in international relations, such as 
the agency–structure problem and the representation of identity. Therefore, I test the 
applicability of some important terminology regarding symbolic capital in international 
relations. In this way, this stage theoretically reconsiders the agency and structure problem of 
international relations through a Bourdieusian lens.  
The second stage is based on the prescriptive side of the research. I critically discuss 
the Bourdieusian concept of capital in relation to construction and change in the political 
subjectivity of state identity. It aims to achieve a prescriptive account in international relations 
theory regarding how to define the political subject, how to construct identities, how to 
understand relations between structure and ideas and how to interpret the vision and division 
of states in international relations. Therefore, in this prescriptive stage I not only work on how 
to produce political identity and political subjectivity but also focus on how and in what 
conditions the identities of political agents transform. I reconsider the existence of domination 
in international relations. Contrary to existing positivist international relations, I theorize how 
domination is embedded in symbolic pre-existing divisions in the produced rules of 
international relations. In other words, the study focuses on embedded division in the 
positions of states and its symbolic reproduction in domination beyond the conscious 
interpretive and structural consideration of power and its domination in the formation of 
interests and ideas. 
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The theoretical background of both stages is based on the social constructivist ideation 
of identities and political subjects, especially states in international relations. However, the 
study does not scrutinize the constructivist paradigm as the theoretical otherness of 
Bourdieusian study of international relations. Rather, particularly in the first stage, I critically 
review social constructivism in order to see the potential weaknesses in the structure and 
agency problem which show similarity with ontological engagements of structural theories. 
Therefore, I consider Bourdieusian international relations as an approach which overcomes 
the ambiguities of social constructivism. In particular, the first part describes the embedded 
existence of symbolic violence, which produces a distinctive approach beyond the existence 
of anarchy as an ontological presupposition of both constructivist and structural theories. In 
line with the main objective of this study, I research the potential of a structural constructivist 
approach in international relations. In the first part, I give descriptive elements of what a 
structural constructivist approach distinctively produces in international relations. In the 
second part, I highlight the practical productivity of Bourdieu’s structural constructivism via 
specific engagements with methodological concepts. In the second stage, chapters of political, 
economic, cultural and social capital are researched with the contribution of globalization, 
neoliberalism, democratization and developing state concepts. These concepts are logically 
chosen because they have an intertwined coexistence. In this way, I rely on a broader 
methodological concept of globalization in the third chapter and, in the following chapters, I 
use a more particular methodological concept in accordance with that of the previous chapter. 
In the second chapter of my thesis, I offer my readings of the understanding of 
Bourdieusian structure with the aim of developing an account of what distinguishes his 
understanding of structure from the other perspectives and of how his approach improves 
understanding of identity in international relations. The chapter begins with an evaluation of 
the constructivist impact on the definition of identity and the ontological dilemma of this 
definition, in which I discuss that Bourdieu improves the ontological deficiency of identity 
definition by way of his structural constructivist perspective. I illustrate how Bourdieu 
distinguishes the understanding of structure by way of his theorization with regards to the 
production of dispositions. I discuss that the qualification of identity constitution is created by 
the values embedded within the dispositions before the agents constitute constructive 
objective relations in the field. In this way, I question the value and reliability of ideas in the 
creation of identities. I research what takes a prominent role in the determination of identities. 
The claim that constitutive values and inter-subjective ideas construct dispositions is 
questioned, because a Bourdieusian understanding of structure proves that a structural 
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dependent history of dispositions affects how agents produce their interrelations and ideas. 
Then I turn to rethink the essential impacts of misrecognition from a Bourdieusian 
perspective, which rejects the conscious control of produced ideas because the agents in less 
dominated positions always lack a reflexive understanding of self.  
Then I turn to the concept of structuring and structured structures, arguing that both 
structures have an intertwined coexistence on the definition of state identity. I illustrate how 
Bourdieu understands subjects and structure relations which question objective and subjective 
differentiations. I consider how Bourdieu theorizes reality and misrecognition relations via 
illusio, and considers the embodiment of accumulated structural history as norms and shared 
ideas in which objective–subjective differentiation are rendered invisible. Then I focus how 
structured structures function as the base of division and classification of identities. In this 
way, I research the productive power of structured structures on the productions of symbolic 
capital. In particular, I indicate its functionalization on the unequal distribution of habitus 
between the agents, which results in positional differentiation in the international field. Then I 
emphasize the mutual cooperation of recognition and structured structures in international 
relations. I emphasize that value creates itself spontaneously when the agents struggle to 
achieve a certain kind of capital or its doxic relations. In this way, I aim to show how to 
distribute distinction in line with structured values of structures. I try to reach an 
understanding of how a classification mechanism objectifies itself through the domination of 
produced symbolic capital.  
Then I turn my attention to the symbolic power of identity. This is the variety of 
thought that indicates how collectiveness and its collective subjectivity, in which cognitive 
process and its interests are objectified, are created. Therefore, I focus on the functionalization 
of symbolic capital as means of collectivizing domination. I examine how certain domination 
determines itself in the predisposed symbolic capital of agents. Further, in order to emphasize 
the spontaneous embodiments of dominant symbolic violence into the identities of agents, I 
show how symbolic violence is unconsciously represented as objectified forms of doxa within 
the international field. In this way, I set out the engagement between the structural effects of 
accumulated history and the divisionary characteristics of symbolic violence into the 
organizational bases of international relations. I show that the subjectivity of identity has a 
pre-given nature which is characterized within the field via an objectified form of common 
knowledge – or, as Bourdieu named it, doxa. I introduce how political identities embody 
values of structured domination. Ultimately, I try to show the arbitrariness of production of 
symbolic power, which forms values of categorization that shape the definition of identities.  
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Then, drawing on Bourdieu’s ideas, I develop my argument on political identity and 
change. Firstly, I look at the construction of modernity and its state identity. I discuss how 
modernity transformed the previous interpretation of political subjectivity in international 
field. Secondly, I observe how the state’s political identity transforms into different forms 
beyond the theorization and institutionalization of modernity. Thus, I go beyond the 
perspectives which claim that state identity is an objectification of sovereignty or power 
relations which are produced by relations of states. I consider the identification of state 
identity as a fraction of capital accumulation. The accumulation of existing structural 
symbolic power essentially affects the transformative production of identity. In this way, I 
discuss the construction of modern state identity in line with symbolic power and a symbolic 
capital understanding of Bourdieu. Then I turn my attention to the discussions of how the 
symbolic capital of modernity loses ground in defining the subjectivity of states in the 
contemporary international field. I conceptualize how to define political identification beyond 
modernity. Therefore, I research differentiations in descriptive symbolic orientation within 
contemporary international relations. In particular, I observe transformations in the 
institutionalization of sovereignty in contemporary international relations, which create 
ungovernable zones for the classical understanding of state identity and its subjectivity. As a 
result, I argue that new transitions of capital allocation distinguish the distribution of state 
identities.  
From this, I establish my concept of the international field. Firstly, I discuss how a 
Bourdieusian understanding of the field is a relevant conceptualization in order to define the 
international field of politics. I argue that field and habitus engagements illustrate how to 
construct realities in international relations. I find that, even though political identity and 
political subjects differ, they always produce similar forms of habitus and field engagements 
in order to produce a categorization of identity. I observe that the transformation of political 
subjectivity represents a different interpretation of identity within a more complex field of 
relations. A different expression of political subjectivity always produces its unique practical 
field, which distributes identities in line with a predisposed nobility of domination. Therefore, 
I discuss that the representation quality of certain political collectiveness, such as modern 
state identity, depends on characteristics of accumulated capital which objectify compatibility 
between accumulated capital allocations and structured nobility in the international field. 
Then, I focus on how the field credits and produces certain realities. I objectify the production 
of realities via discussions on how to define security within different state identities. I try to 
show that the understanding of security creates different roles in accordance with the 
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positional distribution of identities. Eventually, I conclude this stage by expressing how 
Bourdieusian study creates a distinguishing understanding of identity in international 
relations. In this respect, I argue that Bourdieu refuses duality in objective and subjective 
structures, indicates the pre-given nature of habitus beyond social interactions and 
constructions, represents embedded nobility within the socio-cultural field of practices and 
theorizes how domination subjectively reproduces itself within the identity of subjects, which 
shows us how transformation come into existence despite the existence of domination.  
In the third chapter, firstly I provide a reinterpretation of debates with regards to 
theory and practice relations in international relations, and focus on Bourdieusian theory and 
practice in comparison, especially, with the existing constructivist perspective in international 
relations. I also discuss how to understand the relations between history and nature and the 
subjects of political identity. In this way, I lead to arguments which conceptualize how 
collectivization on the basis of identities creates its own understanding of self-limitation. 
Therefore, the chapter begins by arguing the compatibility between an understanding of self-
limitation and an understanding of reality or objectivity in the international field. I logically 
contribute the idea that a good compatibility between self-limitation and artificial realities 
results in a good distribution of stability in the objective world. I note that there is an 
inseparable mutual existence between common sense reality and recognized membership of 
the international field. I then rethink relations of power and the political field, which produce 
bases of legitimacy in international relations. I rely on a Bourdieusian understanding of 
power–field relations, which indicates that power is a relational phenomenon. I note that such 
an understanding of power is related to definitions of interests in international relations, but 
argue that these interests not only depend on objective forms but also include subjective 
socio-cultural knowledge and interests simultaneously. In following this, I consider in detail 
the definition of the political field in international relations. Before I go on to make a 
conceptual discussion, I also discuss the problem of reflexivity and definition of the 
bureaucratic field in international relations via a Bourdieusian understanding of reflexivity. In 
particular, I note that the importance of the bureaucratic field in international relations is 
generally overseen by the theory of international relations.  
In the conceptual part of the third chapter I engage with globalization and symbolic 
violence. Here, I represent a reading of the Bourdieusian habitus approach as a moderator of 
the forms of symbolic capital which produce domination via a reproduction of inequality, 
anarchy and legitimacy in international relations. I argue how globalization changes 
structured doxic relation beyond symbolic violence of modernity. The globalizing 
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representation of political subjectivity is theoretically constructed as emancipation from 
inequality and stratification, but in practice it redefines the existing symbolic violence of 
modernity within a wider spatial field of practice. Then I discuss the objectification of 
globalization within neoliberal institutionalization. In this way, I aim to show how 
globalization produces a new historicizing process beyond modern state subjectivity. In the 
final text, I discuss the characteristics of the new bureaucratic field of globalization. I define 
the characteristics of relations between the new bureaucratic field and the political field in the 
globalizing process. I research the differentiation of institutionalizations between the modern 
identity of the state and a globalizing identity of political subjectivity. Essentially, I argue that 
globalization tries to impose new forms of legitimization which impair the legitimate roots of 
modern identity distribution in international relations. Finally, I consider how globalization 
produces norms which change the doxic relations of states in international relations.  
In chapter four, I move away from the existing study of international political 
economy in order to consider the economic field via a Bourdieusian study of economic 
capital. Drawing on the contemporary constructivist engagement of international political 
economy, I argue that Bourdieusian structural constructivism can improve the existing 
understanding of constructivist political economy in international relations. Therefore, my 
arguments here focus on the similarities of the Bourdieusian and constructivist understandings 
of political economy and the distinction of the Bourdieusian economic field beyond the 
constructivist economy. I firstly rely on the constructivist perspective, which sees the 
economic field as a result of the creation processes of social engagements. Thus, 
constructivists do not theorize any rationality. Rather, the economic field depends on a 
collective understanding of relations. As a result, I argue that interpretations of the economic 
field in constructivist political economy are as important as the factual objective data of the 
economy. In line with this, I discuss a constructivist understanding of agency in accordance 
with political capital. Constructivism thinks that agents are not simple implementers of 
objective interests which are defined beyond their own ideas and identities. Rather, agents are 
active creators of their interests in accordance with their knowledge of interactions. Following 
this, I develop my claims on a distinction of the Bourdieusian economic field. I firstly discuss 
why Bourdieu questions the interactionist emphasis of economic capital. He claims that the 
structured existence of accumulated history always influences the institutionalization of 
economic capital. Then I discuss how Bourdieu understands norms distinctively beyond social 
construction. In this way, I consider the habitual tendencies of agents within the political field 
of international relations. In line with Bourdieu, I argue that embedded form of culture is an 
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inseparable part of the economic field, which imposes the effects of structured structures onto 
the identity of states. Indeed, I discuss how embedded subjective capital and its culture 
produce doxic reflexes from agents or states. And, finally, Bourdieusian economic capital 
questions interpretations of agents because the habitus of agents impairs the subjectivity of 
agents on their thoughts.  
Then I turn to considering the conceptual side of economic field via neoliberalism. I 
start by considering how self-limitation and a sense of reality are produced in the economic 
field. In this way, my main objective is to illustrate how neoliberalism changes the sense of 
limits in modern state identity and how it produces new realities which are objectified by the 
institutionalization of neoliberal economic capital. I critically engage the changing vision and 
division of neoliberalism, which transform the stratification of political subjectivity in 
international relations. Then I exemplify this transformation of neoliberal policies via an 
objective institutional observation of the international political field. Following this, I 
consider how neoliberalism changes territoriality understanding of modernity. Firstly, I give 
relevant discussions on the topic, such as homogenization, glocalization12 and hybridization, 
which consider how neoliberal expansion conceptualizes the economic field. In line with 
Bourdieu, I provide an alternative understanding of neoliberalism and territoriality 
understanding based on a re-collectivization of the political subject beyond a modern 
understanding of territoriality. Lastly, I conclude this chapter with discussions on how 
neoliberalism impairs existing states’ collective borders and identities. The social side of 
states’ modern collectiveness is seen as the otherness of neoliberalism. Therefore, 
neoliberalism firstly impairs social democracy understanding of modernity.  
Chapter five follows the general structure of the thesis and researches cultural capital 
in international relations. The chapter opens with the characteristics and definition of cultural 
capital from a Bourdieusian perspective. I critically engage the functionality of cultural capital 
in the production and reproduction of political subjectivity of modern state identity. I try to 
show how a Bourdieusian perspective of cultural capital produces a distinctive approach 
between structural and constructivist approaches. Then I discuss the fundamental norms of the 
Westphalian system in accordance with my argument of cultural capital in international 
relations. In this way, I argue that cultural capital is free from the produced knowledge of 
                                               
12
 The term means the simultaneous and intertwined presences of localization and globalization. It 
indicates that globalisation can be integrated into the local values peacefully. For more information, Robertson 
(1995) 
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common sense in the subjective identities of states. In line with this, I question the 
fundamental constructivist understanding of sovereignty, legitimacy and morality. I question 
how states, as collective agencies of modernity, become conscious regarding their produced 
knowledge and identities and how cultural capital defines the value of identity between the 
agencies of the international field. In this respect, I argue that cultural capital fundamentally 
substitutes the role of morality in international relations. Then I discuss the intertwined 
relations of common sense and domination in line with cultural capital. Following this, I 
emphasize the function of cultural capital on the determination of the categorization and 
division of positions between states.  
Following this, I research how cultural capital functions as a mechanism of 
transformation in international relations. Although a Bourdieusian engagement of cultural 
capital is seen as a very static representation of reproduction, I argue that the cultural capital 
approach simultaneously also embodies the relevant functionalization of transformation. Then 
I reconsider Bourdieusian forms of cultural capital within the study of international relations. 
In this way, I trace the embodied, objectified and institutionalized cultural capital in the 
international field. Embodied cultural capital is fundamentally related to the distributions of 
positions in international relations. Alongside this, I propose that the objectified cultural 
capital of the international field depends on the existence of international law, which creates a 
functionalization of the vision and division of state identities. Lastly, I consider 
institutionalized cultural capital in accordance with produced agreements and regimes of 
international relations. Then I indicate how dominance produces itself via a production of 
legitimacy in international relations. Indeed, I discuss how legitimacy becomes the battlefield 
of domination which constitutes the characteristics of recognized subjectivity in international 
relations. Finally, the chapter closes with a conceptual methodological engagement of the 
understanding of democratization. In this way, I consider democratization in order to practise 
the findings of the chapters regarding cultural capital in international relations.  
In chapter six, I introduce what social capital is and explain how I can apply social 
capital in international relations. I begin with an introductory summary of the concept of 
social capital because social capital is explained in distinctive ways within social sciences. In 
specifically engaging with a constructivist understanding of social capital, I try to rethink 
what social agents struggle to achieve in order to gain legitimacy within the field of 
collectiveness. Then I apply a Bourdieusian conceptualization of agency in order to 
understand how agents produce their sense of belonging in the common field of practice. 
These explanations are followed by considerations of how Bourdieusian social capital creates 
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a distinction to identify the political identities of states within the international field. In this 
way, I try to find out how Bourdieu is distinguished from a constructivist understanding of 
identity construction in international relations. I discuss the roles of habitus beyond conscious 
ideas and ideologies. I note that having an identity inevitably imposes a certain vision and 
division within the field, but the motivation of agents regarding the demand for legitimacy 
creates a misrecognition regarding the self-cate gorizing function of identity construction. In 
this way, I presuppose that the state is a social entity which has its own characteristics and 
personality. Following this supposition, I discuss the inequality of social capital distribution 
among the states, and the functionalization of social capital as a set of obligations for 
recognition.  
In the remaining parts of the last chapter, I indicate further descriptive research on 
social capital and state identity relations. I focus in detail on how social capital functions as a 
producer of inequality between the theoretically equal identities of states. Here I note that 
there is a positive correlation between the accumulation of social capital and the stabilization 
of denomination in the field. In this way, I indicate that social capital is a value which creates 
stratified forms of positions in field. These differentiated forms of positions guarantee the 
domination because dominated identities of states define their positions in accordance with 
positions of domination. I then examine the potential of Bourdieusian social capital in 
international relations via the developing state concept. Essentially, I research how developing 
state identities and positions are defined in the international field. I focus on the advancement 
of developing states regarding the accumulation of social capital because it shows the links 
between a lack of social capital and the definition of positions within the international field. 
Finally, I discuss how a lack of social capital weakens the networking qualification of 
developing states in international relations. 
 
Significance of study 
I believe that analysing Bourdieusian study and his terminology in international relations is an 
original way of studying the political subjectivity of states. There are few, primitive, studies 
examining Bourdieu in international relations, and these have attempted to discuss whether 
Bourdieu is appropriate to apply in international relations. Thus, this study is one of the 
earliest attempts to propose Bourdieusian study as a relevant and innovative resource for 
international relations theory, and to transfer his terminology into the international relations 
field. Consequently, this study seeks grounds for the potential of a structural constructivist 
approach through a Bourdieusian lens beyond social constructivist perspectives. This study 
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believes that Bourdieusian structural constructivism improves the ontological ambiguities of 
constructivist approaches with regards to anarchy in international relations. Besides this, this 
study strongly discusses that Bourdieusian studies in international relations can potentially 
answer many dichotomies and chronic questions such as theory–practice engagements and 
objective and subjective structure differentiation within the field of international relations. 
Furthermore, I believe that this study will be theoretically innovative in understanding not 
only the production and reproduction of political subjects and identities but also changes in 
political subjectivity. It is, therefore, hoped that this study will offer new theoretical 
expansions within the field of international relations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
IDEATIONAL CAPITAL AND IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Structures 
Just as identity lies at the heart of sociological research regarding the formation of social 
groups, political identities are instrumental in dominating the interpretation of political 
subjectivity. There are a lot of discussions and identifications, yet these raise difficulties in 
understanding how political identities empower the parallel mobilization of its subjects in the 
field of politics. As outlined in the previous chapter, constructivist international relations 
theory has seen heated and powerful debates on the formation and change of political 
identities, which have become a blueprint for further discussions of the concept. Further 
debates on the issue mostly use similar conceptual approaches with social construction 
debates. Linda Alcoff tries to depict phenomenology and the embodiment of identities. She 
emphasizes the interpretive roles of social beings that dialogically produce visible identities 
(Alcoff, 2006). Ernesto Laclau researches the orientation of subjectivity in the construction of 
identity, which is constitutively maintained by acts of identification, playing a central role in 
the reconstruction of political identities (Laclau, 1994). Similarly, Charles Tilly inspires 
creative interactions, creating representative shared ideas by the way of knowledgeable 
actions of individuals (Tilly, 2003). Although these studies produce distinctive approaches on 
political identities, they still engage knowledgeable ideas, interactional interpretation and 
mutually constitutive functions of identities which analogically represent somewhat 
constructivist discussions of political identities.  
Rather essential peculiarities of these post-structural approaches are the 
underestimation or ignoring of the ‘structural ontology’ of the construction or existence of 
political identities (Ladyman, 1998). This research argues that structures still have 
determinative power of political identities beyond interactions and social constructions. 
Debates on the transformation dilemma in political identities from particularism to 
universalism trivialize the importance of structural equilibrium in the objectification of 
subjectively oriented political identities. Structural predetermination, or the ontological 
dilemma of structures, is a fundamentally intertwined component of political identity 
formation, yet it disappears in the objective field of inter-subjective construction where 
political subjects practise their underdetermined subjective dispositions. In this respect, I 
argue that Bourdieu’s conceptual terminology and his approach to structural considerations 
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have very influential points to understand the (re)formation of political identities and its 
subjects. In line with Bourdieusian study, it is argued here that (re)formation in the actions of 
political agents does not come into existence in accordance with a certain normative way and 
universal de facto, but political subjects constitute dispositions which proceed from their 
historical accumulations of sociality. Political subjects have different dispositions according 
to their positions of structures, constituting their subjective field, because dispositions are not 
standardized forms but are socialized products of accumulated historical structure and 
objective constructing structure relations. In this respect, Bourdieu fundamentally provides a 
‘genetic structuralism’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 14), which helps us to understand how 
structuration affects the ideational construction of political identities.  
Dispositions as the equilibrium of objective structures are the products of habitus. As 
Bourdieu described,   
Constructing the notion of habitus as a system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level 
as categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as being the organizing 
principles of action meant constituting the social agent in his true role as the practical operator of the 
construction of objects. (Ibid., p. 13)  
The core of this explanation problematizes that subjects conceptualize their 
dispositions in accordance with a practical notion which is not rooted in a constructive 
objective world. These dispositions externalize themselves by way of two distinctive 
manifestations simultaneously. They both function as practically applied structural principles 
and ideationally operated objective constructions. In this respect, political subjects develop 
their dispositions in accordance with their degree of historical social accumulation, and this 
accumulation affects the further production of dispositions, which defines the position of 
subjects in the objective field. The perception of objective structures is based on the 
subjective disposition of habitus, which operates the inheritances of former structural fields. 
Therefore, dispositions are to reach equilibrium somehow, continually leading to a new 
totality of the social field in accordance with the re-structuration of existing structures in line 
with dispositions. In this aspect, the modern political subjects of states emerged as the 
dominant disposition in the field of international relations because structured habitus formed 
dispositions to habilitate tendencies of state, which operate the consciousness of societies as 
quasi-comprehensive responses of the objective field (Goldmann, 1975). Thus, modern nation 
states constructed their subjective symbolic considerations in their habitus as ‘the source of 
cognition without consciousness, intentionally without intention, and a practical mastery of 
the world’s regularities which allows one to anticipate the future’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 12).  
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The transformation of identities is linked to dispositions, which are products of 
interrelations in transforming objective and conserving subjective structures (Bourdieu, 
1990b). Political identities are operated by preoccupied habitus and given realities of 
objective world in order to accumulate more recognition in the objective field. Interrelations 
of objective and subjective structures reinterpret the understanding of what will be recognized 
and misrecognized in the objective field. These intertwined relations are one of the distinctive 
element of Bourdieusian understanding identity, because they are mostly disregarded by post-
structural political identity research. Post-structural research is mostly based on 
interpretations, conceptualizing the dehistoricization of changed political interpretation and 
pure empiricism of ‘social’ (Nicholson & Seidman, 1996, pp. 8–9). However, the 
dehistoricization of political identities only interprets actual bases; it cannot conceive of the 
domination of practical unconscious as embodied actions in the international field. In other 
words, a historical structural perspective is necessary to see unconscious practical dispositions 
of political subjects which are not socially constructed in the objective field. Structural totality 
of history constantly imposes the production of new dispositions in habitus. The 
transformation of habitus is perceived and interpreted differently by individuals according to 
their objective positions in the field. In this way, structures are unconsciously regenerated by 
means of political subjects’ conscious practices on their political identities.  
The relations between political subjects depend on the totalizing equilibrium of 
structures in the habitus, which satisfy specific necessities of domination. In the Bourdieusian 
context, these specific necessities are kinds of ‘ontological complexity’ or ‘a subconscious fit’ 
as an intentionality and principle without any rationality (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 108). In other 
words, when political subjects or states manifest their habitus in the field they consider their 
actions as kinds of rational and conscious strategies, but they are mainly based on a 
subconscious and complex intentionality. In this way, political subjects always reinterpret 
their identities in terms of this objective adjustment process, yet they are unconscious to 
negotiate how these are reconstructed in accordance with the pressure of a preoccupied 
subjective world. Thus, I argue here that political identities constitute a totalizing basis in the 
real world, but they depend highly on the construction of structured history in order to create 
further totalities, serving the demands of domination. Therefore, habitus and its disposition 
illustrate how political identities constitute their bases according to the necessities of political 
subjects and how they change the understanding of political identification in accordance with 
the changes in the habitus of the historical processes. 
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The underdetermined effects of structures on political identity formation design the 
fundamental dilemmas of social constructive identity theorization. As discussed, the 
constructivist approach tries to separate its ‘holistic ontology’ from realist scientific 
understanding, and it perceives that identities are constructed, but it also explains certain 
aspects of the identity as given (Zehfuss, 2002). Improbably, identity becomes a contextual 
entity in social construction. At the very core of my argument, this ontological side of the 
holistic or totalizing identity actually points out underdetermined structural effects on identity. 
Identity is a kind of symbolic capital. It is formed by dispositions which are the totalizing 
predisposition of structures. Political identities are not automatically socially constructed. 
Rather, dispositions adapt them according to the practical unconscious actions of political 
subjects. Consequently, the consensus on legitimacy and recognition does not depend on free 
cognitive actions or operations. Habitus operates its dispositions, which produces the content 
of legitimacy and recognition. In this way, habitus produces disparate objective practices 
which differentiate according to the field (Bourdieu, 1990a). Therefore, sovereign legitimacy 
and mutual recognition among the political subjectivity of modern states are not cognitive 
properties of international relations, but these notions are predisposed adjustments which are 
subject simultaneously to conservation and transformation.   
Habitus functions as both a system for the predisposition of objective structures and a 
producer of perception for the constructive field (Ibid.). In this way, political subjects 
unconsciously produce classificatory bases of political identities because habitus concretizes 
the objective differentiation of field in order to satisfy a degree of totalizing equilibrium. 
Bourdieu not only evaluates the objective structure and its social construction but also depicts 
how structures function as a predisposing reason for the perception of identity. The 
(re)formation of identities is always involved in conserved dispositions because individuals 
inhabit and codify structured dispositions in their habitus. Thus, shared knowledge of agents 
is not purely acquired in the process of social interaction. Rather, it is structured in the 
preoccupied habitus of individuals. Common senses or shared ideas are unconsciously 
acquired by habitus, but political subjects pretend to have their own consciousness of political 
identity when they are influenced by their perceptions.  
The state, as ‘the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of 
capital’ (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4), is an objective field of political identity whose borders are 
structured according to the totalizing characteristics of habitus. Therefore, the formation of 
the political identities within state borders is independent from a kind of ‘scientific 
objectivation’ (Bourdieu, 2003a, pp. 284–285) which focuses on the objectification of 
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objectivizers as well. Ideas and interactions are just one side of political identity construction. 
In order to construct political identities, political subjects use ‘the historical unconscious’ 
(Ibid., p. 285) as a kind of cognitive structure which is in practice internalized in structures. 
Therefore, political identities, from the primitive clan to modern state identities, are based on 
two different fields: an objective field, where interests are embodied and proliferated, and a 
cognitive unconscious field, where reasons for normative frame, understanding and 
recognition are pre-consciously attained in habitus. Political identities always have conscious 
constructed and cognitive unconscious bases. The cognitive unconsciousness of the subjective 
field is the realm of the normative construction of the identity. As cognitive unconsciousness 
weakens, particular identities obtain new importance, roles, fields and interests in order to 
satisfy a new equilibrium on the basis of a new style of structural and symbolic domination.  
At this point, it is important to rethink an important term of Bourdieu’s ‘allodoxia’ in 
line with the political identities. The term basically means misrecognition regarding the 
recognition of an order (Miller, 2003). In other words, identities unconsciously depend on 
cognitive processes and preoccupied symbolic habitus of individuals, yet individuals 
misperceive that these cognitive processes are parts of their own ideational creation. 
Allodoxia is a battlefield where the Bourdieusian twofold political identification process is 
performed by political subjects or states. Firstly, structures are means which determine 
political subjects’ identification of the objective world. Secondly, structures are means which 
are reformed by the interpretation of political subjects. In other words, allodoxia firstly 
imposes the predisposed interests of structures and then focuses on the interpretive knowledge 
of political subjects on their political identities. This knowledge creation process of political 
identities is similarly maintained at every stage of political identity (re)formation. 
In order to understand identity of political subjects, it is important to evaluate the 
relation and connection between the cognitive field and the objective world (Bourdieu, 2001). 
Social interactions do not always underlie shared ideas between the actors, and it is not 
possible to estimate how much particular ideas are voluntarily shared by the subjects, yet 
political subjects may still behave in accordance with certain kinds of structured frames. In 
this aspect, it is important to rethink consciousness of subjects on their cognitive structures. 
As Bourdieu argues, 
When we say that gender, race, class, and other social distinctions are ‘socially constructed’, we must 
not forget that there are social conditions and mechanisms of construction of the constructors, including 
the state which is the great hidden constructor of agents via the mediation of legitimate identities. 
(Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 199)  
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In this aspect, one of the essential deficiencies of social construction is related to the 
construction of constructors. Certain forms of behaviours unconsciously take place in the 
subjective habitus of individuals that functions as the constructor of the constitutive cognitive 
actions of political subjects. Modern states, as the subjects of political identity, are influenced 
by underdetermined structures which predispose their interests by means of national 
educations, anthems, laws etc. Therefore, states are imposed on by these pre-existent codes, 
which unconsciously determine the construction of position in the objective fields. 
Consequently, in order to understand the formation of political identities, it is necessary to 
have a reflexive focus on the practical habitus of the state beyond the objective social 
interactions. 
 
Structuring structures 
In order to shape perspectives and images, individuals attempt to form meanings of things in 
the real world. Reality becomes an objectified form because individuals construct 
perspectives in order to make sense of the real world. This is argued in Bourdieu’s work as 
illusio (Bourdieu, 1990b). Whenever individuals are involved in knowing the objective world 
they embody the identification of structures, which creates realities of field. Reality is not 
intrinsically objective without meaningful interrelations and identifications which transform a 
field into a structuring structuration. Interest, anarchy and identity are not intrinsically social 
realities, but they change into realities after they become meaningful in this structuring field. 
As Bourdieu explained, the ‘immediate meaning of the world … depends on … a 
homogenous conception of time space, number and cause one which makes it possible for 
different intellectuals to reach an agreement’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). This implication 
weakens social construction approaches because it evaluates the objective world as a fraction 
of the practical immediate form of non-cognitive actions beyond communication processes, 
institutions, interactions and shared ideas. It is argued here that there are logics, perspectives 
and interests of identities which are located outside the domain of interaction processes. 
Subjects of political identity have their own logics and perspectives which are not based on 
their conscious preferences about the objective world. Structuring structure provides this 
immediate meaning. In other words, structuring structure highlights how to understand the 
objective field and to exercise identities because it embodies the totalizing equilibrium of the 
objective world. 
Structuring structures is the way to internalize the objective world. At this point, 
norms and institutions are important to understand how individuals evaluate the objective 
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structures. Structures are mutually constitutive by way of shared norms and ideas (Wendt, 
1992). However, the political identity of subjects or states is firstly independent from 
conscious interactions and identities. They are implicitly ascribed by practical unconscious 
actions which satisfy a recognized position in totalizing equilibrium in the field before 
political subjects are involved in constructive struggles by means of their own political 
identities. Whenever states are involved in conscious processes of structuring structures they 
become parts of founded totality and its domination, which are continually designed in 
conscious processes of structuring structures. Indeed, ‘the “interactionalist” error which 
insists on reducing relations of power to relations of communication, is not enough to note 
that relations of communication are always, inseparably, power relations’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 
167). Norms and institutions are not standards to define identities. Rather they are 
intermediary ways to harmonize illusio which impose sense of a certain division into a 
concrete political field. In these processes, ideas are reconstructed as a set of objective 
institutions which provides new bases for political subjectivity of states in order to reproduce 
their identities on the basis of illusio. In other words, ideas are a kind of intermediary power 
which constitutes structuring realities of illusio. Therefore, the social constructive process is 
firstly subject to practical unconscious actions of political subjects in structuring structures, 
yet these unconscious actions re-form institutions and norms in conscious processes of 
structuring structures. 
There is no normative and moral integration or shared norm, before political subjects 
or states respectively perceive, evaluate and accept structuring structures as occupying 
realities. Structuring structures provides position for political agents because it brings inter-
subjective recognition of positions among the members of political identity. In this way, states 
become, simultaneously, subjects of both the implicit institution of recognition and the 
potential transformation of recognition. Because of this, structuring structures compose 
distinctive symbolic means in different historical terms. These means form disparate kinds of 
political identities which are operated by different dominations in the forms of dispositions. If 
existing totalizing equilibrium does not satisfy unconscious domination in the habitus of 
political subjects, it is most likely to be transformed. The political identity of state performs 
two important functions in this scale. It unconsciously hides power relations by way of its 
dominated habitus and then it classifies political subjects via its position in the international 
field. These functions are hidden in power relations, which generate what is structured in 
objective fields (Edwards, 2010). Structuring structures, therefore, are to reform a totalizing 
domination in accordance with structured interests. National sentiment, as the basis of modern 
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state identity, does not depend on the cognitive preferences of the state, but it is related to 
practical sentiments of its position in the field of international relations. 
Political identity and structuring structure relations theoretically cover the middle 
bases between two distinctive approaches in this study. Firstly,  
structures are independent of actors within it. It is autonomous. While structure is affected by activities 
of actors within it, nevertheless the structure has … a determining effect on the behaviour of actors and 
the outcome of social processes. (Olson & Groom, 1991, p. 224)  
At this point, it is argued that structures are not completely independent from subjects’ 
ideation and construction. Therefore, the study separates structures as structuring and 
structured. This structuration shows what extend state identity can be effective on structures. 
More importantly, states have conserving and even transformative effects in the field of 
structuring structures in accordance with how much their habitus is compatible with the 
structured morality of domination. Secondly, structuring structure and political identity 
relations mediate the ideas that political subjectivity of state constructs social realities by 
conscious–cognitive acts of participation; and, therefore, there are preliminary instructional 
rules which classify the social world to improve participation (Kowert, 2015). The state’s 
ideational field is not independent from the preoccupation of the unconscious ideational and 
symbolic knowledge. The externalization of political identities is subject to what states 
internalized in a historical frame. In this way, the state’s identity needs a reflexive 
understanding of state habitus. Purposeful actions are states are always embedded in a 
domination. This unconscious domination is a very primitive functionalization of political 
identity from the family and clan to king and modern state. Fundamentally, the political 
subject always wants to achieve an inter-subjectively recognized position, because it can only 
survive in a social space – or, as Bourdieu calls it, a field. Thus, the definition of political 
identity is an automatic practical use of habitual political capital. Political subjects inter-
subjectively functionalize its identity in accordance with its capacity of constructed morality 
in the international field. In line with this, for instance, the concept of the Western state 
carries meaning, a moral distribution and a distinction beyond a simple sense of locality. In 
order to have an inter-subjective position in the international field, the other members of 
political identity describe their position, such as Middle Eastern, which also results in a 
practical confirmation of domination that shows the extent to which the morality of political 
subjects is compatible with the morality of understanding the structuring objective world of 
the international field.  
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The objectification of identity (re)formation in structuring structures is based on the 
same functional continuum in whole historical process. Firstly, political subjects embody the 
occupied symbolic codes and representations to internalize them. Then, political subjects 
interact in different fields to accumulate recognition. Finally, they unconsciously succeed in 
knowing subjects in terms of certain realities/meanings and, therefore, they obtain particular 
types of identity. However, the unconsciousness of individuals is not an invariable process. 
The consciousness of subjects of their political identities needs to have a reflexive approach to 
structuring structures. In this respect, structuring structures are objectified by a ‘triple 
historicization’ of the agent, fields and the knowing subject (Wacquant, 2000, p. 111). 
Political agents firstly question their dispositions, interests, and judgments about their identity 
in structuring structures. After individuals problematize themselves, they question the 
objective field in which their political identities are constituted. This is important because it 
questions why political subjects always need to pursue a certain kind of recognition in 
comparison with others. The centre of the field of power is occupied by recognition. As a 
result, political agents cannot control their political identification in structuring structures as 
long as they don’t evade boundaries of recognition. Following individuals and their objective 
field of historicization, political subjects need to question the conscious means of knowledge. 
The means of knowledge show the way that the totalizing principle, equilibrium of 
recognition and division are constituted in structuring structures. It is not possible to 
disconnect the link between the field of power and the objective field as long as political 
identities are reflexively historicized in this way. Hence, political subjects unconsciously and 
permanently produce changing historicization by way of an occupied historicizing in habitus 
without presupposing the actual world (Bourdieu, 1990b).  
 
Structured structures 
Structuring structures is the way to internalize the external symbolic and subjective 
occupation of the objective world. Separately, structured structures produce instruments of 
interactions for agents in order to get involved in the construction of identities in the real 
world. The existence of certain symbolic structures is implicitly preceded by former 
structured structures. Therefore, ‘as instrument of knowledge and communication, symbolic 
structures can exercise a structuring power only because they themselves are structured’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). Structuring and structured structures are continually in relation with 
each other in order to reproduce the realities of false historicizing. In this respect, habitus 
functions as a transformative instrument which converts the passively and unconsciously 
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preoccupied subjective world into the objective process of construction. Structured structures 
incarnate into habitus as the centre of classification, inclusion and exclusion of the identities 
of individuals. Structured structures and structuring structures are highly intertwined, yet 
instruments of structured structures vary in relation to structuring structures. Structured 
structures depend on the means of communication, culture and language (Ibid.). Political 
subjects form their ideations in accordance with their historically structured dispositions, 
which obey embedded rules of structured structures. Contrary to the conscious shared ideas of 
social construction, this is just a degree of consensus on the implicit unconscious perception 
of identification. This structure prompts the reproduction of social bases. Political subjects or 
states do not affect any presupposition of former structured structures, yet they can (re)form 
the structuration of actual structured structures by way of their practices in objective field. In 
other words, states have no influence in the habitual foundation of their political identities, but 
they are able to change further production of future political identities. 
Therefore, habitus rests upon structured structures in a bilateral way: the formation of 
habitus is produced by structured structures; and the existence of habitus continually 
reproduces the field of power (Lizardo, 2004). In the production process of political identities, 
states do not fall into rational processes but, rather, objective actions are improvized by 
existing structured rules in the international field. The process regarding objectification of 
habitus in accordance with structured structures is a dynamic process that rationalizes the 
improvisational habitus. The objectification of field produces different practices in different 
political subjects of the same totalized identity because it is exercised by unequally distributed 
dispositions of habitus. This affects how states make their inclusion and exclusion regarding 
their objective field of international relations. Structured structures are mostly related to the 
roots of the totalizing equilibrium of identities. Structured structures incarnate all the 
necessary bodily knowledge into individuals’ habitus. The totalizing equilibrium of bodily 
knowledge is a sine qua non requirement of political identification and it is subject to change 
in accordance with the historicization of identity. In this respect, pre-modern history 
influenced into the totalizing principle by way of religious sentiment. Religious sentiment in 
structured structures firstly created a vision of power which suzerains obeyed because it 
persuaded a degree of recognition under the presence of the king. Afterwards, religious 
sentiment in structured structures satisfied the division, approved of by all social classes, of 
structuring the world despite the hidden unequal division in the field of power. The 
(re)formative power of structuring structures has affected the dispositional construction of 
structured structures. In line with this, totalizing equilibrium transformed into the subjective 
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presence of national sentiment. The national sentiment of identities firstly created a vision of 
power and then imposed a strong sense of division in the structuring world. Therefore, 
structured structures transform into structuring structures, after primitive states produce vision 
and division respectively.  
Politics is the overarching field for all objective relations of agents (Bourdieu, 1995a). 
States struggle to satisfy certain kinds of political identities in order to get recognition. Being 
parts of recognition also connotes an unconscious consensus on the network of certain 
political relations. In this respect, political identity is the way for politics to create 
‘distinction’ in the objective world (Lane, 2000). The fundamental aim to fall into this 
distinction of identities is to enhance recognition. Recognition becomes a reason for the 
internalization/externalization of certain structures in order to satisfy political identification. 
This perception of recognition goes beyond social constructive perspectives, evaluating 
recognition as normative institutional and inter-subjective as ‘social closure’ (Wendt, 1992, 
pp. 412–413). Similarly, critical interpretation is likely to interpret recognition in the bases of 
the moral inter-subjective construction of normativity (Honneth, 2007). However, recognition 
is mostly related to structured structures of field. Recognition as a social closure is highly 
problematic. Recognition does not a cognitive basis to (dis)empower political identities. The 
categorization of identity is unconsciously achieved by the divisionary function of structured 
structures before recognition is conceptualized by political subjectivity of states. In addition to 
this, recognition is related to history and the field of historicization rather than normativity 
and inter-subjectivity. History produces its structured structures before inter-subjective 
conditions give the meaning of recognition. In other words, normative institutional 
construction is not independent from the boundaries of states in their practical dispositions in 
the field of international relations. Recognition is not a direct conscious interest of states. 
States produce political identity to satisfy a totalizing equilibrium of hidden domination which 
constructs its recognition. Therefore, recognition is a result of states’ practical sense regarding 
the necessity of their social position in the field rather than a cognitive evaluation of interests. 
Consequently, recognition is based on conformity between historically accumulated 
dispositions of states and historically embedded rules of structuring structures in the field of 
international relations.  
Structured structures impose pre-dispositional bodily knowledge, which produces the 
distinctive social positioning of individuals. The fundamental function of political identities is 
to form sentimental bases of distinction. Distinction provides means of identification which 
function as social conditionings to comprehend the borders of the field’s conscious process. 
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Distinction presupposes how individuals interact with the objective field and what 
behavioural pattern is approved by political identities. As Bourdieu argues, 
The struggles to win everything which, in the social world, is of the order of belief, credit and discredit, 
perception and appreciation, knowledge and recognition—name, renown, prestige, honour, glory, 
authority, everything which constitutes symbolic power as a recognized power—always concern the 
‘distinguished’ possessors and ‘pretentious’ challengers. Pretension, the recognition of distinction that is 
affirmed in the effort to possess it … (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 251)  
Distinction is the field of social positioning. Political subjects obtain the conscious processes 
of their political identities. Any concrete objective domination or consciously and mutually 
accepted power construction does not exist in the social positioning process. Recognizing the 
social positioning of certain political identities also means that a political subject 
unconsciously becomes part of a field of power beyond its identity. The determination of 
political identities by means of nationality, gender or race indicates what kind of power field 
is unconsciously internalized in structured structures. Therefore, the state most probably 
defines its distinctiveness in accordance with different sub-fields in the field of international 
relations. This is a necessary practical action by states because their dispositions do not 
provide adequate position to be involved in certain fields. In other words, structuring states’ 
dispositions may not fulfil the requirements of the structured rules of the field. As a result of 
this, structured structures concentrate on the creation of appropriate positions for the political 
subjects they construct implicitly otherness and division. In other words, the division of 
political identities is embodied before political subjects inter-subjectively construct 
interactions with each other.  
To know how the inclusion and exclusion mechanism operates in accordance with 
structured structures of fields of power, it is also important to see how culture and the 
language of structured structures organize the subjective sphere of habitus. Culture and 
language function as inculcation mechanisms for the reconstruction of structured structures 
and spheres for interactions where values of cultural and linguistic productions transform 
symbols and dispositions into meaningful justification means of identity. Different products 
within the cultural and linguistic field form unconscious borders of habitus, which interpret 
and achieve distinctive structures and conditions (Ibid.). In this respect, culture and language 
do not only provide objective codes, but also provide the ways for political subjects to 
position their identities in the objective field. When culture is perceived by way of 
nationalistic sentiments, habitus takes the position of objectifying nationalistic values to 
enhance its position inter-subjectively in international relations. In this respect, culture and 
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language function as the bordered subjectivity of reproduced national sentiments. 
Consequently, divisions and exclusion between states are operated by dispositions which 
objectify themselves by means of culture and language. Language and culture cannot be 
separated from the interests of totalizing equilibrium in structured structures. When the codes 
of culture and language transform in structured structures, habitus takes a new position in 
order to enhance the recognition of identity. In order to achieve positioning, political subjects 
engage culture and language because culture and language provide meaningful symbols by 
way of practical dispositions which normalize the divisionary bases of structures.  
 
Identity as symbolic power 
One of the fundamental problems regarding the discourse of political identity in international 
relations is to focus on collectiveness, the state, groups and class and to oversee field and 
identity interrelations on the formation of classification. Classical structural theories evaluate 
states as units and they research how states relate to each other in the international arena as 
dominant sovereign actors. This understanding is argued at length, especially by social 
construction approaches, which evaluate the structure of states as the constructed production 
of collective minds rather than material conditions. Material conditions, interests and ideas are 
mutually constituted entities and they are distinctive perceptions (Wendt, 1999; Legro, 2005). 
On the other hand, social construction approaches see how ideas and interests of states’ 
internal/endogenous sub-structures and compositions interact with each other. They rethink 
the social practices of human and cultural productions as reproductive force of structures. 
However, they determinedly evaluate that the production/reproduction of an international 
system is fundamentally produced by state interactions (Wendt, 1999). In other words, the 
reproduction of international systems is achieved by the interactions of totalized nation state 
identities. In substance, the interactions of nation states are just constructed parts of political 
identities which describe a field’s objective practices, but ‘socialization processes internal to a 
state can change the state’s identity and interests independently of such interactions’ 
(Copeland, 2000, p. 203). In this respect, it is logical to think which socialization processes 
change collective identities. This conception directs my research towards the structured 
accumulation of fields beyond collective identities. In spite of discussions which propose that 
‘interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows 
who it is’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 231), this research argues that identities are mostly predisposed by 
structured rules of the historical social accumulation before political subjects form their 
political identities. Because of structural effects on cognitive constructive processes, moral 
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rules are implicitly and unconsciously influenced into dispositions of political subjects and, 
therefore, political subjects do not problematize divisional domination of power on their 
identity construction. 
It is hard to envisage predisposed structuration, identity and field of power as long as 
research focuses on structured rules of objective field of international relation beyond 
existence of collectiveness. It is argued here that collectiveness – groups, classes, states – does 
not have any direct influence on the structuration of political identity, but the structures, 
which socially collective identities dominate, are predisposed towards the founded morality of 
the structured objective world. Thus, state identity affects subaltern collective identities, yet it 
does not orientate individuals’ subjectivity. It is important to understand how perceptions of 
political subjects ideationally transform into social collectiveness. In this respect,  
It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that ‘symbolic systems’ 
fulfil their political function, as instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another 
(symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which 
underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber’s terms, to the ‘domestication of the dominated.’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 167)  
Identities are rooted in symbolic systems which are produced by the unconsciousness of 
individuals. Individuals’ symbolic systems are externalized in relation to the other individuals 
who gather their symbolic system into the same structured structures. This symbolization of 
individuals also forms subjective borders of their identification, which defines power and 
divisional domination before inter-subjective processes are constructed. Due to symbolic 
codification and violence into the habitus of individuals, the political identities of social 
collectiveness do not struggle to construct a dominated subjectivity beyond political subjects’ 
own subjectivity. Consequently, the collectiveness of political identities directly occupies 
constructive, normative and institutional means of fields of power and domination. Ideas and 
perspectives of collective political subjects are preoccupied by a set of symbolic instruments 
of subjective violence and, therefore, political subjects approve the unequal distribution and 
division of their political identities in norms and institutions. Subjective violence becomes a 
conscious process which influences meanings in objective field, because it legitimizes the 
otherness of political identification. Inter-subjective and communicative processes of 
identities objectify individuals’ internal dispositions of subjective violence. 
Symbolic violence as the (re)producer of divisionary structure of identities is related to 
ideological productions and misrecognition. Classes, groups and states are embedded in the 
structuration of symbolic violence. They hierarchically obtain social positioning according to 
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their relations with symbolic violence. This positioning of socially collective identities 
indicates their interests, which produce ideological infrastructure of the identities in relation to 
the field of power and its symbolic violence. Therefore, ideologies are ‘doubly determined’ 
because they are based on class practices and also on an endogenous logic of production 
simultaneously (Ibid.). Symbolic violence originates from a specialist body of reproducers in 
structured structures. This specialist body of production fundamentally functions as a 
persuasion mechanism of political identity, which also gives meaning to how the subjective 
violence of the field of domination is organized. This persuasion mechanism of the 
state/political subject’s habitus externalizes itself as a concrete disposition in structuring 
structures. Thus, the political identities of class, states and other collective entities are the 
reflective objectification of the symbolic division of historical structured habitus of political 
subjects. Ideologies of social collectiveness transform individualistic symbolic borders of 
identity into generalized social objective borders in the practical world. 
Doxa, which means that individuals consider knowledge of structured structures as 
their own production, is another important point to understand symbolic violence and identity 
interaction. Practices in structuring structures create a common culture which achieves the 
integration of collectiveness. Doxa is based on a structured world which is continually 
reconstructed in order to achieve the distinction of identities (Ibid.). Political subjects define 
their identities according to objective social positioning. Doxa provides the infrastructure 
required to accumulate meanings of social realities which objectify the integration of 
distinctive groups of collectiveness. Norms and institutions of identities are based on these 
perceived realities. Therefore, consensus on symbolic production always precedes consensus 
of normative productions. Separation between identification of social collectiveness takes 
place before the normative bases of political identities are constructed inter-subjectively. 
Structured symbolic dispositions of individuals create consensual social solidarity for 
distinctive groups. Then this separation of positioning collective entities is transformed into 
legitimized political identification by institutional norms. In this way, the functionalization of 
domination influences the institutional construction of identities. The influence of domination 
also legitimizes the structuring distinction of symbolic domination. In order to distinguish 
their identities, sub-collective groups identify their political identities in relation to other 
groups. When sub-identities define their distinction from others they also unconsciously 
legalize the distinctive position of a totalized political identity.  
Symbolic instruments of domination legitimize the establishing identity, which 
originally preserved the domination of a particular social collectiveness (Ibid.). Political 
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subjects behave in accordance with their preoccupied habitus and they accept a common 
culture in their particular historical social fields. In this way, misrecognition imposes 
preoccupied interests which socialize as everyone’s interests. The core beneficiaries of 
symbolic ideological instruments take a better position in fields where the domination of the 
field manipulates all normative processes of identity construction. The social collectiveness of 
political subjects expresses interactions and practices which construct an identity that is not 
involved in their actual interests. In other words, political subjects unconsciously speak in the 
name of the structured domination of identities. Created knowledge, norms and institutions 
are always functionalities of domination which transfer political functionalization into 
objectified identities of political subjects. Inter-subjective processes, recognized moral values 
and political identities are means of the field of power. Thus, inter-subjective processes form 
a recognized morality which satisfies common sense. Due to this common morality, political 
subjects obey their positioning in their own distinctive collectiveness. On the basis of 
objective moral identification, the political functionalization of identities achieves a 
hierarchical construction of domination in the objective field. 
Political identities unconsciously obey structured domination, which forms roots and 
standards of division, knowledge and knowing processes and interests of identities. The 
formation of every political identity is subject to existing domination in the field. In pre-
modern history, clerics functioned as structured structures. They preoccupied structuring 
interests which were based on a religious ideology that explains the moral borders of the 
recognition of individuals’ identity. Structured doxa emerged from the morality of Summa 
Theologica, which indicates that the identities of individuals should defend union, eternal 
togetherness and the fellowship of God under the rule of its representative king (Finnish, 
1998). In practice, the promised morality of recognition was to the benefit of a dominant 
group and its field of power, yet theoretically this morality was represented as salvation and 
recognized identity for everyone. This vision dominated structuring realities and division as 
long as another structured structure of modern historicization substituted its doxa. In the 
historical turn of modernity, the monopoly of clerical elites over structured structures was 
questioned and eventually substituted by a new group of elites which consists of some 
fraction of the old aristocracy and the new wealthy in a new capital production procedure. The 
new group changed the moral construction of the former clerics. It formed its own Puritan 
ethics in order to influence the identities of individuals. Contrary to the former passive 
participation of eternal fellowship, the doxa of structured Puritan ethics demanded that 
individuals had to be active and hard-working. It claimed that it is hard to define who is 
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selected by God, therefore accumulated wealth would prove whether a person had been 
selected. It supported self-scarification for the benefit of individualistic and societal goods 
(Weber, 1991). Importantly, Puritan ethics claim that former clerics are not automatically 
‘God’s elected’, and then they define the conditionality of ‘God’s elected’ by means of 
accumulated wealth and social responsibility. The doxa of modern nationalistic state identities 
was ideologically preoccupied by this ethical foundation in the collective state habitus. The 
structuring structures of modern state identities under the influence of self-devotion, 
accumulation and social responsibility formed its objectified realities according to the 
interests of new structured specialists. The new interests changed perceptions of recognition, 
hierarchy and vision of division simultaneously. The political centres of identities were 
eventually transferred from the objective king to the subjective body of nation. Social 
collective bodies of structured structures created their conscious political national identities by 
way of structured specialists’ interests. Similarly, the (re)formation of political identities 
affirmed once again that the structured dispositional production of identities precedes modern 
construction and the normative institutionalization of political identities.  
In a similar way to medieval political identification, national political identities 
promised a similar kind of functionalization in the objective field, yet it assigned distinctive 
meanings to reinterpret created realities. Generally, national identities are understood 
according to a system of associational ideas, the indivisible solidarity of groups in defined 
territory, the mutual tasks of members, the mutual recognition of automatic membership, the 
participation of everybody, a common history etc. National identities of states are (re)formed 
by recognition, hierarchy, division and mutual understanding, as well. In other words, the 
functional means of political identification are the same but the symbolic construction of 
power and domination between collective groups and structuring structures gives distinctive 
meanings and practices in order to function these means. This argument goes beyond the 
ordinary discursive omnipresent formation of Foucault, which theorizes power as a unique 
peculiarity of nature of identities (Sindic, Barreto, & Costa-Lopes, 2015; Strozier, 2002). 
Discursive field/language plausibly forms the borders of political subjects’ ideation and 
identification, yet political collective subjects never have the same discursive capital because 
their discursive capacities differ in historical social processes. Therefore, they cannot produce 
the same reasonability and argumentation which might be proofs of the omnipresent nature of 
identity. I argue here that political identities are the products of historical processes and 
symbolical exchanges of individuals and structures. Reality is not discursively omnipresent, 
but it is historically an intuitional misrecognition of knowing processes in structuring 
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structures. Political identities, as the highest institutionalization of the field of power, are the 
products of perpetual conflict of the division beyond omnipresent domination. The 
institutionalization of political identities is misrepresented by the historicization of reality, 
which is constituted by the social collectiveness of states as political subjects. Created 
structuring collectiveness is arbitrarily selective rather than suppressive. Historically 
contingent realities of structure and subject relations do not directly dominate political 
identities, but they selectively reward some social bodies. Selectiveness is recognized by 
individuals because it satisfies a sphere of recognizable justification for political subjects. 
Therefore, the formation of political identities is to continual selective division in order to 
satisfy the struggle of justification in the process of structure and identity historicization. 
Symbolic power is arbitrary and it is objectified as it is exercised (Bourdieu, 1991). 
Identity is a symbolic power to make political subjects believe some predicted and recognized 
division of the world (Bourdieu, 1991).13 The symbolic power of political identities is 
independent from not only political subjects who exercise a given doxa but also political 
subjects who are selectively consecrated by the given subject structure relations. In other 
words, the dominant position of the social collectiveness of political identity in social division 
is predisposed beyond power in the objective world. Eventually, continual conflict between 
dominated and subordinated identities maintains the differentiation of structured structures 
which reforms the division and justification of political identities. Similarly, political identity 
and globalization engagement trace a new historicization of this subject and institution 
structuration. As is noticed above, martial tourism is a very peculiar case to see how 
structured structure deteriorates justification capacity of national political identities. The case 
firstly orientates division beyond the national identities. Secondly, the case reinterprets 
symbolic violence. Having a justifiable national identity renders obsolescence, but being a 
part of a third locality is valued by new symbolic violence. Importantly, recognition does not 
depend on a shared historical background, but it is defined according to accumulated 
economical values. Therefore, globalization offers a division of political identities which is 
                                               
13
 Bourdieu (1991, pp. 181–221): ‘Struggles over ethnic and regional identity … are … classifications, 
struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to 
impose the legitimate definition of the division of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. 
What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of social world though principles of di-vision which, 
when they are imposed on a whole group, establish meaning and consensus about meaning reality of the unity 
and the identity of the group.’ 
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based on material financial background rather than a culturally and historically shared 
background of nationalistic identity. Globalization distinctively reinterprets functions of 
national divisions. It ‘offers the prospects of at least fully realizing the promise of modernity 
… market forces, electoral multiparty democracy, techno-scientific rationality, national self-
determination and international cooperation have the opportunity to work their complete 
magic, and the benefit of all humanity’ (Scholte, 1996, p. 51) This characterization of 
globalization changes the divisionary vision and justificatory recognition of national political 
identities. It extends the borders of structural reality from the interests of nation to all 
humanity. It changes the justification of division in individuals’ dispositions. It defines the 
institution and division of doxa within a more inclusive transnational structuring structure. 
Finally, it changes the symbolic structure which reforms practices of symbolic violence in 
field of power. 
 
Political identity and change: modernity and transformation of political identities 
The relation between change and identity is a longstanding debate in the international 
relations field. In particular, critical theories extensively argue the link between interests, 
ideas and identities. It is assumed that the constructed relations between states change 
identities, and the transformation in interests of states reconstructs these changes of identities 
(Wendt, 1999). These claims illustrate an essential shift in the classical realist–rationalist 
theorization which is based on selfish interests and prefixed political identities because 
interests are found before states construct a relation web among the members of the 
international field (Waltz, 2001). On the other hand, post-structural theories rethink the 
sovereignty of the state as a form of dominative power relations (Nicholson & Seidman, 
1996). Post-structuralism debates structuration and idealized institutionalization of political 
identities beyond the perdurable existence of power on identities. It is interested in 
sovereignty as a kind of discursive subjectivity. As a result, changes in identities are 
conceptualized by a large spectrum of debates from structuration to social construction, power 
and domination.  
In order to understand change and identity link, it is essential to know what the 
interactions of states are based on. According to the theoretical outlook of our argument, these 
interactions are based on a dual formation of capital in structured and structuring structures. 
Identities are reformed according to the change in capital, which is predisposed in structured 
structures and constructed in structuring structures. Changes in political identities determine 
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the relation webs, organizational frames, rules and borders which satisfy the structuration of a 
justified identity. As Inayatullah and Blaney realized, 
By contrast with the vision of an emerging tolerance, we suggest that the practical and intellectual 
repercussions of the Thirty Years’ War fostered a movement as much towards uniformity as towards 
recognizing and respecting diversity … Westphalia deferred a deeper exploitation and engagement of 
the problem of differences (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004)  
Not only the roots of modern political identities, but also the historicization roots of every 
political identity from pre-modern to postmodern are based on a uniformity which conceals 
division in the field of the perpetual struggle on capital. States always demand the justifiable 
field of their existences because predisposed capital and field relations always constitute a 
uniformity of identification. Therefore, the main guideline in the historical process of 
identities aims to satisfy a kind of totality. 
The capital allocation of identities of modernity reshaped the normative aspiration of 
the internal and external formation of the modern state identity. Externally, it formed mutual 
recognition and sovereign-equity between nationalities. Internally, it was involved in a kind of 
internal consensus which embodies supreme laws. The externalization and internalization of 
modernity also reproduced relationships between the objective field and political subjects or 
individuals. Concrete borders insulated institutionalized capital allocation from other 
localities. This institutionalized capital imposed a symbolic foundation for the justification of 
being within/outside this bordered political national identity. In this respect, subaltern social 
collectiveness took part in national identities not only materially but also mythically, because 
the mythical foundation of physical localities constructed the national identities’ historical 
narratives (Newman, 2001). Also, territorial borders not only prove a differentiation in 
physical capacity, but also indicate a potential differentiation in cognitive, cultural and 
informative capital. As a result, borders, as the productions of physical capital, concretize new 
territorial divisions which mean a new responsibilization according to the idealized capital 
allocation of national division.  
In the history of modernity, the state obtained legitimated rights, concrete rules and the 
monopoly of legitimate violence in certain borders. The modern nation state functions as the 
centre of physical force and coercion. The monopolization of the use of force is not an 
ontological foundation of nation states, but it is a sine qua non peculiarity of domination 
which is ruled by socially coercive institutions, concrete borders and symbols (Wilson & 
Donan, 1998). Changes in capital allocation satisfy the creation of the coercive institutional 
realities of political identities. In this respect, the institutionalization of the modern state is 
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rooted from differentiation in capital allocation. One interesting institutional change in the 
coercive function of identity in modernity arose from the institutionalization of national 
armies according to the perception of total war. The coercive capacity of pre-modern 
professional militaries was operated by the selective aristocratic institutionalization of army, 
generally based on royalty and the nobility of aristocratic knights. Being a constant member 
of the military in pre-modern history bestowed privileges upon a distinctive occupation of 
some social groups, which enhanced higher capital allocation in the structuring structure. 
Socially distinctive positioning was constructed by way of exclusive membership of the army. 
Afterwards, owing to the changed capital allocation of modernity, being a member of a 
professional army in pre-modern societies lost its distinctive vision of division because the 
nationalization of modern political identities forced the whole population to go to war. The 
institutionalized realities of modernity changed inclusionary practices on the division of 
political identities. The divisionary positioning of the aristocratic institutionalization of armies 
was replaced by the distinctive positioning of bureaucracy. The former distinctive role of the 
army was transformed into a compulsory task for everybody, including subaltern social 
groups in this field. Therefore, being a member of the army lost its prevailing position in 
capital allocation and the power of justification. The domination of modernity on the 
historicization of identity changed the totalizing equilibrium of structured structures, operated 
by bureaucracy. Indeed, bureaucracy was rewarded by royalty and nobility in this new vision 
of division.  
The field actually objectifies the accumulated production of former structures which 
controlled power (Bourdieu, 1985) because it embodies a consensus of state collective habitus 
and discursive historicization of misrecognized consensus in structuring structure. Changes in 
identity mean a reformation from one unification to another. Subjective capital identifies a 
new kind of responsibilization when individuals reach a distinctive stage of unification, 
because subjective capital always provides prospective responsibilities which are recognized 
by all parts of social construction (Bourdieu, 1989). Capital provides an accumulation of 
information which is involved in a redistribution of objective capital by way of cognitive 
reconstruction (Ibid.). Identity reforms language in order to achieve consensus according to 
reconstructing knowledge (Bourdieu, 1991). The Treaty of Westphalia was the primitive 
proof of changing language of capital allocation in identity of modernity. In accordance with 
the changes and expectations in physical capital, the Treaty of Westphalia reconstructed a 
new kind of consensus which imposed a distinctive capital allocation in comparison with the 
pre-modern institutionalization of capital. The changing subjective capital internally reformed 
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normative standards between the sovereigns because institutional differentiation in the 
functions of states required dependence and the integration of boundaries (Habermas, 1998, 
2012). Therefore, the political identity of modernity functioned as ‘world-making’, which 
manipulates the practical vision of the social group in order to reproduce the cognitive 
realities of individuals (Bourdieu, 1989). The identity of modernity reinterpreted all cognitive, 
informative and subjective bases of knowledge.  
The political identity of modernity is a kind of marketplace in order to share and 
distribute cognitive interaction and information, which accumulate the consciousness of 
former structured structures. It satisfied the instrumentality of internal legitimacy and external 
recognition because it created a national ideology which survived in the forms of symbolic 
codes. These codes also form the bases of national laws, which are legal and objective 
creators of symbolic violence and the borders of states’ identification regarding their 
collectiveness. Thus, social and legal products of cognitive capital, such as national languages 
and the law, transformed into unification on the basis of given codes of subjective habitus. 
National identities also created international norms and institutions to objectivize division and 
inclusion/exclusion in the field of struggle. 
Capital forms three different categories as embodied state, objectified state, and 
institutionalized state (Bourdieu, 1985). The embodied state functions as a kind of starting 
point for differentiation in the political identity of modernity. The embodied state is based on 
imposed codes and practices which give the meaning of rules, norms and institutions of 
national sentiment of modernity. In the embodied state, national identities and their normative 
and institutional routines are transferred to individuals and their social groups. The embodied 
state firstly provided the standardized rules and borders of citizenship. Secondly, the 
embodied state formed distinctive imposed codes in the international arena, where normative 
productions of embodiment were integrated into national identities. In this cognitive process, 
national citizens learn ‘the rational’ behaviours as inter-subjective values to achieve internal 
justification of modern collectiveness (Reus-Smit, 1999). The codes of unification for 
‘rationalization’ are given by shared symbolic capital between citizens. Symbolic capital 
represents both objective and subjective capital and it creates a perception of a shared set of 
beliefs to standardize the differentiation between the national states. 
Objectified capital is represented by concrete items of national identities such as 
languages and armies. While embodied capital forms the ideational bases of unification of 
national identities, objectified capital symbolizes embodied capital in the real life. Modern 
state identities depend on knowledge of the objective structures but knowledge is independent 
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from its created realities (Bourdieu, 1989). Thus, objectified capital provided an appropriate 
construction of embodied capital in order to achieve national unification and justification of 
political identity. That is why the objectified capital of modernity is not an autonomous, 
distinctive and supreme form. Rather, it is a reproduction of historical discursive realities. 
Therefore, it is plausible to say that forms of objectified capital in modern national identity 
strengthen or weaken in accordance with the differentiation in embodied capital.  
Institutionalized capital is a product of the recognition of the interrelation between 
certain embodied and objectified forms of capital. Institutional capital is based on both 
internal and external recognition of national identities. Institutional capital is also a 
mechanism to create definite and permanent differences between the subjects. Constituted 
absolute differentiation between subjects of institutionalized capital is derived from the 
indirect exclusion of power relations, which institutionalizes and/or stabilizes capacity and 
legitimacy of access to certain resources (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). Indeed, the institutional 
capital of modernity externalizes itself by way of sovereignty. Sovereignty is internally 
concretized by means of national laws. This normative supremacy of laws is involved in 
mutual recognition between the similar national identities in the international arena.  
The nation states’ sovereign identity is only a historical stage of certain kinds of interactions 
in capital. This research claims that the nation states are products of differentiation in 
subjective and objective capital and they are doomed to disappear as interactions in capital are 
reorganized, redistributed or relocated. In this respect, social identities are products of 
physical, economic, informative, cultural, cognitive and symbolic reformation.14 Capital 
functions as the collectivity of objective and subjective resources which objectifies knowledge 
of reality for justifiable identification (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The perpetual struggle of 
capital in structuring structures reforms the imposition of structured individuals. Therefore, 
the historicization of different structured structures reinterprets cognitive and informative 
processes because different political identities depend on a distinctive organizational sum of 
capital. Changes in capital allocation result in the reorganization of structures, the reformation 
of interests and the redefinition of political identities. Capital allocation fundamentally 
functions as a patrimonial symphony for the justification of social position, which suppresses 
any contradiction with symbolic and objectified division.  
 
                                               
14
 For further reading, see Bourdieu (1995a).  
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Political identity and change: reproduction of political identity beyond modernity 
Today, the political identities of the modern state are experiencing a new stage of 
differentiation and responsibilization. The monopoly of nation-state identities over bordered 
localities is impaired by a new kind of intertwined political representation and pluralism. The 
contemporary political interpretation tries to make objectified capital allocation and 
institutionalization of modernity non-functional. The institutional capacity of modernity is not 
in harmony with the dispositional capital of individuals any more. This means that the 
structured structure of modernity forms new capital allocation, which changes the institutional 
bases of justification of political identities. In this aspect, modernity is forced into sharing 
capital allocation and its field of power with changed rules of structure because, 
quantitatively, the number of institutions is rising beyond the scope of modern territoriality, 
and, qualitatively, rule- and law-making authorities of the new political identities are 
increasing beyond national collective identity (Grande & Pauly, 2005).  
The conceptualization of state identity was originally endowed with capital allocation, 
which enhanced states’ symbolic and objective positioning according to socially collective 
division of identities in the field of international relations. Citizenship is derived from the 
dispositional doxa of modern identity. The modern state, in line with continuing expansion 
and complexification, defies the existing institutionalization of modernity on violence and 
coercion. The national unification of modern political identification renounces some spaces of 
coercion because the collectiveness of the modern state on the disposition of nationality 
transforms into distinctively new institutionalizing fragmented structuring dispositions. The 
fragmentation of political identification also changed the institutionalization of threats, which 
affects the perception of states regarding unconscious symbolic violence. In line with the 
differentiation in the physical and symbolic capital allocation of modernity, centres of threats 
become heterogeneous and plural in character (Mansbach & Wilmer, 2001), which results in a 
new distribution for the symbolic violence of domination. The fragmented post-structural 
characteristic of modern state identities creates their heterogeneity via symbolic violence 
which interprets a new vision of symbolic division in a more complex field of international 
relations. Originally, symbolic violence functioned as a way of unification in political identity 
of modernity. New practical dispositions of the modern state shelve various subaltern 
distinctiveness and division, which are bordered by diverse symbolic violence according to 
the domination of new structured structures. The doxa of new, fragmented post-structural 
states revives diverse symbolic violence of national identity such as ethnic, language-oriented 
or gender-based symbolic violation beyond the collective symbolic violence of nationality. 
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Symbolic violence, as justification of political identity and modern domination, is 
unconsciously designed new structured domination in a more complex and wider field of 
international relations.  
In line with this, changes in symbolic perception of socio-cultural, economic, political 
positioning in the field affect modern national identity, which loses its control on the 
historicization of discursive realities in the field of power. National spaces are substituted by 
issue-oriented fragmented subaltern identification, which forms new knowing processes of the 
subject beyond the unification of modernity. The same national spaces are rendered obsolete 
by the new physical institutionalization of local and global pluralism. In this fragmented 
plural knowing process of individuals, different quantitative and qualitative political identities 
represent ‘bottom–up’ alternatives of states as responsibilizing individuals to achieve more-
accountable institutions (Chandler, 2007). This new, fragmented resemblance of capital 
allocation forces states to define their inter-subjective social positions in the field of 
international relations. Modern laws lose their power and mutual recognition becomes 
meaningless because structuring realities construct quasi-sovereign interaction webs. New 
capital allocation weakens both knowing processes of modernity and the objectivized 
institutionalization of modernity as laws, coercion and sovereignty.  
Institutional reformation of citizens’ identity of modernity dialectically decays the 
institutional roots of nation states. Modernity tries to loosen the border of nationality and, 
therefore, it constructs new kinds of political cooperation. However, this results in a 
differentiation of capital allocation within territorial borders. This changes individuals’ 
perceptions of justification, coercion, division and inclusion in their socially collective 
boundaries of identities. As is experienced in the process of European Union, economic and 
socio-cultural capital takes a significant position in citizens’ capital allocations, while 
physical and political capital lose their prominent role within the new bordering of the EU. In 
this way, the EU vitiates the national identities of states that help the local entities to 
interrelate with a wider global society (Vitanyi, 2001). This also changes perceptual 
misrecognition of citizenship and division within and outside the domain of EU. New 
fragmented political identities form a kind of global division, inclusion and justification 
beyond institutional realities of modernity. New capital allocation in habitus influences new 
globalizing structuring structures and creates new misrecognized common knowledge of 
individuals’ political identities, such as the global society. Consequently, it is common today 
to hear that borders of the EU have become concrete for refugees because the problem of 
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refugees is too complex to achieve without the contributions of the global society (Sassen, 
1998).  
In the process of the perpetual struggle on capital allocation, the supreme authorities of 
modern states are impaired by cognitive, informational, cultural and symbolical capital of new 
structured rules. Modern states abide by certain kinds of constructed norms to achieve mutual 
recognition among the states, which is determined by their symbolic, informative and cultural 
political capital allocation. However, the post-structural international relations field 
redistributes the role of cultural, informative and symbolic capital according to new structural 
rules of symbolic domination. Essentially, knowledge schemes and symbols are not 
territorially restricted anymore. Rather, they are becoming independent from the 
particularization of national identities. In this aspect, particular cultural capital or knowledge 
influences all parts of world. This not only results in a changing understanding of morality in 
habitus, but also produces a new position for the political subjectivity of states in the field of 
international relations. This means a common language and knowledge that transmit the local 
subjective capital to other localities. In this way, the new division and inter-subjective 
distinction of the state identity re-define themselves beyond the justifiable unification of 
modern national identities.  
Moreover, the identity of modernity does not homogenize modern state identity any 
more. Externally, the mutual recognition of the modern state loses its value to define its inter-
subjective position in international relations. In a historically changing field of the structuring 
world, national states engage new structured rules of institutions such as democracy and 
human rights. These institutions are seen as a blueprint to define the position and symbolic 
nobility of states because the contemporary fragmentation of institutional norms forms 
‘universal grounds’ which are becoming a sphere for states to request emancipation of a more 
complex field of international relations (Eva, 2002). With reference to the democratization 
processes in the developing world, these differentiations ‘can create zones of ungovernability 
that complicate transformative processes even for states that are inclined to cooperate’ 
(Grande & Pauly, 2005, p. 296). Internally, states do not solely rule their internal authority 
and law because borders of states are increasingly becoming a battlefield of division of the 
new capital allocation. The new division creates a new resistance and responsibilization in 
which new social groups and collectiveness increasingly express their ‘experiences of 
exclusion’ from the modern state boundaries (Patton, 1996, p. 239). New embodied capital 
impairs the national foundation of subjective capital and creates a new disposition to improve 
a better position and recognition in accordance with historically changing rules of doxa. 
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Citizens of modern states are transformed into members of wider collectiveness by a new 
responsibilization and symbolic violence of proliferated and complex fields of action.  
Objectified capital creates distinctive fields and practices for the institutionalized capital of 
post-structural identities beyond the identities of national states. Knowledge, information and 
symbols increasingly emphasize a more complex field of power relations to accumulate 
capital. This transforms the former political rationalities of modernity in accordance with a 
wider globalized society (Rose & Miller, 1992). Besides this, growing technologies improve 
new governmental processes outside the control of nation states. The changing political 
identification of the modern state is involved in new governmental processes which result in 
negotiating the classical authority of states and institutions and interests. Consequently, it 
somehow gains roles in the construction of socially collective identities, such as the EU, in 
order to fulfil the changing requirements of capital allocation in the field. Differentiated 
capital creates many different fields of action for modern states, which are causes of new 
symbolic violence and vision of division, because the changing justification of modern state 
identity aims to achieve nobility according to the epistemology of new institutional capital, 
which is unequally distributed by historical social processes. Meanwhile, new post-structural 
states gradually form ways of practical knowing in order to reconstruct political rationalities. 
As a result, post-structural identities of modern states interpret sovereignty and recognition 
once again because the identity construction of capital allocation requires changes in 
knowledge, language, symbolization and information according to changing positions of 
identities in the international relations field. 
It is true that decline of modern political state identity created essential liberation from 
organizational principles of modernity. Some radically evaluate that the downfall of 
modernity results in a separation of the subject from any kind of collectivization: 
emancipation of knowledge as public discourse from domination (Shapiro & Alker, 1996). 
However, changes in institutionalization of modern political identities depend on 
differentiation in the dispositional vision of division. In this respect, the post-structural world 
means a new reformation of historical discursive realities in globally inclusive structuring 
structures rather than a creation of autonomous conscious realities. Post-structural identities 
promise a new knowing process of the field according to a new justifiable unification. The 
uniformity of political identities is actually imposed into knowledge which lulls state identity 
into a false sense of justification. Therefore, the post-structural field of international relations 
can be seen as a new struggle for inclusion in order to reform the structured division of 
identities. Consequently, physical and subjective capital extends its borders at both local and 
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supranational levels because modern borders of structuring reality do not institutionalize its 
existing realities in structuring field.  
The expansion of modern international relations field results in a new style of 
symbolic violence of domination according to new structured capital allocation. It enhances 
the speed, scope and bases of capital interactions. The borders of modern collective political 
states experience a functional de-bordering of borders, which leads to structural, social and 
cultural shifts beyond physical shifts in the borders (Albert, 2002). A new bordering of 
political identities weakens the concrete character of modern bordering and constructs a new 
historical discursive division in a wider and heterogeneous field. Heterogeneity is a 
fundamental characteristic of the new interactions of political identity in order to form a new 
common knowledge of justification or sovereignty. The political borders of modernity failed 
to keep the possession of operational/external and formal/internal sovereignty because they 
are confronted by new issues which require interactions for the changing meaning of rules of 
structure (Mills, 1998). New political identities unconsciously form a new way of knowing 
which is interested in environmental issues, human rights or the rights of a language minority 
beyond the classical security of state identity. Therefore, this new discursive historicization of 
realities is fundamentally in conflict with the former dispositional interests of political 
identities of modern states.  
The structuring world is experiencing a process of new capital allocation in the field. 
The fundamental means of nobility and symbolic violence in the changing international 
relations field are somehow to achieve democracy. Therefore, a whole field of international 
relations experiences a kind of structural instrumentalization of democracy. All modern states 
claim to be more democratic because the justification of modern state identity is changing 
according to the reformation of practical dispositions of domination. In other words, national 
political identification in modernity no longer institutionalizes a vision of division, but the 
field of power is objectified by a distinctive construction of power in a wider inclusion 
process (Held, 2002). This vision of division is important, because identities in the field of 
power demand a distinction which is transformed into otherness in order to defend their self-
certainty (O’Hagan, 2004). In this way, identities are products of changes in accumulated 
knowledge and constructed interactions. In order to reconstruct their identities, modern states 
are involved in this unconscious accumulated knowledge, which consists of loyalty to 
changing domination styles. Consequently, changes in political identities create dispositions 
for interaction to accumulate political, economic, cultural and social capital in a changing 
international relations field. In this aspect, capital allocation is institutionalized in cognitive, 
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knowledge-based and informative interactions which continually create objective realities of 
individuals. As a result, changes in the political identities of modern states are changing 
loyalty and symbolic violence of modern state capital allocation in the field of international 
relations.  
 
The international field and the identity of the state as the political subject of modernity 
The fundamental concentration of this thesis is to research how the Bourdieusian 
understanding of field (Bourdieu, 1984), the habitus of the agent (Bourdieu, 1995a) and the 
understanding of reality (Susen, 2011) come together and depict the identity of states, as 
subjects of totalized political power relation, in a wider and more complex space of 
international relations. These three components of Bourdieusian study emphasize a distinct 
manner of state, an organized group of people, which forms identification beyond the 
structuralist and ideational/social constructivist understanding of identity. The purpose of this 
part is to transfer Bourdieusian understanding of social relations and the identification of 
reality from individuals’ spaces to the international field of an organized group of people or 
the state. The first and most essential engagement of this study is to evaluate the state as a 
social group which experiences power relations in the field of international relations. In 
practice, Bourdieusian field theory will be a guideline to understand the identity of states in 
the international field. The state as a social organism rests on its social position in the 
international field, creating a specialization in the spheres of power relations. As a 
consequence, it is important to understand what kinds of power relations the 
agent/state/political subject can opt for to define the behavioural tendencies of the agent in the 
international field. These behavioural tendencies of positional relations in the fields result in 
the social categories of the agents’ identities.  
The second important element of the state identity – defining positions in the field – is 
a perception of the agents’ reality. The realities of agents, defining their identity, are 
interrelational phenomena which consist of both structuring and structured components of 
field relations. The agents carefully observe differences in power relation in the international 
field and define their identities in comparison with different relational exercises of the other 
agents in the same international field. Therefore, structuring a sense of subjects leads 
simultaneously to the reproduction of themselves (Goodman & Silverstein, 2009). The 
existence of structuring and structural elements in the same field of relation rejects the 
astaticism of structural thinking and overvaluation of social construction of the identities of 
the states. This existence discloses the bilateral influence of habitual practices of the agents 
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and the socially agreed conditionality of doxa on the formation of a relational state identity. 
This reveals the interplay and tension between the resistance of existent relational identity and 
revisionist acts of the intended identity struggle. 
The last distinctive element of definition of the state identity is the habitual spaces of 
agents which stock all essential capabilities of agents to improve a better and more favourable 
power relation in the international field. Habitus fundamentally defines the relational 
differences in different fields according to subject (Reed-Danahay, 2005). It shows the style 
of exchange and hierarchy in a field of practice. Habitual space lays a burden on agents to 
show a willingness towards the submission of their actual identities. On the other hand, 
habitual practices have the potential to change the definition of agents’ identity in their 
favour. States’ power relations in accordance with their habitus structurize state identity in the 
international field. Therefore, in order to understand how state identity is defined, its 
necessary to look at what involvement the power relation in the habitus of agents enables.  
 
Understanding field and identity relation 
One of the most important characteristics of Bourdieu in defining the identity of the state in 
international relations is based on understanding the concept of the field and its spatial 
distribution of state identity. The fundamental expansion of this study in relation to 
Bourdieusian epistemology is to understand the state as a group of social representation in a 
politically concentrated field of international relations. This expansion also describes the 
conceptualization of agency in the international field. In this aspect, the state, as the agency of 
the international field, is a group of individuals which constructs social relations with other 
similar entities. In this way, there is no differentiation in the socialization of individuals in the 
field of a community/family and the socialization of the state in the field of international 
relations. Similar to individuals, the state can only have an identity in relation to other states 
in the same practical field. The state acts as an individual in its socio-spatial field of practice. 
The entire system of states functions as a system of a single society, and states perform as 
individuals, who accomplish different spheres of actions in different fields of the society.  
The structure of the international field, functionally, is the same as for pre-modern 
political systems, and even the basic tribal community or family’s practical sphere of 
relationship. From the tribal to the pre-modern and modern societies of states, differentiation 
is derived from the expansion of space in practical world. The spatial expansion of space 
illustrates what ‘global’ is involved in a certain system of society. In this way, the modern 
state system is practised in the wider space of the international field. A wider international 
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space contains a more complicated and intensified field of practice because, as Bourdieu 
implied, fields are dynamic and diversifying (Mendelson, 2010). In this aspect, modern state 
identity is based on a complexification of the same social and relational existence mechanism 
of pre-modern societies. In this way, the international field is a more complex form of 
conventional societies where the state substitutes for individuals’ and the king’s agency 
positions in the pre-modern social spaces of practice. The identity of the state fulfils the 
specialized field of action in an international relations field. The increasing specialization of 
the sphere improves the identity of agents because differentiated sphere of action and spatial 
complexity in the international field demand a certain definition of identity to naturalize 
legitimized positioning in relation to other identities (Coicaud, 2002). The international field 
is a complex form of the pre-modern field of political space. Therefore, the state fulfils a 
societal role similar to that of individuals in societies.  
The relationship web in the international field has all the political field features of any 
pre-modern societal practices. However, there are some characteristics of state agents which 
downplay the substitutive characteristics of state identity in pre-modern identities. Essentially, 
the advanced bureaucratic functionalization of agents under the name of the state dissembles 
the social characteristics of the agency (Bourdieu, 1996b). Owing to the great stress of 
structure and state relations, the social and mutually relational characteristics of state are 
mostly disregarded. Similar to the individual position in the society field, in the international 
field the state only claims its identity in relation to the other states. In this aspect, it is not 
possible to think of modern state identity in a structure where a single world state takes place 
because the identity of the state is social and relational. This socio-relational identity can only 
survive as long as certain structured structures are conserved by its political agencies. A state 
can only define its advance in relation to others and another state can only identify its lack in 
the same relational way. Individuals define their position in society by evaluating the 
relational differences in practice. Similar to this social functionality in comparison with the 
society of individuals, state identity is also defined by marking differences between observed 
practices in the international field (Ibid.).  
The spatial expanse of pre-modern societal space simultaneously widens the field of 
political practice. This imposes a more complex way of capital allocation in society, which 
provides distinguishing power for subjects’ actions. Because of a complex accumulation of 
capital, individuals and their groups struggle to have a better identity which is more 
compatible with the structured rules of the international field. The spatial expanse of political 
space fundamentally refers to a space where more differences are manifested. The more 
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differences the agent has, the more power relations the agent gets involved in in a wider field 
of practice. Whenever an identity in a societal space does not deal with these power relation 
webs, it inevitably creates another social agent to become an answerable part of new field of 
practice. The identity of the modern state is a result of such spatial expanses of practice. It 
answers the production of new diversified differences. These differences improve the 
institutionalization of social identity in accordance with the practical relations the state can 
compete with.  
Similar to the previous political fields of practice in conventional societies, the 
international field, in a wider inclusive global space, typifies the patriarchal social structure in 
its relational practices. Therefore, all the ‘international’ agencies occupy a positioning of the 
practical field of action beyond a constitutive academic theorization of the state as a sovereign 
equal identity (Reus-Smit, 1999; Shannon & Kowert, 2012). The occupied positioning of the 
state agent in the international field caries out different dispositional productions. In the same 
way, with a patriarchal relationship of conventional pre-modern societies, the state performs 
its potential characteristics of action derived from its capital allocation. Capital allocation 
embodies itself in a symbolic accumulation which reflects agents’ positional distribution in 
the structured international field. As a social entity, the state has always had a symbolic sum 
of capital which has defined the roles and position of the state in the patriarchal relations in 
accordance with other states in the international field. This symbolic accumulation is a sum of 
agents’ embodied previous experiences (Loveman, 2005) and, therefore, there is no structural 
natural characteristic and boundary to expect its own symbolic capital allocation. Hence, the 
identity of the state is predetermined by its socialistic tendencies in a patriarchal relationship 
web.  
The distribution and redistribution of identities by way of differences are closely 
related to agents’ dispositions of nobility (Grenfell, 2008). Identities can only be defined by 
differences and differences can be achieved by relational practices on the basis of structured 
nobility. Agents form their practical understanding of nobility according to the structured 
practices of the field, which improve agents’ compatibility to constitute interrelational 
differences (Bourdieu, 1991). However, a potential expansion in the scope of the field results 
in a redistribution of nobility in agents’ practices. An expanse of space also produces new 
fields of practice which improve agents’ engagements in different fields. Increasing the 
number of fields of practice also improves the capacities of the agents involved 
simultaneously in different fields. The dissipation of existing differences between the agents 
weaken the ordering capacity of nobility between the agents. At the same time, new relational 
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differences strengthen differentiation in line with a new vision of nobility. Under the field of 
medieval political identity, nobody criticizes the king’s ordering of nobility because the 
structured structure persuades that nobility that kingship is bestowed by God. In line with new 
fields and opportunities of capital allocation, the king’s nobility is destroyed because the 
safety of new capital achievement also transforms the symbolic capital of agents, which 
defines a suitable nobility for itself.  
Changes in the scope and extent of a field and its space do not change the fundamental 
institutions of being a society, which focus on the symbolic influence in the nobility of the 
field (Swartz, 2013). In a nutshell, every certain field of practice creates an understanding of 
nobility which forms ordering disciplines for the distinction and differentiation of agents. 
Therefore, modern state identity constitutes a distinctive societal practice of nobility in its 
international field. Changes in nobility in modern state identity are not a natural process. The 
state constitutes its own interrelational understanding of nobility because it is not independent 
from the constraints of being in a society. This is an unconscious strategy: states are bounded 
by their habitual practices when they share the same understanding of nobility as national 
sovereignty. States’ conscious actions in the field are unconsciously embodied by their capital 
allocation, which defends states’ positions in the international field and supports the societal 
functioning of nobility.  
The state’s sovereign nobility does not intentionally operate in line with any social 
convention between states in the international field. Although the definition of identities 
depends on an inter-subjective observation of differentiation (Hopf, 2009), state agency is not 
independent from the positioning of its subjective capital when it translates its identity into 
practical relations (Melanie, 2014). Indeed, in the field of practical relations, states have a 
variety of different positionings according to their available capital allocation. They obey the 
same national sovereign functioning but this functioning is certainly not equally expedient 
because sovereignty is not equally distributed. It functions in accordance with the capital 
allocation of the state. It is persuasive that the state perceives structures by means of its 
conscious experiences, but these experiences are mostly limited by its social positioning in the 
international field. The capital allocations of a sub-Saharan state and a Western state do not 
produce a similar positioning in the international field. They claim the same sovereignty even 
though they have different capacity in terms of the distribution of sovereignty. Both states 
deliberately link to the same nobility of sovereignty but the Western state has more 
adventurous structuring capital to get involved in the advantages of nobility. Otherwise, if one 
looks at these two states in a socially constitutive conventional way, one cannot clarify why a 
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state becomes a particular part of international society, which creates an uneven situation in 
relation to other states. Consequently, these two states abide by their unconscious structured 
symbolic sum of capital as a conscious product of relational convention. Their relations with 
the structure become not only a conscious social convention, but also a practical unconscious 
strategy which fulfils the necessities for being a meaningful part of a society.  
The fundamental disposition of a historical political agency is to fulfil the practical 
requirements for being a part of a community (Navarro, 2006). Having a political identity is a 
struggle to occupy a relationally recognized social position in a community. This is the 
structural narrative of any kind of political agent whose structuring practices confirm its 
dispositional necessity of social position (Weininger, 2005). Political agents always strive for 
a recognizable social position beyond a mutually beneficial agreement of the meanings. Even 
though the social positioning enables a less reputable position for a political subject or an 
agent, this agent hypostasizes the availability of this social space for itself. Further, it does not 
acknowledge any other positioning in the practical community field because symbolic capital 
allocation does not enable itself to fulfil the social reality of another position which does not 
stress and clarify the relational differences of agents’ identity in the field of practice. In line 
with this logic, neither a structurally generalizing individualistic nature/principle nor a 
conscious consensus of a social convention automatically prompts political agents to have a 
certain political identity, but ‘a social nature of structure’ compels agents to be parts of a 
social body (Wacquant, 2013, p. 2), because political agency fundamentally has a meaningful 
presence in a social whole and, therefore, it always unconsciously defines itself in the social 
whole before it produces mutual and rational conventions on their identities.  
The state is a social whole and, therefore, it functions its positional practices, derived 
from its capital allocation, in the social whole. The social whole acts as a family, where states 
perform their positional prosperity to conserve and transform their capital allocation in the 
field of international. In this respect, social relations between agents create realities which 
describe both differences and roles of the political subject in the field. The social nature of 
structure imposes onto the political identity of agents. The political subject does not criticize 
its potential unequal positioning in the field, because taking a recognized position in the 
family is an inevitable structural prerequisite to conserving and changing its positioning by 
way of constitutive ideational processes. In this aspect, state identity naturalizes the unequal 
distribution of social positions in relation to others. Relationally created social realities 
influence practices (Crossley, 2011) and state what kinds of power relations a certain state can 
take part in. The international field provides all the necessary social functionality of this 
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patriarchal distribution social positions. The issue-specific and double-decision mechanism of 
the UN is one of the most interesting peculiarities of this patriarchal social nature of structure. 
Every state of the UN is represented by their capital allocation in the international field. States 
of political subjectivity consciously know the unequal positioning of their social natures, 
which prompts them to be part of a union. States give higher decision-making capacities and a 
patriarchal higher position to the core states because they know that the sum of their symbolic 
capital cannot provide a thoughtful position in terms of the nobility of the international 
structure (international law). So the core states try to conserve their patriarchal position in the 
UN and the other states try to transform this via improving their capital allocation.  
 
Understanding of reality in international relations 
In line with the functionality of the field for understanding state identity, Bourdieusian study 
also opens up an opportunity to problematize thunderstanding of reality in international 
relations.15 Reality is interrelational beyond any materialistic and structuralist evaluation. 
Agents value their identities via looking at the differences in similar entities in the same social 
space. Agents always struggle to become parts of the social space, therefore they try to have 
spatial power relations in the fields according to their comparative differentiated positions in 
the field (Pouliot & Mérand, 2012). In this respect, from the primitive family to the modern 
state, political subjects increasingly become parts of more sophisticated and differentiated 
spatial relations in diversified fields of action. On the other hand, the agents of spatial power 
relation have never been passive bearers of objective structural features. Every single agent 
constructs relations with the social space in accordance with its interaction with the intensified 
interaction with the field. In order to reform structured space, agents have a meaningful 
identification in the existing structured contents of identity. Existing objectivity gives 
meaningful identity allocation to become a recognizable member of the space, which provides 
a basis for constraining existing structures and their power relations. 
The state as the political subject is disposed to the participant of social relations in the 
field of practice. These social relation webs provide differentiated and unequal positioning for 
each state in the field, but, in order to transform social positioning, the state must firstly 
consider that it has to have a recognized social positioning in a different field of power 
relations. This positioning in the field defines the scope of power relations for every 
                                               
15
 For a comprehensive discussion on Bourdieu and reality in social science, see Jenkins (1992). 
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individual subject of the same international field (Bennett, 2008). The scope of the social 
positioning of the state here is more complex than a concrete understanding of self-defence. 
The social positioning of state identity functions as a field of recognition which empowers 
state identity to transform its social relation and its positional location in the field. Because of 
differentiated social positioning, state identity does not externalize itself in a monotonic 
anarchic structure, but differentiates according to restricted spheres and the capability of 
action in its special positioning. Thus, in order to understand how state identity operates, one 
should look at what kind of power relations can be taken part according to the particular 
social positioning of individual states.  
The differentiated positioning of state identity in the field carries out different 
dispositions for each state. These dispositions are linked to certain ‘rules of game’ as social 
realities which are actually social constraints of comparative social positions between states 
(Swartz, 1997; Nye, 2013; Pilario, 2005). The political identity of the subject is not 
determined by structures, but dispositional constraints of a certain positioning predetermine 
how political identities are defined in relation to the others. In this respect, the social 
positioning of the political subject is free from the structural determination, but dispositional 
constraints distribute a different nobility of structure, which empowers different constitutive 
conscious practices for every political subject. Social reality derived from dispositional 
constraints of practices continually balances political identity under a new patriarchal system 
of identity which changes its identity via a conceiving and transformative functioning of 
dispositional positioning/repositioning.  
The identity of the subject is always defined and survived under the existence of a 
somewhat patriarchal balance in the practical field (Kårtveit, 2014). These patriarchal 
relations are practised in a similar way in the international field by political subjects. On the 
other hand, these patriarchal links between political subjects become invisible as the political 
subjects link more complex and diversified fields of action simultaneously. Here, I want to 
reconsider the understanding of ‘security’ for political subjects. Every political subject 
produces a different disposition of security according to its social positioning. Dispositions 
predetermine how security is conserved and transformed into political subjects in relation to 
others. Because of dispositional constraints in practical field, it is not plausible to talk about 
an automatic self-defence system of structure.16 Political subjects are structured by a different 
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positioning which depends on different dispositions. If the self-defence system does not 
operate for agents in the same way, one cannot conclude that the space is anarchical. Because 
of the fact that different dispositional positioning survives in the same field, dispositions 
should unconsciously dictate certain roles in the social reality of a patriarchal balance. In this 
way, in a primitive tribal political structure, the patriarchal leader is believed to save the 
security of other individual political identities in the practical field of relations. Individuals of 
this patriarchal balance provide some other functions, such as giving gifts to the leader and 
providing their fundamental necessities, which construct the nobility of security. In the feudal 
political organization of identity, this patriarchal balance is reconstructed by nobility 
exchange between the king and their feudal units. The king provides security in exchange for 
tax from feudal units which organize the nobility of security in a new patriarchal balance. 
Owing to the complexity of the field of practice in the modern state as political subject, this 
patriarchal balance weakens in the field of practice. The function of security in the 
international field is operated by the UN system. The UN Security Council is theoretically 
believed to guarantee the safety of all states in the system. Other states give a patriarchal role 
for five permanent members of the Security Council. This patriarchal balance in the 
international field illustrates the nobility of security and distribution of positioning among the 
states. These five states undertake patriarchal roles and the others help them to achieve 
security via giving them such appropriate necessities as military bases in their territorial 
spaces. The distribution of positioning from the UN General Assembly to the Security 
Council embodies the symbolic exchange of nobility and disposition. Therefore, the exchange 
of nobility on the basis of positioning is also a social reality of state identity, even though it 
becomes more complex in comparison with former identities of political subjectivity.  
In a similar way with constructivist social understanding, it is plausible to say that the 
identity of the political subject has the conscious ability to negotiate the structures (Frueh, 
2003; Chandra, 2012). From individuals in a peasant community to modern complex state 
identities, political subjects have been able to negotiate their identities in the field. The critical 
point here is to see whether the dispositional products of political subjects carry out the 
similar negotiation capacity for the political subjects. Political subjects do not simply embody 
structures, but structural embedded constraints in political subjects’ dispositions affect the 
independent transformative ability of political subjects regarding their identities (Seidman, 
2013). International law is a characteristic tool for describing the conceiving and 
transformative ability of subjects’ political identities. Here I want to focus on the classical 
constructivist claims that modern state identity is derived from conscious agreement on a 
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fundamental norm – sovereignty/recognition – which creates an international law-based 
society of states (Shannon & Kowert, 2012; Neumann, 1996; Green, 2002). International law 
forms an objective embodiment of normative agreement on state identity. Similar to the gift 
exchanging system in peasant society, international law constitutes unconscious dispositional 
constraints which are preserved by the states. For example, international law regarding 
sovereignty within the defined borders of national states is likely to be in the interest of 
certain countries, because they are more likely to be under the pressure of immigration in 
comparison with others. Consequently, by conceiving of a social positioning in international 
relations, the state also conceives of its dispositional differentiation in terms of international 
law. International law theoretically constructs a normative agreement among the members but 
in practice embodies a notion of nobility and the distribution of roles in a more complex 
patriarchal international field of practice.  
Therefore, in the formation of the identity of the political subject, objective and 
subjective structures and conceiving and transformative social productions intrinsically 
coexist in the field of practice (Hassdorf, 2007). Otherwise, if the political identity of state 
depended purely on conscious ideational consensus on fundamental norms, it would be hard 
to understand why all the states would want to be part of agreements which create unequal 
positions for its members. Substantially, it is not plausible for some political subjects to 
recognize certain identities in the cause of fundamental norms because they certainly become 
parts of social practices which are disadvantageous for them in comparison with other 
political subjects in the field. Political subjects are restricted by their structural experiences in 
a different social positioning. In this way, when political subjects reproduce themselves they 
are consciously involved in their dispositions, but these dispositions are subject to embodied 
unconscious structural experiences (Lane, 2000). In this way, the political subject or state is 
capable of transforming its identity, but the dispositional arsenal of this transformation is 
derived from structural constraints and the experiences of the political subject. The illusion 
regarding conscious normative agreement, or ‘unconscious universalisation of a particular 
case’ (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 136), actually traces a more complex and diversified field of 
action. It forms a new patriarchal system of exchange which reproduces a suitable disposition 
for the changing social positioning of political identities. Conserved symbolic perception of 
the political subject transforms its identity in relation to other subjects in the same field. In 
other words, the inseparable existence of objective and subjective structures embodies the 
social positioning of political subjects, which uses its conserved dispositions in order to 
transform its positioning and its identity simultaneously.  
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Habitus and political identity formation 
The potential distinctive element of Bourdieu regarding the political subject/state and its 
identity is to use habitus as the mediator between the objective and subjective structures 
(Bourdieu, 1990b). Habitus is mostly based on a blended amount of disposition derived from 
objective structures. These dispositions comprise all positional experiences and predisposed 
cognitive structures such as the tastes and fears of subjects. They unconsciously affect and 
restrict the potential structural engagements of subjects. Owing to these embodied 
dispositions in the identity of subjects, subjects unconsciously border their transformative 
actions and possible imaginations of their advancement in the structural world. This 
compatibility between the conserved and transformative character of identity helps us to 
reconsider objectivity and subjectivity confusion on identity creation. Both structural and 
constructivist approaches to political identity of state try to confirm a standard totalized 
identification for all members of the political subjects. Therefore, discussions focus on a kind 
of overarching characteristic of all members. They mostly oversee the individualistic 
characteristics, positional distinctions in fields, cognitive abilities to discussion of structures 
and expectations for being a part of society of political space. However, habitus not only 
provides us with a basis to take into account individualistic features of subjects/states, but also 
affects states’ transformative qualification on their own identities (Guillory, 2000).  
Accordingly, the reasonability for a state of being in the international space does not 
cohere with the reasonability of other states in same international space. Every individual 
subject/state has their own ability of discussion regarding acts of the field. Because of the 
individualistic and distinctive dispositions of each state regarding their structural position and 
identity, it is not plausible to link the rational choices of subjects and their identities in the 
international field. In other words, the state does not operate a functionalization of its identity 
by means of a coherent ideation of its members or a norm-based consensus of structures 
which requires a parallel belief of all states on an external social structure of existent 
fundamental norms. However, this could only be possible when all members of political 
identity originated from the same forms of dispositions in their habitus. Consequently, 
political subjects or states do not consciously make rational decisions on the definition of their 
identities, but they behave in accordance with a practical strategy (Bourdieu, 1998b; Lane, 
2006), which is influenced by their positional dispositions in international field. This practical 
strategy – or, as Bourdieu defined it, ‘feel for the game’ – serves as a part of social space 
(Bourdieu, 1998b). This functions in the same way from political identification of a very 
 70
traditional primitive community to the modern state identity. Individuals’ practical sense of 
the feel for the game in a primitive community results in a definition of their identities in 
relation to the patriarch (Bourdieu, 2012) because the practical sense of the political subject is 
fundamentally prone to occupy a position in social space. Similarly, medieval political 
subjectivity was based on a practical sense on having a position in social space in relation to 
the king. In the same way, the identity of the national state system cannot be seen as a result 
of mutually cognitive production and participation of all members, because, apparently, the 
construction of the international field is not equally feasible for all states pursuing national 
identities. This can only be explained by a practical strategy of states in order to be a part of 
the social field. Otherwise, it would not be logical for a state to act in accordance with 
fundamental norms of the international system which provide unequal conditions in relations 
to others.  
As it is described, the identities of political subjects only live in the social sphere field. 
This continual socialization of identities takes their distinctive positions of the field, which 
always link to a somewhat patriarchal distribution of sociality. This structure spontaneously 
forms and influences certain limitations on the positional behaviours of political identity. 
When a certain political subject enters into a field, it is always subject to an evaluation of 
presuppositions in this field. These presuppositions effectively function as descriptive 
blueprints of the subject which are benefited by other subjects of identity when they construe 
actual positions of individual identities into the field (Bourdieu, 1984; Robbins, 2000). This 
means that every field has its own rules or internal organizational expectations which 
originate from an aggregated experience of field throughout the history of structures 
(Bourdieu, 1993d). The rules are found before subjects of political identity produce their 
unconscious dispositional strategies in the field of action (Sparrow & Hutchinson, 2013). In 
this way, the objective field of structure forms a certain type of guideline logic beyond the 
subjects of identity’s own dispositional production of habitus. Productions of habitus or 
dispositions of subjects belong to ongoing transforming structures of history of society. Also, 
rules of fields or logics of structures belong to the present state of aggregated history of 
socialization, which contains traces of all existing and inexistent fields of historical 
accumulation. This double foundation of the societal field indicates that structures not only 
restrict the actualization of political subjectivity but also predispose the practical strategies of 
political subjects through dispositions. The degree of harmony between the rules of the 
structures and dispositional unconscious strategies of political subjects illustrates the 
distinguishing characters of particular identities in accordance with the other identities of the 
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field. This harmony forms an unofficial common accord among the members of political 
identity. It functions as a mediator for political identity to gain certain positions. According to 
their positions, political subjects embody a founded patriarchal structure which distributes 
social roles of political subjects in an unequal invisible hierarchical way in the field. Thus, 
political subjects perceive the structures’ rules simultaneously as members of the same 
structures.  
Bourdieu calls these internal aggregated rules of field ‘doxa’. Doxa, or primordial 
political belief (Bourdieu, 1998b), is essential to understand how the identity of the state, as 
the political subject, is influenced by the aggregated history of structures; therefore, the state 
does not contravene the rules of objective fields. It was embodied before conscious struggles 
come into existence between competing political identities (Ibid.). The field of international 
relations also forms a distinctive patriarchal role in which the identities of states can take a 
potentially suitable position in comparison with others. The quality of position for the 
political subject is determined by how well its disposition (feel for the game) corresponds 
with doxa (the rules of the game) (Busby, 2015). The better a political subject matches up 
with the aggregated doxa of the field, the better it establishes objective relations. In a 
medieval political field, the king is in his position because the dispositions and aggregated 
rules of the field accomplish a higher patriarchal role for the king. In this respect, the field of 
international relations is a distinctive distribution style for the disposition of states and doxa 
of the field. The rules of the international field certainly serve the purposes of certain states in 
comparison with others. Although states try to transform the field in accordance with their 
practical future strategy, they conserve patriarchal distribution of political identity in 
accordance with the rules of the international field. In this way, the rules of field, such as 
national identities, the inviolability of defined borders and the sovereignty of the state, create 
better values for some states, which have a better patriarchal position in the international field. 
In addition, the symbolic role of identity for some states becomes more valuable than for 
other states. In particular, the European Union is able to utilize sovereignty better than the 
other developing states. In consequence, it is possible today that an individual can buy 
residency or even nationality of a state in exchange for a considerable amount of money. On 
the other hand, a Third World state cannot sell its residency or nationality because its position 
in the international field is not in accordance with international rules, and, therefore, 
nationality of that state cannot create symbolic value which helps to improve better objective 
relations in the field.  
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Language is another important point to understand the construction style of patriarchal 
identity distribution and its historical accumulation of doxa in the international field 
(Bourdieu, 1991). Produced strategies of state identity symbolically focus on creating 
meaningful answers for this socially produced and aggregated language. In the international 
field, international law forms the language of state identity. The international law of the 
international field also juggles with the representative positions of its state members in the 
practical field. In the same way, dispersions of habitus manifest how well certain states can 
take advantage of the existing language in international fields. This is important because in 
practice it determines the patriarchal distinctions of state identities in relations to the others. 
Consequently, the language of international law offers an opportunity to define positions – 
such as ‘First World’ – for some state identities. This also results in the creation of a practical 
space, such as the Second World, and the Third World, for other subject states of the same 
international field. Other states which want to be a member of the same societal field objectify 
their legitimate positions in accordance with the language of doxa in in international relations. 
In this way, constructivist weakness regarding state identity in international relations 
rests upon its overarching emphasis on the rules of the field, or doxa (Checkel, 1998; Rieker, 
2006). Although constructivist terminology intensively discusses the effects of historical 
aggregated rules on the institutionalization of state identity (Guzzini, 2013), it theorizes these 
rules as a conscious accord between the members of political subjects. A Bourdieusian 
concept of habitus helps us to remember that states as political subjects do not consciously 
find out the rules of the international field, but they are motivated by practical strategies of 
habitus which are deeply embedded in their previous structural experiences and qualifications 
(Swartz, 2013). Indeed, constructivists are highly successful in understanding the subjective 
structures of identity construction in international relations. However, the question of what 
kind of rationality forces the state to be a part of the international field raises problems, 
because, in practice, being a part of this field also means being a part of an unequally 
distributed identity on the basis of credible pride in a new internationalized patriarchal field. 
A Bourdieusian understanding of habitus complements a doxa-centred definition of state 
identity in a constructivist evaluation. Owing to the distinctive dispositions of the states in 
their habitus, their objective practical strategies embody even non-advantageous positions in 
the international field. This asserts unconscious structural effects on the practical 
implementation of doxa in international relations. Habitus as structuring structure creates 
unconscious practical strategies for states to conserve and transform their identities in the 
doxa-ruled field of international relations as structured structures. Therefore, a fundamental 
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distinctive success of Bourdieu in understanding states’ political identities is to propound 
habitus as structuring a practical sense of political subject which provides indirect habitual 
effect in the formation and practice of political identity beyond the more structured historical 
aggregated doxa of international relations. Consequently, constructivism is successful in 
demonstrating more structured relations of political subjects, but it is not plausible to 
understand the structuring effects on identities and practical strategies of habitus beyond any 
rational convention between the states or subjects. 
 
Distinction of a Bourdieusian study of political identity 
First and foremost, Bourdieusian study of political identity in international relations opens up 
an opportunity to obliterate the duality of subjective and objective structural approaches 
(Fogle, 2011). It enables this study to successfully depict the intrinsic, intertwined and 
inseparable coexistence of structural and idealistic productions on the formation of political 
identity in international relations. Similar to social construction, a Bourdieusian study of 
political identity conceives that the political field is based on social structures and the 
historical social accumulation of experiences beyond the material structures, but it also 
questions the determinative reductionist approach of shared ideas and knowledge/culture on 
the socialization of the field and its subjects. Political subjects are not wholly conscious 
regarding their productions of ideas. They form their knowledge according to practical 
dispositions which depend on historically accumulated experience of structures. Different 
political subjects experience different positions in the field of structure, but they 
unconsciously become parts of a structural accumulated culture by means of their unequally 
distributed positions and positional dispositions. In this way, the identities of political subjects 
are not independent from their ideations and interactions. On the other hand, political subjects 
are also not independent from the unequal structural distribution of positions and their 
dispositions. This means that political subjects are always invisibly influenced by structural 
predetermined dispositions. Political subjects use these dispositions as a practical reflex when 
they produce their practices. Due to the unequal distribution of subjects’ positions in the 
political field, these practical dispositions also transfer a founded structural domination into 
the field of politics. Shared knowledge or culture always imposes the symbolic violence of a 
certain founded domination in the field. In this way, the intertwined foundation of subjective 
and objective structures in the political field emphasizes two important structural effects on 
the ideational construction of socially accumulated experiences. Firstly, the habitus of 
political agents imposes predetermined structural forms into agents’ practical reflex of actions 
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in line with their social positions in the field of action. Afterwards, the compatibility between 
the positional dispositions of political subjects and historically accumulated knowledge or 
culture (doxa) of structure defines how agents interpret their identities according to invisibly 
founded structural domination.  
Besides this, Bourdieusian fieldwork in particular opens up questions regarding the 
internal indigenous representation of political subjects beyond their social interactions. The 
study pays regard to the indigenous socialization process of political identity. It not only 
conceptualizes the actions of political identities in accordance with other political identities in 
the same field, but also researches the individualistic presence of identities before interactions 
in the field. This gives us an opportunity to scrutinize the indigenous subjective structures of 
political subjects in political field. In other words, Bourdieusian study highlights the 
subjective structures of political agents before agents constitute their relational identities in 
objective fields (Narváez, 2013). In a nutshell, Bourdieusian study does not approach political 
subjects as unit-based similar actors in the field of interrelational practices, but the study 
works out all indigenous subjective productions of political subjects, which are also 
significant means for tracing the foundation of political identity. The study emphasizes the 
links between the founded capital allocation of political identities and their relative positions 
in the process of socialization (Bourdieu, 1998b). Consequently, it is interested in the 
indigenous capital allocation of political identity, which restricts the dispositions of subjects 
on the perception of identity. It researches that the subjective capital of agents is an important 
productive element of political identity beyond the objective capital of agents. It claims that a 
certain combination of subjective and objective capital achieves a better position according to 
founded culture of structures (rules of field/doxa) in the field of practice. It shows transitive 
links between the subjective capital of agents and the objective rules of structures. In this way, 
agents’ indigenous dispositions and habitus become elements of political identity foundation 
as much as agents’ exogenous inter-subjective position, knowledge and culture of structures.  
Bourdieusian fieldwork also observes continuation and transition of historical 
structural accumulation of experiences in a more descriptive way. It helps us to see that, from 
primitive peasant political socialization to modern state identity, political subjects render 
themselves members of more complex and diversified fields of practices. Increasingly, 
modern political states develop into participants of different conditions in different fields, 
which prompts an involvement in distinctive power relations in line with their positions in the 
fields. The kind of power relations that states take part in also defines how they interpret their 
political identities in the objective field of action. By contrasting the social constructivist 
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perspective, inter-subjective ideas, knowledge and culture of particular historical accumulated 
experiences are not the sole bases of political identity production in Bourdieusian theory. In 
addition to this, Bourdieusian study tries to show the similarities regarding the unconscious 
interpretation of identity construction in different structural field of practices. In other words, 
Bourdieusian political identity engagement not only shows a differentiation of political 
identities in different historical accumulation of socialization, but also illustrates the structural 
resemblances of identity construction from the primitive political identity to the modern state 
identity (Bourdieu, 2012).  
The core of structural resemblances regarding political identity construction is derived 
from a rendition of patriarchal representation in a different socialization of historical 
accumulation. The patriarchal representation of political identity in Bourdieusian study goes 
beyond the ordinary study of patriarchy in Hobbesian and Weberian study. Hobbes naturally 
transfers the family organization of patriarch to the state authority and describes patriarchy as 
anthropologically and morally empowered natural and historical fatherly authority (Thornton, 
2005). Besides this, Weber truly distinguishes patriarchy from its gender-based definition but 
he inadequately thinks that patriarchal distribution of identity is based on a historically static 
and natural relationship of dominance (Gerth & Mills, 1991; Adams & Sydie, 2001). 
However, Bourdieu, in a similar way to Weber, helps us to distinguish patriarchy from its 
gender-oriented bases, and provides us with the perspective that patriarchal political identity 
is reproduced by practical dispositions which unconsciously force agents to behave in 
accordance with certain structurally dominated norms of patriarchy. These embodied 
dispositions of political subjects unconsciously impose dominance onto identities of political 
subjects as natural social practices of structures. Patriarchal representation is found in 
symbolic unconscious embodied dispositions of political subjects, rather than a natural, 
historical and unchangeable fatherly structuration of subjects. Therefore, a Bourdieusian 
understanding of patriarchy emphasizes a distribution of symbolically defined hierarchy 
between the members of political identity. Bourdieu does not see patriarchy as a static form of 
primitive family authority in more complex political identities, but Bourdieusian 
understanding of patriarchy is apt to understand how the honour mechanism of a certain 
hierarchical structure is reproduced in accordance with a different distribution of political 
identities. Honour, which is the symbolic border of a subject’s position in the practical field, 
is a hidden form of patriarchal subjective domination in the socialization of political 
identities. Structured honour not only creates symbolic consensus for the loyalty of patriarchal 
hierarchy on political identities, but also forms contents of symbolic violence for the subjects 
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which are dependent of this patriarchal honour. As a result of this, Bourdieusian patriarchal 
resemblances of political subjects in different historically accumulated structural experiences 
depend on a dynamic and symbolic representation which produces honour for the consensus 
of invisible domination and symbolic violence for the determination of position in symbolic 
hierarchy.  
Consequently, a Bourdieusian study of political identity achieves a better 
understanding of reproduction and changes of identities in the political field. The existing 
studies of social construction mostly focus on the interactional side of political agency (Klotz 
& Lynch, 2007; Copeland, 2000). According to this, interactions among the political subjects 
may change the identity perceptions of subjects, because subjects do not have any pre-defined 
understanding of identity but they define self–other differentiation and its content in the 
process of social interactions (Risse-Kappen, 2005; Wendt, 1999). It excludes socialization 
processes in the political field from the internal social productive processes of agents because 
it supposes that the inter-subjective processes of political identities produce independent 
distinctive cultures of knowledge and ideas for the definition of identities. This makes 
structures a space that only exists in the inter-subjective productions of political subjects. This 
means that changes in identities are only possible via the creation of a distinctive 
understanding of the self–other dichotomy in the process of inter-subjective interactions. In 
line with Bourdieusian identity study, the existing research misses out some important bases 
regarding changes of political identities. It does not explain the scope of changes or the 
question of why political subjects prefer certain changes in comparison with others in the 
process of inter-subjective social interactions. Besides this, it fails to notice political agents’ 
indigenous socialization of self beyond the inter-subjective field of action. Bourdieusian study 
of identity emphasizes that political subjects depend on embodied habitual behavioural 
dispositions derived from structural position of self, which gives code and conduct of self and 
other separation before political subjects construct inter-subjective relations. Any 
differentiation in the embodied structural dispositions also changes positions that affect 
definitions of self and otherness in the field of practice. In other words, the embodied 
structural habits of subjects affect the characteristics of reproduction and change in political 
identities before inter-subjective relations come into existence.  
In line with this, the Bourdieusian study of political identity also understands the 
indigenous socialization of agents before social interactions in the political field (Susen, 
2011). Characteristics of these indigenous socialization are defined by the capital allocation of 
self, which depends on the structural subjective bordering of political subjects. Because of 
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these unconscious subjective borders, political subjects comply with the reproduction of 
political identity in the field of practice. Therefore, changes in identities are transferred into 
practice by both structural and inter-subjective processes simultaneously. Existing structures 
interpret borders of knowledge or the culture of particular subjects because they restrict 
unconscious dispositions of political subjects according to their present state of capital 
allocations. Then, political agents define their positions and identities in line with their 
unconsciously dominated dispositions in the inter-subjective processes of the practical field. 
Changes in political identities fundamentally depend on crisis or conflict on doxa or shared 
rule of structures, which prompts the problematization of the unconscious domination of 
practices. In this way, political subjects reproduce their identities by way of dispositional 
behaviours which objectively confirm their positions in the field and subjectively embody the 
unconscious domination of power. Accordingly, changes in political identities happen when 
political identities start to resist the unconscious dispositional cognitive productions of 
domination in their habitus which impose to behave in accordance with the domination of a 
certain patriarchal nobility. Therefore, Bourdieusian study of political identity presents both 
conserved and transformative characteristics of political identity in the field (Bourdieu, 
1995c). Transformation not only happens in the inter-subjective field of actions but also 
firstly depends on the internalization crises of political subjects regarding embodied 
dispositions that go beyond the indigenous space of inter-subjective construction. Changes of 
political identities arise out of conflicts with the symbolic indigenous dispositions of subjects; 
these conflicts are then brought into crises on the inter-subjective cognition of doxa in the 
objective field.  
Bourdieusian study of identity also interprets cultures of fields in political spaces in a 
more comprehensive way. The existing research on construction generally conceptualizes 
culture in line with the existence of anarchy in the field (Dessler & Owen, 2005; Hopf, 1998). 
Bourdieusian study does not focus on objective existence and construction of culture on the 
basis of anarchy, but it highlights subjective the existence of nobility, which unconsciously 
imposes a patriarchal domination onto the social bodies of political subjects. Being part of the 
doxic relations of the field also creates a consensus on the distinctive position of domination 
because doxa always complies with certain nobility of domination which is unconsciously 
valued by all members of the political field. The existing nobility of the political field creates 
different positions for the members of political identity. Nobility functions as domination and 
its capital allocation for some members of the political fields, but this nobility also functions 
as a symbolic violence for some other members of the field which have less capable capital 
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allocation (Bourdieu, 1991). Therefore, the production of culture is related to the existence of 
a consensus of nobility rather than the existence of certain anarchy in the field. In this way, 
beyond the cognitive production of knowledge and culture, political identity is derived from 
the behavioural preferences of agents, which are not objective rational products but are the 
subjective unconscious values of agents’ positions, containing spheres from nobility to 
symbolic violence of domination. Eventually, in the light of these distinctive elements of 
Bourdieusian political identity, this study defines political identity as a struggle on capital 
allocation which facilitates the domination of symbolic dispositions and enables the 
reproduction of domination in accordance with the recognized doxa of the political field. 
Improved capital allocation of subjects may change consciousness of subjects regarding their 
dispositions; political subjects may then rebel against structured rules of doxa. In this way, 
subjects refuse the symbolic violence of dominative nobility and they problematize their 
conserved positions in order to transform political identification. To sum up, for Bourdieusian 
study, political identities depend on both objective and inter-subjective relations and have 
both reproductive and transformative capacities simultaneously.  
  
 79
CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Politics: theory and practice via Bourdieu 
Consideration of theory–reality relation and its inferences in the field of economics is seen as 
a different and problematic construction by Bourdieu (2005). This is in part because theory is 
not seen as a kind of subtraction or complement of reality. Rather, it is perceived as a 
deliberate intention of power allocation in the social life. Thus, every theory constructs a 
particular kind of neutralization in order to form the rational means of causation. These 
rational means of causation serve the arbitrary logic of powerful and collective identity. 
Objective structures and their real world interrelations are not theorized by factual reason–
result implications. Contrarily, they are designed by theoretical evaluations because theories 
interpret how the domination of social structures relocates the relation web, classification, 
boundaries, collectiveness and distribution in political, social and economic life.  
The Bourdiean turn in international relations can prompt approaches that are in many 
ways more embedded in historical and social context. History is dialectically full of objective 
social changes. However, to evaluate history as just an interpretation of objective changes 
(Krasner, 2009) not only ignores the dynamics of social interactions regarding the production 
of a common future, but also objectifies the past as a sole concrete meaning. In this respect, 
Linklater seeks to understand the history in which transformation of political society comes 
into existence at a deep level. He claims that ‘freely chosen moral principles’ improve history 
in order to emancipate the future of society (Linklater, 1998, p. 22). Nevertheless, these 
principles cannot be the reference of history as long as they are not compatible with the 
objective socio-political and economic structures. Historical subjectivity is intertwined with 
the objective structures because it indoctrinates the causation of historical arbitrariness in 
certain collectiveness. In addition to this, to evaluate history as a kind of story or linguistic 
permissiveness (Jenkins, 1997) impairs the dialectical objectification and re-objectification of 
history. Dominance of arbitrary interpretations of history does not solely depend on 
interpretations of the subjects. In fact, history is an ongoing process which governs the 
coexistence of pre-domination of subjective structures and continuation of objective social 
life.  
There is not any ontological connection between human nature and structures, but it 
should be seen that human nature, interests and identities always cohere in the whole history. 
The ontology of human nature is the relativity of historicizing which transforms temporal 
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particularity into ontological universality via the ‘ethernalization of temporality’. Ideas cannot 
provide common actions to prompt common interests and shared identities. In order to give 
the meaning of common ideas and interests, it must be by means other than the ontology of 
human nature. In this way, it is thought that habitus is the way to explain the meaning of how 
interests and identities can be constructed similarly. Habitus bridges the gap in structural and 
interactional ontology. The agents freely pursue their interests in accordance with their ideas, 
but their ideas are unconsciously imposed by a set of representations of certain habitual 
constructions. The material world is designed in accordance with this set of instructions in 
habitus. Habitus is continually reorganized by the feedback of this material and objective 
world. Therefore, concepts such as peace, war and cooperation do not correlate to the 
construction of certain historical identities, but, on the contrary, they refer to how habitus 
identifies the objective world and how the objective world reorganizes agents’ dispositions in 
their habitus. The objective world is not the constructive basis of common norms or identities, 
but this field undergoes unconscious construction of the agents’ habituation and conscious 
reconstruction of habitus respectively. 
Every social collectivity produces practices to maintain objective changes in 
accordance with its own aspirations and expectations. Changes firstly dominate the 
subjectively internalized structures of individuals and then they externalize their existences by 
means of objective embodiment of subjective structures. A totalized political collectivity in 
social stratification tends to influence objective structures in accordance with their own 
arbitrariness. Theory functions as the nobility of this collective subjectivity, which naturalizes 
the artificial conditions of their interests into practices. In other words, theory comes into 
existence when individuals, groups and classes in the same social collectivity want to improve 
and naturalize their own objective structures because dispositions are inadmissible without 
this theoretical invasion in the subjective structures of political identity. Thus, history is the 
field to understand the linkages between the deliberate construction of subjectivity and the 
objective structures of this subjectivity (Bourdieu, 1995a). Theory forms the beliefs of the 
whole political identity, which leads to codes of practices. Because of this belief, political 
subjects do not conflict with the objective structures and its stratification.  
The function of theory is to produce a sense of limit for subjects in a certain historical 
social stratification (Bourdieu, 1984). The basic instrumentality of theory for political 
subjectivity not only rests on objective institutions, moral expectations and linguistic 
relativity, but also improves a state of ideational social stratification which produces coherent 
practices for subjective and objective structures. According to Bourdieu, this coherence is the 
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most consistent nature of established order, which operates on its own peculiar logic and 
stratification (Bourdieu, 1995a). The theoretical domination of individuals extends from 
individuals’ practices to the common practices of the state called common sense. This 
improves the recognition of political subjects in accordance with their social spaces. The 
success in theoretical dominance enhances quality of differentiation in social positioning and 
standardizes the boundaries, borders and rules in a given political field. Standardization also 
means naturalization of the relationship styles and intensity between the classes, because the 
state perceives its positioning in the international field as a kind of natural positioning, which 
can be the only suitable closure for their theoretical knowledge and disposition. Therefore, 
theory functions as the subjective predetermined mode of an arsenal which produces 
misrecognition for the social positioning of the state in a particular domination of objective 
practices. Misrecognition constructs the self-limitation mechanism due to the limited and 
determined knowledge of state identity regarding its own positioning. In accordance with this 
theory and practice coherence, objective political relations in the international field are 
produced and reproduced as long as a new theoretical naturalization comes into existence in 
order to serve a distinctive domination of social stratification.  
The second part of the same coin is the sense of reality, which means the 
objectification of self-limitation in real life (Bourdieu, 1984). The sense of reality pretends to 
be the production of subjects and, therefore, political subjects evaluate themselves as 
autonomous entities when they produce their identities. The autonomy of the state, achieving 
social and political identity, is a political fictionalization of knowledge in order to maintain 
the continual reproduction of the political field. Any kind of inconsistency in theory and sense 
of reality may cause significant obstacle to achieve stabilization in the distribution of political 
identities. A lack of strong sense of reality and challenges of new limitation result in 
differentiation in political order and identities because theoretical statements do not support 
the objective social world.  
Furthermore, the most important function of the sense of reality is to produce and 
reproduce power relations in the identities of political subjectivity. It always has a political 
function, which also shapes the social and economic institutions (Bourdieu, 1995a). In this 
aspect, subjective references of state identity have the same classification, division and 
boundaries as the objective field because subjective and objective fields are framed by the 
same power relations. When state identity is identified, an understanding of ‘nature’, which is 
an interpretation of power relations in the objective field, always precedes this theorization. 
This ‘nature’ is naturalized by theories, exercised by practices and changed by new 
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allocations of power relations or social stratification. The roles and positions of political 
subjects are distributed according to these power relations. The dominance of power relations 
as an invisible hand constructively governs every differentiation in the international field from 
gender, labour, age groups and family to ethnicity and nation of state. In order to be a part of 
the international field, the state should be part of the existing sense of reality because this 
reality is basically a presupposed common sense in their subjective structures (Holton, 2000). 
For example, a gendered discourse hardly produces a counter position, as opposed to gender 
differentiation in the market, because its subjective world is also constituted by the same 
sense of reality. In other words, it has to take advantage of the existing dispositions in order to 
give meaning of the objective world.  
Therefore, when we try to understand the construction of political identities, it is 
important to evaluate the social constitutive norms, recognition and legitimacy of sovereign 
actors (Reus-Smit, 2007; Ruggie, 1998; Finnemore, 1996a), but these are not enough to 
understand the political subjectivity of state because, from a Bourdieusian perspective, these 
are always contingent upon a theoretical deliberate focus. Therefore, when one tries to 
understand how identities are constructed, one should take into consideration two 
indispensable functions in addition to recognition, norms and legitimacy. These two 
indispensable factors are misrecognition and arbitrariness of domination (Bourdieu, 1995a). A 
political field is formulated when all these recognizable and misrecognized factors regularly 
operate and produce each other. Any incoherence in misrecognition and recognition processes 
prompts crises in the political subjectivity of the state. Dominant states of political 
stratification in the international field want to maintain the coherence, but other states are 
gradually troubled with political restlessness when their symbolic accumulation does not 
achieve their practices. However, crises do not automatically lead transformation in political 
identities. Another set of habitus should fulfil the symbolic incoherence of existing political 
structure because the new symbolic coherence is provoked by new power relations and 
domination, which always claim distinctive political identity.  
In the theory of international relations, the constructivist turn to ideas and identities 
deals with the material realist/rationalist theoretical justification of human nature via re-
emphasizing shared interests and ideas (Ruggie, 1993; Reus-Smit, 2002; Reus-Smit, 1999; 
Guzzini, 2000), but it generally oversees the habitual production/reproduction of agents in the 
nature. Human nature is not the reason for production and reproduction of the structures of 
international relations, but the agents still construct their ideas in line with the formations of 
habitus in nature as the objective fields of politics. Identities are not pre-given forms of the 
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nature but they are primarily shaped by the agents’ habitus, which is continually reproduced 
in nature. In this way, when agents construct their identities, they cannot produce the nature 
beside of their social habitus. Objective and subjective natures always reproduce structures in 
relation to each other. Thus, it is necessary to look at the interrelations in the reconstruction of 
ideas and reproduction of nature. One of the guiding references of the Bourdieusian concept 
in international relations is to understand these interrelations between nature and subjective 
ideas. In this part, the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic violence is rethought in the field of 
international relations and it is discussed how symbolic violence references the production 
and reproduction of globalizing identities. Then, the study will rethink and reinterpret the 
construction of bureaucratic field in international relations. 
 
Classificatory function of political field  
Political capital is reorganized by new classifications, forms and limits at every stage of 
historical accumulation. Classification, forms and limits reproduce new totalized collective 
beliefs which institutionalize and concretize certain kinds of rituals as the recognized norms 
of certain political identities. The political capital of identities is reconstructed when 
collective beliefs change. Therefore, it is important to first reinterpret the functions of 
collective beliefs. Collective beliefs prescribe the ideal forms via the symbolic world of 
individuals. When individuals are involved in the objective structures, they do not fall into 
any ambiguity because collective beliefs form the ways of access to the objective structures as 
kinds of ethical norms or rules of exchange. Collective beliefs stem from historicization of the 
totalized symbolic world into the objective structures and they become the bases of identities 
which internalize divisions and achieve mobilization of collective political actions (Bourdieu, 
1984). Agents unconsciously gain the dispositions of collective beliefs which code 
individuals’ identities. The ‘unconscious’ simply means an omission of the former 
historicization and an attachment to a new historicization (Bourdieu, 1995a). Consequently, 
collective beliefs originate in a dehistoricization of former structures for supporting a new 
historicization when a new political identity unconsciously succeeds in representing its own 
interest in the habitus of the other agents as the interests of everyone. In this way, political 
capital does not differ from the individualistic preferences, tastes, aesthetic and material 
interests of certain classes which are concretized by collective beliefs. Historical improvement 
of the abolition of slavery is a good example to depict the historicization/dehistoricization of 
collective beliefs so as to reconstruct political identities. Slavery was originally 
institutionalized as the identity of certain individuals. The states had a right to take advantage 
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of slavery as a kind of social institution. Slaves unconsciously gained their identities by way 
of symbolic violence. They embodied the symbolic construction of slavery and also exercised 
objective structures of slavery. Slavery was historicized by some dominant classes of some 
territories. The subjects of this social institution recognized the interests of these dominant 
groups via falling into misrecognition despite the fact that these interests or ‘realities’ were 
the worst conditions for the slaves. However, in time, slavery institution was recognized all 
over the world as illegitimate. There is no doubt that every agent disapproves of slavery as a 
social institution today. Changes from the approval to disapproval of slavery are the important 
points to understand changes in common beliefs. In this aspect, the interests of dominant 
political identities have changed. This dehistoricized slavery and historicized another 
identification of the individuals instead. These improvements were unconsciously organized 
without the exception of the slaves’ own will because institutionalization of the abolition of 
slavery was gradually realized by the consensus of domination. Therefore, the historicization 
of agents begins the dehistoricization of embodied judgments, which means a dismantling of 
older habitus (Fowler, 1997). Political capital always totalizes identities as the common 
beliefs whose agents are unequally represented according to their territorialities, subjective 
dispositions and objective ‘realities’ by historicization.  
Collective beliefs represent the particularities of a certain domination as universal 
identity. It makes the individuals internalize political capital, which is the reproduction of 
inequalities and distribution of domination. However, the individuals do not realize these 
particularities or inequalities because the particularities dominate unconscious parts of their 
habitus, but they can realize the contemporary functions and objectives of civilization which 
have not been formed as the unconscious common beliefs of the agents (Bourdieu, 1995a). In 
this aspect, when agents engage their identities, they do not form their own collective beliefs 
in the process of these engagements, but they objectify the collective beliefs of identity which 
are produced and reproduced throughout the long processes. In this respect, inequalities are 
not objective conditions, but they are predetermined accumulations of values which make 
agents recognize and regularize their unequal identities. Common beliefs are the producers 
and reproducers of the political order which dissemble inequality and domination of identities. 
Common beliefs are the ways of symbolic power to impose ‘the realities’ of political capital.  
Systems of classification in political capital should be illustrated to understand the 
differentiation of political identities. In this aspect, political capital always reproduces its 
identities by classification of the agents. Classification comes into existence when a dominant 
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class imposes its own consciousness of order as subjective symbolic violence for the other 
agents’ political capital. Bourdieu argues 
The ‘social order’ is thus reduced to a collective classification obtained by addition of the classifying 
and classified judgments through which agents classify and are classified, or, to put it another way, 
through aggregation of the (mental) representation that one group has of the (theatrical) representations 
that other groups give them and of the (mental) representations that the latter have of them (Bourdieu, 
1990b, pp. 135–136)  
In this respect, political capital is reinterpreted by the mutual existence of the classifying and 
classified identities. The dominant social classes of the political order engender a new 
classification which differentiates the producers of the identities from the practitioners of the 
identities. The agent defining the modes of classification imposes the identities and symbolic 
violence of a particular historicization. The dominant classes of political capital can only 
impose ‘a vision of division’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 134), which results in politically 
categorized and individually internalized identities. Classification reorganizes and modifies 
‘the realities’ of the domination according to the new political identities. The agents construct 
their identities by embodiment of the given ‘realities’, which is based on the interpretations of 
other agents’ categorization regarding these particular agents (De Fina, 2006). Thus, political 
identities always require classification in order to survive. For example, the medieval identity 
was due to the classification of suzerain and vassal. The suzerain functions as the creator of 
classification and the vassal serves as the practitioner of this classification. National identities 
objectified new kinds of classifications such as nationally civilized/uncivilized, 
modern/premodern, Third/Second/First World and core/periphery. These classifications 
ideologically serve the purposes and interests of the dominant classes of national identities. In 
the same way, globalization is creating distinctive classifications which are territorially 
decentralized and heterogeneous. Globalization disintegrates the national totalization of 
identities. It classifies the identities according to their degrees of democratization, liberation, 
individualization, genderization or humanitarian-orientation.  
Furthermore, it is logical to re-evaluate ‘the politics of forms’ (Bourdieu, 1995b, pp. 
84–85) in relation to the political capital of identities because forms are always created in 
order to reference political roles, interests and values (Ibid.). The agents are unconsciously 
involved in the politicization of forms so as to give meanings to their identifications. These 
forms are represented by the symbolic construction of the agents. In this aspect, when the 
Western world is defined as the developed world, it also creates sub-forms to make sense of 
the definition of West, such as the developing world. The form of developing world is taken 
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advantage of the agents in order to eliminate the ‘othering’ of the developing world. Political 
order, which stems from social order, is internalized by relative interactions with otherness. 
Objective limits to embody political orders lead to the recognition of inclusion/exclusion, 
whose agents include or exclude themselves from the others in terms of thoughts, status, 
places and belongings (Bourdieu, 1984). Division is recognition of political order in objective 
practices. Antagonism between the political capital of the different groups represents political 
orders which creates political hierarchy because some agents embody some kinds of political 
identification as the most advantaged political position for themselves so as to encounter other 
political identities. This creates dispositional fields of emancipation for the dominated or 
subordinated classes. These fields of emancipation make the subordinated classes obey the 
identity of political capital. They eventually reproduce ‘the classificatory judgments’ (Ibid., 
pp. 170–171) in order to continually regenerate the hierarchical division of political orders.  
 
Power and political field 
Understanding the identifiable characteristic of political subjects leads to discussions of how 
to define power in international relations. Bourdieusian study gives us comprehensive 
descriptive theatrical tools to rethink power in international field. Bourdieusian perspective of 
power mostly relies on legitimacy beyond any structural elements of power (Bourdieu, 
1996b). Power is fundamentally a product of subjective misrepresentation regarding objective 
positions. The misrepresentation of positions is contributed to by an accumulation of 
legitimacy which characterizes a taken-for-granted feature of power. In this respect, power 
and compulsion are not identical and coexistent. The existence of power is based on the 
habitual existence of legitimacy, which naturalizes practices as taken-for-granted actions 
beyond objective structural struggles (Swartz, 2013). Political subjects do not realize the 
existence of power relations because their habitus imposes particular forms of definition as 
legitimate ways to achieve political recognition and representation. As a result of this, the 
main struggle of power is related to struggles of how to represent legitimacy for descriptive 
roots of political collectivization. The field of power is distributed by a contestation of 
different forms of capital which try to influence the roots of legitimacy in the definition of 
collective political identity.  
From a Bourdieusian perspective, power is relational (Navarro, 2006). It is a product 
of different forms of capital which improve its capital allocation as the most distinctive form 
to define objective institutional relations in the field. This relational characteristic in the 
Bourdieusian understanding of power creates a distinctive expression beyond material factual 
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(Cesa, 2009) and ideational consensual explanation of power in international relations (Reus-
Smit, 1997). Power can only be defined when unequally distributed forms of capital compete 
in order to obtain a dominant position in definitive or transformative power of political 
identity. In this respect, the existence of power depends on a creation of subjective categories 
in political identities. These subjective categories can only be produced by positions in 
international fields. In this way, relations actually create objective positions which 
unconsciously legitimize the field of power among the members of political identities. 
Political subjects do not only legitimate their own positions but also legitimate the dominant 
and dominated positions in relation to their own positions. Power is mainly objectified by 
domination in particular political identification, but the control mechanism of this domination 
is not formed by struggles in the objective field. The field of power relies on struggles for the 
domination of dispositions, imposing internalized knowledge which embodies a certain 
position and categorization of political identification as a legitimate and natural way of 
existence.  
The fields of power are not objectified by interests because interests are formed by 
dispositions of states, which are distributed by capacities regarding the objectified legitimacy 
of capital. In other words, there is no immediate consciousness on the interests of states 
because capacities of struggles for legitimacy are differentiated in accordance with the 
harmony of accumulated capital and its legitimate domination. In this respect, state identity is 
constituted by collective memories, but these collective memories are connected to unequal 
capacities of dispositions. Unequal capacities fundamentally create positional differentiations 
in the international field. States can only produce conscious interests in relation to each other 
after this unconscious distribution of habitual classification in positions of the international 
field. The main struggle on the definition of political agency arises from different forms of 
capital, which increase the legitimacy of domination in a field (Bourdieu, 1994). As the result 
of these struggles, owners of a particular form of capital dominate the power of practice in the 
field and they constitute the legitimate definition of political identity. In this way, ownership 
of a particular combination of capital becomes more legitimate in comparison with others. 
Domination of particular capital in the field also defines the conversion rates of capital, which 
depicts distribution in the field of power and position in practice. Consequently, the objective 
interests of political subjects are products of this conversion rate of capital because the value 
standards of behaviours are only defined after a particular conversion rate creates categories 
and positions in a field.  
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After the domination of the collective identity of political subjects is internally 
embodied, this also transforms the internal situations of other political subjects in the same 
field. The internal situations of political subjects are reorganized in accordance with the 
exchange rate of political subjectivity regarding distinctive forms of capital (Swartz, 2013). 
This exchange rate for forms of capital is transferred to the territorial space of other political 
subjects because this increases internal legitimacy, which leads to the relative external 
recognition of political subjectivity. The success of this transformation depends on the relative 
strength of a legitimate form of capital within a particular state identity. A lack of legitimate 
capital results in having dominated positions in relational field of practice. Similarly, a 
conversion rate of accumulated capital also distributes the positions of states in a wider 
international field. In this respect, control over the conversion rates in the internal societal 
structure of political subjects extends the borders to control the rate of capital in the 
international field. This conversion rate determines relative dispositional capacity of political 
subjects. The capacities of each subject naturalizes their positions in field because capacity 
imposes definitive characters of classification in the practical international field. As a result, 
the dispositional capacities of states correspond to their positions in the field.  
Contrary to the existing dominant structural approach in international relations, 
considering the existence of power in relation to the objectification of material interests 
(Moravcsik, 1997; Keohane & Nye, 1989), in Bourdieusian study the field of power is not 
only associated with pure economic reasons or interests. The field of power is always in 
affiliation with an embodiment of a certain form of social and cultural capital, such as 
religious or ethno-centric or academic capital. Political capital is a mechanism to influence the 
legitimacy of state identity, which eventually improves the accumulation of economic capital 
via the domination of power. Economic capital is just a more fluent form of capital which is 
convertible to all other kinds of capital. Therefore, having a dominant position in terms of 
economic capital does not achieve a dominant position of political identity because identity 
construction always requires distinguishing the subjectivity of social and cultural capital over 
the control of disposition, which improves the accumulation of economic capital in the 
practical field. The accumulated history of political identity is the evidence that there is no 
political collective envisioned by the pursuance of economic capital, but political identity is 
continuously designed by differentiation in the forms of subjective capital in distinctive styles 
of domination. However, due to the conversion fluidity of economic capital, it is possible to 
enhance the accumulation of a certain form of social and cultural capital in exchange for 
accumulated economic capital. In this way, states can improve their social, cultural and 
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political capital via their use of the advancement of economic capital. For example, 
advancement in economic capital can provide a relevant opportunity for states to represent 
prestigious international social and cultural events within their territories, which enhance their 
relative positions in social and cultural capital of state.  
In line with a Bourdieusian understanding of power, it is essential to understand how 
political capital can be framed in the field of power. According to Bourdieu, political capital 
is a subjective form of capital, but it should be objectified by institutional objective actions 
and, therefore, political capital also functions as a subtypes of social capital when it is 
examined in objective world (Swartz, 2010). According to this perspective, political capital 
can be objectified in different ways. In this respect, political capital can be linked to the 
individualistic fame and nobility of personal qualification, or it can be more connected to 
existence of representative qualification of particular institutional bodies (Kauppi, 2005). 
Both forms are relevant objectified categories to understand the formation of political 
subjects’ identity in the field. In both ways of objectification in political capital, having a 
distinctive political capital in social collective body is prerequisite for having dominant 
positions in the struggles for the field of power. Looking at the political objectification style 
of pre-modern clans, it can be seen that both representative and personal styles of political 
objectification intrinsically affect the construction of political identity. The political identity 
of clan is more connected to patriarchal ties, but it also requires the functionalization of the 
primitive family or group’s primitive internal representativeness. Contrary to this, the 
objectification of political capital in pre-modern political identity is represented by the 
personalized loyalty and nobility of the king, which embodies many different forms of 
symbolic instruments such as religious capital. On the other hand, the objectification of 
modern political subjectivity is based on a representation of institutionalization because 
political capital relies on the organizational capacity of the state, which rewards individuals or 
groups with domination in the field of political power. The representative objectification of 
capital also constitutes its own organizational distribution, which forms new social capital for 
the embodiment of a representative body. This representative body of the modern state is 
institutionalized by the functionalization of bureaucratic capital into the state identity. 
Therefore, a well-defined bureaucratic capital functions as a power which approves the 
domination of political capital in the name of selected individuals or groups in the 
international field. 
The objectification of political capital always arises from the political field, where all 
struggles over the objective institutionalization and distribution of subjective capacities take 
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place. In this way, unequal and dominative classifications of political identities are objectified 
in the field of political capital. The political field produces practices to persuade political 
struggles which enhance symbolic capital regarding the domination of vision and division 
(Pouliot & Mérand, 2012). All of these struggles in the political field serve a particular 
political domination which imposes a particular interpretation of identity and obedience of 
collective behaviours. In this respect, domination in the political field means control over the 
collective actions of other political subjects. These behavioural actions are transferred into 
political subjects through doxa. The political field always forms its unique culture of 
representation or doxa which limits the actions of states in accordance with the vision and 
division of positions in the political field. The international field, as the political field of 
modern state identity, provides a suitable basis for all these struggles over the subjective 
capital of political identification. Indeed, states, as actors of political subjectivity, carry out 
the expected political culture of the international field in their practices. Considering the 
United Nations’ institutionalization as an objectification of political capital in the international 
field, it is seen that the UN practices represent the fundamental characteristics of a 
Bourdieusian political field. The foundation of the UN mechanism provided a distinctive 
political vision and division under the dominant positions of four states. Four states achieved 
the legitimacy of power via their superiority of political capital, which imposed legitimate 
standards of keeping peace. The founded political doxa of state identity was constituted on the 
existence of relational and external recognition in the international field. After recognition of 
state identity became connected to UN membership, states pursued membership of objective 
institutionalization in a proposed peace of the international field because, without having a 
position in accordance with the doxa of the international field, state identity is always under 
pressure from the symbolic violence of domination. As a result of these, the legitimacy of 
domination, empowered by four dominant states, achieved collective mobilizations of 
political subjects, which imposed a legitimate meaning of peace onto the identity of all other 
dominated states of the international field.  
The positional and relational distribution of states rests on borders of the political 
field, because state identity can be only defined by the positions of other states in the same 
international field. Therefore, struggles are based on competing positions beyond the 
definition of political identity. Struggles for the collection of better political capital aim at 
changing the structured inequality of opposition. States do not compete for the abolishment of 
inequality in the domination system, but rather they struggle for enhancing their capacities to 
produce a better positional distribution in the field. Inequality in the political field is an 
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embedded characteristic because the existence of a political field relies on a relational 
exchange of capital between states, which requires division in continual positional 
differences. The autonomy of states from the embedded relational inequality depends on the 
institutionalization quality of domination in the political field. When a certain political 
identity, such as modern state identity, concretely establishes its institutional basis in the 
international field, it becomes autonomous from the dispositional capacity of dominated 
states. The dispositional infrastructure of dominated states is trivialized by the institutional 
advancement of domination in the international field. However, this dispositional domination 
in relational practices loses its autonomous characteristics in the existence of crisis situations 
(Bourdieu, 1994). Crisis situations in the international field mean that the existing institutional 
distribution of domination and its bureaucratic functionalization remain incapable of proving 
doxic political capital in practice. Political doxa or culture provides practical ways of 
behaviour which states obey unfalteringly, because doxa makes all other potential ways 
unthinkable for the states (Swartz, 2013). In this respect, crisis discloses these unthinkable 
options which damage embedded domination. In line with crisis, the autonomy of dominant 
positions decrease. This relational peculiarity of the political field was materially experienced 
during the independence process of colonial territories. At the beginning of colonialism, 
imperial states had great autonomy in the determination of the relational distribution of 
political culture because the primitive political identities of the colonial territories were 
incapable of accumulating political capital. As accumulated political capital increased in the 
colonial political society, the existing institutionalization of colonialism was questioned. 
Colonial political subjectivities improve relevant political capital to define their political 
identity in distinctive positions in the international field. Accumulated political capital also 
transformed the dispositional capacity of these political bodies, which changed the embedded 
political culture of the political field. Eventually, crises in colonial distributions inevitably 
decreased the autonomy of embedded domination in the international field.  
  
Problem of reflexivity and bureaucratic field of international relations  
One of Bourdieu’s most productive theoretical tools to understand the political identities of 
states in international relations is to rethink political subjectivity in accordance with his 
approach of reflexivity. Bourdieu emphasizes that agents perform their identity in a spatial 
field position, but they lack insight with regards to their own objective positions (Bourdieu, 
1990a). Under a dominant distribution of identity definition, agents are unable to produce 
critical shifts from their political localization and division. The subjective embedded culture 
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of habitus into agents’ identities restricts their practices in line with the expected 
characteristics of their capital allocation. The divisionary structure of the political field 
confirms practices of agents and dispositional embedded culture of domination. In this 
respect, the state can only improve a reflective insight into its own identity when there is an 
irreparable inconsistency between its position and dispositions, which can be monitored by 
crisis situations in the international field. This crisis rests on significant changes in sums of 
states’ capital allocation, which impair or improve the political capital of states in the 
international field. Consequently, a lack of state reflexivity with regards to its identity 
represents stability and embedded domination in the international field. Indeed, the genetics 
of international law are the basis for the state’s incapacity to self-reflect in the international 
field. Many rules of international law influence the identity of state as jus cogens which states 
obey unquestionably. Many fractions in jus cogens are in practice inapplicable functions or 
restricted spaces which do not cope with capacities of dominated states. Also, jus cogens are 
pre-mediated institutions which reflect the culture and nobility of designer political actors. 
However, because of the limited dispositional capacities of dominated states, the divisionary 
capacity of domination undoubtedly becomes a practical institution of the field. Institutions 
such as the monopoly of the use of force or the equality of sovereigns are in practice 
inapplicable and feasible institutions for states in a dominated political position in the 
international field, but they become parts of the same institutional objectivities in line with 
their incapacity of reflexivity. In line with discussions above, reflexivity can only overcome 
dispositional domination of jus cogens in the event of crisis in the international field. In this 
respect, slavery was a peculiar institution which was a functional capacity of domination until 
the Hague Conventions in 1889. Consequently, slavery become unjustified after the 
dominated states accumulated a significant amount of institutionalized capital. Similarly, 
owing to the fact that the lack of self-reflexivity rests on a stable obedience of dispositions, 
genocide was not represented as jus cogens until dominant identities imposed its doxic 
infrastructure, which was reorganized into dominated dispositions. Therefore, the Armenian 
Genocide was disposed of as the internal action of a sovereign state until it was 
institutionalized as jus cogens in the international field after the Second World War. 
Following Bourdieusian reflexivity argumentation, it is claimed here that state identity 
is embedded in political relations which are defined by the unconsciousness of otherness and 
division in categories. Contrary to the constructivists’ conceptualization regarding states’ own 
consciousness on the construction of their identities, the collective identity of state identity 
does not explicitly produce reflexive consciousness because its consciousness is distorted by 
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the pre-disposed political culture of the practical field (Bourdieu, 1990b). Therefore, a state’s 
identity depends considerably on its positional space in the field. The potential conscious 
actions of the state lose their essence and transform into dispositional practices of the state 
because embedded history in its political field restricts state actions via the bordered 
engagement of institutional objectivity in the international field. To be in a certain political 
position in the international field means that state has a certain form of political culture and 
behaviour which constitutes its interests simultaneously. In this respect, to be a part of 
European identity depends on certain behaviours and characteristics of accumulated history 
which objectify divisions without any deliberate intention of divisionary behaviour. The 
European state identity describes a position which defines an objectification of history. Thus, 
the border of European identity extends according to this accumulated identity beyond the any 
objective reality of territoriality. To claim European identity eventually requires the inclusion 
of all parts of a shared collective history, which demands similar capital accumulation for the 
participants’ states of the same European identity. Consequently, individual improvements of 
a state in capital allocation are not enough in order to improve the relative position of its 
identity, but also other states, having the similar categorical positions in the vision and 
division of the international field should improve and distinguish their relatively distributed 
political positions.  
Bourdieu also considers that the formation of state collectiveness over the use of 
power and its capital allocation results in the formation of particular struggles with regards to 
categorization and division (Bourdieu, 1994). These struggles target domination on the 
legitimate use of functionality and institutionalization of the state. Thus, the state, as the 
representative of political identity, rests on particular interests which are seen as being for the 
collective benefit of all individuals and groups in state identity. In this respect, state identity 
continually reproduces dispositional representations of objective structures which should 
constitute particular interests of domination as universal values of all members in political 
society. The state functions as a stability of a particular vision and division via producing 
legitimacy, which creates particular language on how to understand universality and its 
institutionalization. The stability of domination requires a ‘monopolization of universal’ 
(Ibid., p. 17) via practices of a bureaucratic field. In line with this, the bureaucratic field in 
international relations functions as the creator of political dispositions which describe 
universal values for the struggles between states. The bureaucratic field invests its interests of 
domination as universal values for the interest of state identity. Consequently, the 
bureaucratic field represents legitimacy in the international field and, therefore, it contributes 
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characteristics and borders of vision and division which constitute political culture or doxa of 
the international field. 
In a Bourdieusian sense, the bureaucratic field is the sphere where the vision of 
division is produced and distributed (Wacquant, 2013). In this respect, the bureaucratic field 
in the international field normalizes the unequal distribution of positions because it produces 
relevant legitimacy which synchronizes the dispositional capacity of the state and its unequal 
positions in the objective international field. Bureaucratic capital is also subject to changes 
which diversify the embedded doxa and influences objective institutionalizations. In other 
words, in order to impose particular legitimacy, changes regarding the distribution of the 
bureaucratic field impair existing political culture and its institutionalization, which is also a 
product of the former distribution of bureaucratic capital. In line with this, the bureaucratic 
field in international relations functions as an intermediary which not only produces and 
imposes a meaning of political culture, but also improves and impairs the objective of state 
identity in the institutional sphere of international relations. Consequently, different 
bureaucratic fields in different historical accumulations interpret the objectives and 
institutions of political capital in accordance with their distinctive arbitrariness. Due to this, 
the arbitrariness of interpretation in imposed political culture, as it is discussed in previous 
parts, and similar problems of the international field, such as genocide and slavery, or 
institutions such as democracy and development are distinctively identified in accordance 
with particular arbitrariness of bureaucratic capital in the international field. Although the 
produced arbitrariness of bureaucratic capital generally does not express the unequal positions 
of dominated states, the domination of the bureaucratic field on the disposition of meanings 
supresses any revival between dispositions and the self-reflexivity of the state. 
The bureaucratic field in international relations rests on struggles between different 
forms of groups which obtain and dominate distinctive capital and its subjected and objective 
accumulation. Political collective groups, having domination of different forms of capital, try 
to influence the bureaucratic field in order to impose their own discrete interests as the 
common agenda of the field (Bourdieu, 1996b). Therefore, the capital allocation of the 
bureaucratic field differentiates in accordance with characteristics of domination and 
distribution of positions in the international field. Different identifications of political identity 
are constituted by different combinations of forces in the bureaucratic field. The arbitrary 
power of the bureaucratic field in the legitimacy of the king is formed by the subjective and 
objective capital of religion. On the other hand, the objective and subjective capital of religion 
in the capital allocation of the modern state’s bureaucratic field is mostly eliminated by the 
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domination of distinctive capital allocation of bureaucracy, which is constituted by the 
economic and cultural interests of specific bourgeois factions. In other words, the 
characteristics of the bureaucratic field in international relations improve the positions of 
particular capital ownership, which organizes the political culture of state identity in 
accordance with its own arbitrariness. The bureaucratic field in international relations 
eventually influences the internal bureaucratic capital of states and imposes the transformation 
into capital allocation of the states’ internal bureaucratic field. The success and failure of this 
transformation process indicate states’ positions in the dominated–dominant field of 
international relations.  
In order to dominate the definition of political identity, dominant political subjects 
also need to form and impose their legitimate nobility, which distinguishes the dominants 
from all other political subjects in practical field. In this respect, an essential functionality of 
the bureaucratic field is related to its distributional power of nobility (Bourdieu, 1994). The 
bureaucratic field defines the characteristics of nobility, which produce a doxic concentration 
of symbolic capital. Looking at the political identity of the king in medieval political 
subjectivity, it can be seen that the king embodies all of the bureaucratic field and its capital 
allocation because he defines the meaning of nobility and arbitrarily distributes this nobility in 
the political field. On the other hand, in modern state identity, the nobility of king transforms 
into the cultural and economic supremacy of bourgeois, which defines the legitimate nobility 
to be a recognized member of the political field. Therefore, in the same way as the 
Bourdieusian conception of nobility in political societies, in the international field the 
symbolic infrastructure of a particular capital allocation becomes the legitimate language of 
institutionalization. States in the international field struggle to improve the nobility of 
particular domination because the bureaucratic field synchronizes this particular nobility and 
legitimate recognition, which institutionalizes itself into the practices and productions of 
international law. Eventually, international law as objectified capital produces 
institutionalized capital in accordance with the nobility of the dominant bureaucratic field.  
 
Symbolic violence on political identities in the globalization process 
The questioning regarding identification of identities in international relations is liable to be 
rethought by the existence of anarchy and peace. Anarchy and peace are forms of social 
practice that give meaning to ‘the reality’ for identities. In this respect, it is important to 
understand how the agents formulate ‘the reality’ of the objective world. The formulation of 
identities derives from a deep-rooted domination in the individuals’ habitus. This domination 
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is found before the anarchy or peace is perceived by the agents and ‘the reality’ is embedded 
in the structures. This pre-dominated perception is achieved by symbolic violence, which is 
more embedded than physical violence because the unconsciousness of the state regarding 
symbolic violence results in dispositional obedience and conformation of violence beyond any 
self-reflexivity of identity. Therefore, symbolic violence is the product of the agents’ 
misrecognition of the recognizable processes of habitus. Symbolic violence is never seen as 
dominative violence by agents, even though agents become the battlefield of symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu, 1995a). In this way, the agents are both practitioners and bearers of 
symbolic violence via social practices. The political subjectivity of the state unconsciously 
procures symbolic violence and passes down this produced symbolic violence via its 
practices. More importantly, symbolic violence takes a formalized and constituted form which 
is seen as shared habitus by states. Consequently, symbolic violence functions as a 
determinative factor of all dominant and dominated identities of states in the international 
field.  
It is not plausible to separate symbolic violence from concrete violence of states in the 
international field. Controversially, it is argued that concrete violence fully stems from 
symbolic violence of a certain historical habitus. In other words, concrete violence is 
organized/reorganized in accordance with symbolic construction of violence in dispositions of 
state identity. Symbolic violence forms a basis for the political control of states via the 
objective violence of domination in international field. In this aspect, symbolic violence is 
perceived as the particular characteristic of identities and, therefore, agents unconsciously 
subscribe the construction and objectification of it (Bourdieu, 1990b). In relation to habitus, 
states are liable to different kinds of symbolic violence which distinguish their capacity of 
objective violence simultaneously. This is a reason for the different definitions of identity, 
interests and anarchy in different historical terms. More concretely, religion as a system of 
symbolic violence has been of vital importance regarding the construction of identities, but 
religion induces different kinds of collective beliefs and symbolic divisions, which result in 
different kinds of objective perception of identities because political subjectivities of different 
historical accumulations raise diverse interpretations of objective violence. In the middle ages, 
identities were categorized in terms of their religious capital as a positive value of dominant 
political subjectivity, which was seen as a legitimate basis of political subjectivity. It means 
that religion defined practical formal forms and categories. On the contrary, in modern state 
identity, religion constructs its symbolic violence in the political identities of dominated states 
as a less legitimized and negative value of state identification because religion and state 
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collectivization is seen as anarchical and illegitimate creators of disorders in international 
institutionalization.  
The shared habitus is the epitome of symbolic violence and, as a consequence, 
concrete violence as the monopoly of legitimacy in everyday life (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1990). Anarchy, peace, domination, inequality etc. are not socially constructed but rather they 
are produced and reproduced by the misrecognized consciousness of states regarding their 
positions in the international field. Because of misrecognition in habitus, states turn to the 
origins of violence which are linked to the other identities of international field. As the 
habitus of a state socializes its identity in field, symbolic violence forms concrete 
characteristics, features and roles of domination which promote the institutionalization of 
symbolic violence. The misrecognition of violence is recognized by the collectivity of agents, 
which denies the controversies between its identity and recognition because agents can only 
represent the objective world via their recognition (Bourdieu, 1991). Thus, the socialization of 
habitus always precedes the social construction of identities but states cannot realize this 
because they refuse the opposition between their misrecognition and recognition. What states 
misrecognize is what states recognize in their relational practices of the international field. 
For instance, there is no certain geographical justification regarding which land is eastern in 
comparison with the others, but Morocco is usually categorized into the values of eastern 
states. This categorization immediately describes the Moroccan state in accordance with its 
location between the east and west, modern and less modern, developed and underdeveloped 
etc. These forms represent symbolic violence in state identity, which generates other sorts of 
objective violence afterwards.  
Symbolic violence is not a stable form, but it may change in accordance with the 
changes in symbolic power and habitus. Symbolic power hides itself into a misrecognition of 
habitus but it envisages the reality before reality is socially constructed. Before domination 
emerges from real-life experiences, domination is embedded into political doxic relations of 
the international field as common sense, which is subject to change in line with changes in the 
representation of domination. As discussed above, slavery was seen as de jure and 
communities were involved in slavery in accordance with their skin colours until slavery was 
purged from the embedded doxa of the international field. These kinds of changes not only 
mean institutional changes, but also illustrate changes in the dominated social hierarchies 
 98
which depict the habitus of the individuals.17 Gender questions in the international field also 
produce relevant examples here. Women were not seen as parts of everyday political action 
because women embody awareness of social hierarchy and its domination in their habitus, 
which construct/reconstruct the means of judgments, tastes and individual spaces (Bourdieu, 
2008). In this way, women’s habitus makes women accept the ‘realities’, hierarchies and 
domination, which are the most inacceptable conditions for their individualities and social 
spaces. These inacceptable conditions are subject to chance according to changes in the 
internalized social hierarchy and its combination of domination. However, this does not put an 
end to the social suffering of women, but, rather, the disadvantages and social suffering 
continue via new forms of judgment and categorization in the political collectiveness of state. 
As a result, changes in the political conditions for the production of habitus result in 
differentiation in social realities and objective domination, but the symbolic suffrage of 
violence remains stable for dominated identities.  
In Bourdian theory, the objective social world is a production of ‘accumulated history’ 
(Bourdieu, 1993c, p. 67), which influences the habitus of the state as universalization. 
Universalization is the basic feature of every kind of historical accumulation and its habitus. 
The dominant subjects of historical accumulation impose their interests as the existing order 
and ‘universalize their particular interests … for others to grasp the universality of their 
particular conditions’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 434). In other words, accumulated history precedes 
the habitus of the agents but this historical accumulation consists of a kind of specific interest 
which is represented by domination. However, political subjects internalize and represent 
these particular interests as universal principles of their identities as a whole. Thus, the 
identity construction of political subjectivity is always based on a hidden power relation, the 
political representation of particular interests, inequity and unjustness. Symbolic violence 
always demands universalization in order to set a framework for states, both theoretically and 
practically. For instance, English School theory tries to categorize and standardize the notion 
of identity of modernity or modernization. It claims that whoever wants to become modern 
should produce certain social, economic, political conditions, institutions and social 
infrastructures. The school then represents certain kinds of rules and norms which guide the 
agents to embody symbolic violence in habitus and represent this in the real world. In this 
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way, the theory standardizes the modernity of state identity even though the sovereign 
capacities of states are distributed unequally in the international field.  
In line with self-reflective involvement in embedded political doxa, it is argued that 
theories in international relations function as an objectification of symbolic violence. Theories 
translate how symbolic violence is constructed and reconstructed in terms of a certain 
accumulated history because they represent identity as a separation of human nature (as bad 
and good), as moral preferences for some norms (such as sovereignty), as an estimation of 
certain institutional foundations and/or as a conservation of a gendered construction of the 
objective world. All of these perspectives rely on structures or ideation but oversee a mutually 
intertwined existence of structures and a socially constructed nature from the perspective of 
habitus. For instance, when a theory describes gendered discourses, it also defines the basic 
structures for the universalization of gender inequality in habitus. It defines certain gendered 
roles for certain genders, which elicit a separation and a stereotyped relation web. Indeed, 
socio-political domination and power relations are also taken advantage by gendered 
discourses and feminist movements (Bourdieu et al., 1999).  
 
Globalization as symbolic violence  
Theories of international relations always construct new kinds of separation, forms and moral 
equivalencies which differentiate state identity and its materialization. Theories engender 
meaningful answers regarding the political capital of states in order to make sense of state 
identity in accordance with historically accumulated symbolic capital. Theories function as 
totalized forms of symbolic capital which organize symbolic capital as practically applicable 
order for the construction of identities. In the early twenty-first century, theories delineate 
some stages of anarchy in nature. The classical English School claims some fundamental rules 
between the states in order to recover this anarchy; neorealism claims that there is no central 
ruler outside state borders and that is why the borders of states are seen as fences of self-
safety; and neoliberalism emphasizes states’ cooperative actions regarding their similar 
interests and institutional organizations.18 These theories represent states as kinds of safe 
haven for political collectivity. Any of these theories cannot see any life sphere without a 
bureaucratic state field. After the post-structural expansion of international relations, anarchy 
is seen as a creation of states’ identity. Therefore, theories try to find ways for emancipation 
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to get rid of state anarchy.19 In other words, states’ identities lost their significance as the sole 
creator of symbolic violence because new symbolic violence is created and reproduced 
beyond state identity. It is discovered that the identities of the states are not seen as sine qua 
non factors but rather as ideas, as a particular form to represent the collectiveness of political 
subjectivity. By means of weakening state-centric symbolic violence, symbolic violence is 
reproduced in a more globalized sphere. Thus, globalization becomes the new field of 
symbolic violence to represent the political dispositions of habitus. 
Globalization as symbolic violence is consciously represented as a kind of new 
habituation in states’ dispositions. Therefore, states unconsciously embody this new symbolic 
violence, which represents the new realities of international field. Thus, it is not plausible that  
inter-subjective communication generates common understandings of reality, shared norms for social 
behaviour, and notions of group identity and solidarity. Conversation and symbolic exchanges lead 
people to construct ideas of the world, rules for social interaction, and ways of being and belonging in 
that world (Scholte, 2005, p. 131)  
Globalization is not a simple intensification of social interaction, an expansion of solidarity 
outside the state borders or a political belonging of a more inclusive society outside states’ 
identities. As Jan Aart Scholte accomplishedly describes, in substitution for the identities of 
states, globalization brings out a blend of complex multidimensional, competing, conflicting 
or conciliating identities which may belong to the same agent at the same time (Ibid, p. 227). 
However, this illustrates the transformation of state identity as a hybridization of identities or 
hybrid identities20 which may be non-territorially and multi-nationally based on sexual 
orientation, gender, disability, class orientation, race or age groups (Ibid., pp. 251–252). In 
line with Bourdieu, it is argued here that class-based, gendered or racial characteristics of 
identities are not embedded classifications, but what is new is the production of 
representations of identification in the international field. In this way, we are practising new 
symbolic violence on the basis of globalization and its distinctive historical accumulation, 
which supersedes the former historicization of the state. This new historical accumulation of 
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20
 ‘A hybrid identity draws from and blends several different strands in substantial measure, so that no 
single marker holds clear and consistent primacy over others. For example, a hybrid self might encompass 
several nationalities, or might be of mixed race, or might have a multifaceted sexuality, or might combine 
different class contexts. Likewise, a hybrid identity can give strong emphasis to several types of being and 
belonging, with the result that, for instance, national loyalties, religious bonds, and gender solidarities could 
compete and conflict.’ (Scholte, 2005, p. 252) 
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symbolic violence represents the changes regarding the borders of identities from the 
territorial states to indefinite and uncertain spheres where particularization and 
universalization exist simultaneously.  
The contextualization of democratization in globalization exemplifies this coexistence 
of particularization and universalization. In modern state identity, there was a standardized 
way of democracy which was represented and standardized by Western domination. However, 
globalization falls into the misrecognition of the agents’ habitus, which makes a gap between 
the former and actual understanding of democracy. Globalization imposes that 
democratization can be possible without having any standardized infrastructure such as 
freedom, free markets, free expression, gender equity etc. With the trend of globalizing 
democratization, democracy gains new meanings, hybrid forms in relation to the localities, 
boundaries and beliefs which create ‘radical democratic pluralism’ (McGrew, 2003, p. 502) as 
humanitarian, environmental and feminist movements. In other words, the new socialization 
of globalization imposes new forms such as Islamic democracy or illiberal democracy. In this 
aspect, the globalization of identities represents the most undesirable conditions of the agents 
as legitimate interpretation. Globalization reconstructs two important functions of solidarity 
because it does not only impose an internalization of social identities but it also contributes 
the stability of objective structural relations (Schiffrin, 2006). In this way, the agents construct 
their identities in accordance with the new symbolic constraints of the democratization 
processes.  
Globalization also imposes a distinctive historicization and universalization beyond 
the legitimacy of state identity. The new historicization renders the objective institutions of 
states obsolete. For instance, democratic revolution imposes new direction and values, which 
result in new kinds of colourful, ethnic, religious, ethnic and regional revolutions. Pro-
democratic forces of these revolutions become very vulnerable in terms of the Westernization 
of democratic politics because pro-democratic forces of the postmodern revolutions do not 
break deep-rooted territorial connections (Tucker, 2007). In other words, the political 
subjectivity of globalization relies on distinctive forms, but vision and vision continues in 
order to define positions and domination via a categorized identification in the international 
field. In this respect, globalization imposes a new understanding of justice (Fraser, 2007) via 
the transformation of existing symbolic violence. The globalization of state identity is 
experiencing a kind of marketization of democratization which imposes individualistic values 
as ‘the realities’ so as to achieve a ‘social good’ (Couto & Guthrie, 1999). Contrary to the 
former international relations, which identified national borders as the fields to beware of 
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anarchy in the international field, globalization represents a borderless world as the cure for 
the emancipation from anarchy. As a result, globalization results in a misrecognition in the 
dispositions of state subjectivity, which forms distinctive symbolic violence in the 
international field.  
 
Changing political subjectivity of globalization and its bureaucratic field 
Historical accumulation linked to particular capital allocation interprets a distinctive 
bureaucratic field which presents its interests as the ‘universal realities’ of political practices. 
This is achieved by the national bourgeois elites, which form the ‘universal class’ (Fraser, 
1990, p. 60) in the political subjectivity of the modern state. As globalization impairs the 
national sentiment of the bureaucratic field, the new globalizing political subjectivity relies on 
de-territorializing the bureaucratic field. In line with the weakening separation of the state’s 
internal and external structures, the stratification of states changes because the globalizing 
bureaucratic field does not rely on territorial division and the classification of nations, which 
depended on secured and defined territorial spaces. On the contrary, the new bureaucratic 
field influences ambiguous structures and hybrid diversity, which creates primitive 
empowerment arenas such as the humanitarian space, transnational workforce or 
supranational unions. These new structures of political capital are based on indirect 
relationships which do not only change the orientation of values but also change the social 
structure, power and constructiveness of direct relations (Calhoun, 1991, p. 103). More 
precisely, the bureaucratic field of globalization does not pursue a direct relationship style of 
modern state identity, such as sovereignty, citizenship and nationality, but it utilizes indirect 
relationships with classes and other collective bodies. As indirect relationships become 
widespread, fundamental institutions and institutional functions of state identity become less 
collective entities in line with the creation of new functionalities such as multi-national 
citizenships. As a result of this, globalizing bureaucratic capital does not directly relate to 
other classes and individuals in order to form its symbolic violence in their habitus. On the 
contrary, it takes advantage of the indirect objectification of political capital, which is derived 
from the newly produced capital allocation of globalization such as finance capital and 
informational capital. Originally, the bourgeois collectiveness of national states directly 
constructed the national educational systems and it imposed symbolic structures of state 
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identity.21 In other words, modern national identity directly engages educational processes to 
maintain their domination of political capital. However, globalizing bureaucratic capital is not 
directly involved in these direct relations, but rather they apply social cultural and especially 
informational capital, organized by global media, the internet, international organizations, 
NGOs etc. In this way, the habitus of political capital becomes subject of large-scale, de-
territorialized and indirect symbolic dominance (Calhoun, 1991).  
In order to construct strong national ties with regards to national identities, national 
bureaucracies are important mechanisms imposing symbolic construction of national 
homogenization of identities. The dominant bourgeois of nation states educate a group of 
individuals which maintains the organizational foundations of state identity and materializes 
the interests, tastes or expectations of the dominant classes of states. National bureaucracy 
basically takes active roles to objectify the political emancipation mechanism. It creates an 
elite group consisting of all the national classes. Due to this, the sub-classes fall into 
misrecognition and think that they are constitutive parts of political capital because they can 
reach a status via an elitist bureaucracy: ‘The monopolization of the universal is the result of 
… the bureaucratic field’. Therefore, bureaucracy is the fundamental way for the national 
bourgeois to construct the political emancipation mechanism, because the individuals in 
national boundaries evaluate bureaucracy as the proof of the potential for fluidity and 
transition between the classes. In other words, the heterogeneous class characteristic of 
bureaucracy is seen as the empowerment of sub-classes in the formation of political capital. 
The bureaucratic field of modern states establishes political doxa in accordance with 
expectations of domination because the habitus of state collectiveness has already been 
imposed by the symbolic capital of the bureaucratic field. Bureaucracy is not the durable 
power of political capital, but rather it gives states ephemeral power regarding certain issue-
specific functions of political capital. In this way, bureaucracy serves as the formation and 
continuation of hierarchy via the stratification of states in the international field. The hidden 
hierarchy, which is constructed by the symbolic violence of the domination, is maintained by 
bureaucracy and, then, it is transformed into practices in the objective world. However, the 
globalizing bureaucratic field differentiates into new forms of durability and hierarchy. 
Globalization is a decentralizing national definition and distribution of justice and 
empowerment techniques. It is not involved in organic functionalization because it does not 
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institutionalize in every part of political capital, but rather it dominates and institutionalizes 
issue-specific areas which are occupied by their interests, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. Therefore, global bureaucracy is more durable than the bureaucratic field of the modern 
state. In order to impose its identification of the hierarchy, the globalizing bureaucratic field 
forms new spaces, such as human security, and humanitarian spaces make a subordinate 
representation of state institutions with regard to the definition of interests. As a result, 
similarly to the former national bourgeoisies, the new global ruling class represents their own 
interests as a kind of common will. 
Recognition is also redistributed by the globalizing bureaucratic field. As the political 
decentralization of state identity becomes prevalent, recognition between modern states and 
its symbolic capital lose significance. This decentralization objective by the new vision and 
division in political capital allocation beyond the materialistic accumulation of recognition in 
modern state identities, such as new collectiveness regarding religious, ethnic and feminist 
collectivity, leads to a shift of recognition because these new identities pursue recognition 
without deliberately engaging any materialistic accumulation, redistribution or expectation 
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Recognition of political capital is reproduced by a new globalized 
stratification, values and tastes. In this respect, globalization paves the way for new ‘aesthetic 
dispositions’ which reinterpret political recognition in accordance with new global 
stratification and the bureaucratic field. 
Any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception and tacitly defines as the 
only legitimate mode of perception the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain 
competence. Recognizing this fact does not mean constituting a particular mode of perception as an 
essence, thereby falling into the illusion which is the basis of recognition of artistic legitimacy. It does 
mean taking note of the fact that all agents, whether they like it or not, whether or not they have the 
means of conforming to them, find themselves objectively measured by those norms. At the same time 
it becomes possible to establish whether these dispositions and competences are gifts of nature, as the 
charismatic ideology of the relation to the work of art would have it, or products of learning, and to 
bring to light the hidden conditions of the miracle of the unequal class distribution of the capacity for 
inspired encounters with works of art and high culture in general (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 28–29)  
Therefore, in order to legitimate the political capital of globalization, the new bureaucratic 
field represents its political interests, individualistic tastes and their objective ‘realities’ as the 
common perceptions for the political recognition of the agents in the system. States sharing 
the same globalizing international field fall into misrecognition because they perceive the 
imposed habitus of globalizing political capital as their own ideologies. On the basis of the 
new disposition and the doxic relation of globalization, recognition eliminates nationalistic 
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class structure and it also unconsciously reconstructs a new stratification of global which 
invisibly redistributes inequalities beyond state borders. The contemporary world exercises 
the disposition of political capital of the new ruling classes. In order to be recognized by the 
new global distribution of classes, the agents should embody a certain set of values, including 
individualism, liberalism, market-orientation, humanitarianism, multiple-identity etc.; these 
are not equally applicable to all states, but rather they mostly represent the interests of the new 
globalizing bureaucratic field.  
Globalizing bureaucratic capital imposes a distinctive capital allocation, which 
subordinates the capital allocation of national states. Differentiation in capital allocation 
indicates a shift in the distribution of domination beyond the distribution of modern state 
identities in the international field. The main rivalry of globalizing bureaucratic capital takes 
place in the allocation of symbolic and objectified capital in the international field. 
Objectively, the accumulation of distinctive capital allocation in modern states is based on the 
more collectivized and material apparatus of the economy. However, the new globalizing 
bureaucratic field rests on a virtual creation of the economic apparatus, which enables the 
accumulation of economic capital without occupying any physical production, or creating any 
employment. Subjectively, the new bureaucratic field struggles to change the state monopoly 
on the definition and embodiment of nobility in the international field. Previously, the modern 
state was the only power centre capable of deciding how to evaluate the relational and 
collective nobility of the international field. Indeed, dominant states in the modern 
international field influence the bureaucratic field and produce relevant doxic relations of the 
field, which was originally determined by the practical sentiment of the Treaty of Westphalia. 
In this way, domination organizes the values of political identification in accordance with its 
own capital allocation. Because of the disposed values of membership in the international 
field, other subordinated states subjectively embody the interests of domination as valued 
nobility without any concrete enforcement. However, the globalized bureaucratic field 
abandons the mutually supportive link between state identity and definition of nobility. 
Nobility becomes a more pluralistic agenda beyond the collectiveness of the state. In practice, 
the institutional and positional advancement of the state is decided considerably by decisions 
of institutions such as Standard & Poor’s, or organization representatives such as the annual 
reporters of Human Rights Watch. In this way, the globalizing bureaucratic field decides the 
credibility of states’ political identity, which values or devalues the practices of states. More 
concretely, the globalizing bureaucratic field defines the distribution of state positions in the 
international field because it changes the values of doxic relations regarding how to pursue 
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interests or how to represent the nobility of the international field. Eventually, it enhances its 
capacity in the categorization, vision and division of political subjectivity.  
The modern state loses its effectiveness in the determination of legitimacy or 
representation. The globalizing bureaucratic field imposes a dehistoricizing process beyond 
the existing institutionalization of states. In this respect, territorial integration and unification 
forms the most characteristic objectification of the new political capital in the globalizing 
bureaucratic field. Integration weakens historical accumulation and makes political 
collectiveness believe in the existence of distinctive political identification beyond the 
national identity of modern political subjectivity. Also, integration demands new political 
constructions which are generally in opposition to the identities of nation states. Owing to the 
advanced information regarding values and lifestyles such as ethnicity or religion in the 
globalized world, the grouping, identification and political good of the agents are formed 
beyond the national borders (Held & McGrew, 2003). This subordination is relevant in order 
to increase the transitivity of the symbolic violence into the other territorial spaces. The 
fundamental characteristic of global institutionalization is represented by individualization, 
which is supported by the new globalizing ruling class as a kind of symbolic violence. Social 
capital changes the ways that agents engage, from totalized communal nationalistic 
participation to interest-based, self-oriented and volunteering engagements (Field, 2008). 
These changes are concretized by IMF policies. Theoretically, the IMF focuses on treatment 
for the objective structural problems of dominated states, but in practice it imposes a doxic 
relationship of globalizing bureaucratic capital, which weakens the political 
institutionalization of modern state identity. 
The globalizing bureaucratic field reinterprets the fundamental norms of modern state 
identity in order to accomplish relevant disengagements from the political capital of the 
modern state, especially sovereignty, which is transformed into sovereign individuals 
(Scholte, 2005). Therefore, the symbolic violence of the globalizing bureaucratic field firstly 
tries to disconnect the psychological ties between the collectivity of states, which results in a 
distrust of national institutions and their social functionalization within concrete borders. In 
this respect, the globalizing notion of social capital defines ‘the moral resources of trust and 
cooperation’ which are represented by individualism and self-reliance in globalized identities 
(Couto & Guthrie, 1999, p. 64). Through the instrumentality of the new sovereignty of 
individualism, globalization creates new ways, rules and laws, which give the possibility to 
judge states regarding their institutional practices. The globalizing bureaucratic field not only 
surpasses national laws and rules, but also abandons the collectivity and institutional 
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domination of states. Besides this, the physiological/subjective sovereignty of globalization 
represents new ways of emancipation, which relieves the individuals from the emancipation 
mechanism of national citizenship. Thus, globally increasing inequalities not only function as 
an erosion of the social capital of the modern state,22 but this is the reconstruction of 
emancipation mechanism in a new stratification of social capital, based on the new symbolic 
violence of globalization. This new symbolic reconstruction of social capital manifests itself 
via the new objectification of institutions and values in political capital. For example, new 
sovereignty constructs new supranational laws to judge the state and its institutions, creates 
humanitarian spaces within the territory of state collectiveness and qualifies multi-nationality 
to weaken the national ties of collectivity. The symbolic reconstructions and objective 
representation of the new sovereignty of individuals result in a new distribution of 
stratification and domination beyond the modern stratification of states in a globalizing 
international field which is more pluralistic, heterogeneous and de-territorialized. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD 
 
The structure of this part is to critically find out the similarities and distinctions of 
constructivists and the Bourdieusian perspective regarding economics in international 
relations. By doing this, I aim to figure out state identity and its positional distribution in 
international relations by way of the Bourdieusian structural contribution within the socially 
constructive theorizing of the economic field. The constructivist tradition provides scholars 
with relevant theoretical means to criticize and overcome the materialist domination of 
realities in the field of international economics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Ruggie, 1998; 
Abdelal, 2009). Essentially, Bourdieu, whose research targeted the anthropological and 
sociological roots of economic fields in the practices of economic agents, takes advantage of 
social construction when he conceptualizes the economic preferences of agents in the 
structure of the economic field (Bourdieu, 2005). Although Bourdieusian anthropologic and 
sociologic research does not aim to explain the economy in the frame of politics, the 
inferences and approaches of the economy by both Bourdieu and the constructivists in 
international relations are in line with each other. However, by engaging with the embedded 
structures of domination, Bourdieu enhances further relevant discussion on the production of 
collective dispositions and identities in the economic field (Kauppi, 2003). In this respect, 
firstly, this part will summarize the similar directions of economic theorization in 
constructivist international political economy with constructivist side of Bourdieusian 
economic capital. Then, I will examine Bourdieusian distinction from structural 
constructivism regarding the economic field beyond the constructivist economy in 
international relations. By doing this, I will try to disclose how we can locate state identity as 
political agency in the economic capital of the international political field.  
 
Distinction of a constructivist approach to economic capital  
Social constructivism conceptualizes a considerable contribution for the field of economics in 
international relations by theorizing the inter-subjective products of political subjects, which 
impairs the materialist rationalist domination of economics (Abdelal, 2009). It discovers the 
intertwined links between the social and institutionalized realities of the international 
economy. Constructivists focus on a conceptual perspective beyond the material facts of the 
economy in international relations because the material facts cannot explain the realities of 
structures which are linked to the ideational, inter-subjective and social bases of economic 
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relations. More precisely, the rationality of the materialist economy explains realities which 
do not illustrate the facts of practices in the international economy. Social constructivism 
rejects the reductionist rational perspective of the economy because it theorizes that ideas 
regarding economic realities are constructed by a collectivized interpretation of agents in the 
process of inter-subjective relations. In a similar way with constructivist conceptualization, 
Bourdieu emphasizes that the economic field can be understood by its social engagements. 
From a Bourdieusian point of view, the agents’ economic field is socially constructed 
(Bourdieu, 2005). As a result of these socially constructed dispositions, agents do not 
spontaneously produce meanings in accordance with an objective logic of structure.  
One of the most visible peculiarities in the Bourdieusian and constructivist 
international political economy theorization is related to the gap between the economic facts 
of rationalism and social practices. The constructivist perspective questions the compatibility 
of rationalized economic facts with the realities of international political economics (Abdelal, 
2009). At this point, constructivism emphasizes that all rationalization of economic apparatus 
actually depends on the relational practices of agents, which depict a socially constructed 
embodiment of collective understanding (Tuomela & Balzer, 2002). In line with this 
constructivist theorization, relying on the quantitative data of economic calculation produces 
some applicable facts for agents but these mislead the reductionism of a rationalized 
ontology.23 Indeed, many tools of economics, such as the annual economic growth index, 
expected inflation and global prices, describe to some extent the facts, but these facts are 
mostly not compatible with the practical realities, which are contrary to a rationalist 
international economy theorization. For instance, the facts with regards to the expected 
inflation of an economy vary in accordance with the prices of products or services which are 
considered in the accounting of inflation. In order to come to this rationalist ontology, 
constructivists conceptualize that quantitative facts and the products of economics in 
international relations only indicate identities on the basis of agents’ beliefs and ideas. 
Therefore, the proposals and scope of economic facts generally embody social identities. 
Actors in an international economic space do not necessarily have a required set of rational 
behaviours, but the ideas and beliefs in socially constructed identities supply an appropriate 
collective understanding which limits their economic behaviours in a certain way without 
rational engagement. Basically, it is possible to see similarities in the tendencies regarding the 
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 For further discussions regarding the subject, see (Mäki, 2002) 
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facts and economic realities in a Bourdieusian approach of economy. Bourdieu evaluates that 
the factual bases of economic actions generally rely on ‘empirically established statistical 
correspondence between dispositions and positions’ (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 215), which conducts 
agents’ tendencies in line with the objective possibilities of the economy. In this way, the 
practical facts of the economy do not necessarily need to be compatible with the social 
realities of the objective world, but these need to dominate agents’ inter-subjective 
expectations, which must create a collective understanding of the possibilities regarding the 
objective structures of the economy.  
Another important peculiarity of a constructivist economic approach is to reveal that 
the interpretation of economic objective structures is as important as the empirical facts of the 
economy in international relations. Thus, objective facts are perceived in different forms in 
accordance with the interpretations of agents (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). This approach opens up 
an opportunity to go beyond the reason–result objectivity in international politics. 
Interpretations question both the validity of single reasoning and the results in the economic 
field. At this point, the constructivist economic approach values two essential factors which 
do not fully depend on the factual objectivity of the international field. It firstly considers the 
productivity of the inter-subjective interactions of agents in the economic field (Seabrooke, 
2007). Further, it bears in mind that the historical accumulation of knowledge affects the 
economic inter-subjective productions of agents (O’Brien & Williams, 2013). Agents mostly 
depend on their interpretations when they establish practical actions on the basis of economic 
facts. Despite Bourdieusian suspicion on the extreme emphasizing of agents’ interpretations 
(Bourdieu, 2005), his thoughts on the economy resemble a constructivist understanding of the 
inter-subjective production of economic actions. In particular, the Bourdieusian stress on 
habitus and economic action relation asserts that the inter-subjective ideational production of 
agent establishes links between socially constituted ideas and structures of the economy 
(Lebaron, 2002). The dispositions of agents embody the same economic facts in various ways 
in accordance with their positional engagements of objective structures. Economic actions 
originate from the dispositions of subjects and their positions in objective relations. Therefore, 
the economic field is deeply rooted in the historical accumulation and produced dispositions 
of different positional distributions in objective relations. The dispositional interpretation of 
states regarding their positions in the economic globalization is a good example of this 
approach. States’ ideations of their positions differ beyond the reason–result facts of their 
economies. For instance, the American interpretation of economic globalization can vary, 
from the cheap prices of cheap production in developing states to a high unemployment risk 
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from production outside the USA. As a result, economic reasoning and facts are not generally 
compatible with agents’ production of dispositions.  
In line with the explanations above, constructivist economic approaches contradict the 
passive positions of agents in economic actions. Economic actions are organized by the 
embodied values of agents beyond concrete facts in the economic field (Abdelal, 2001). 
Although economic facts persuade clear facts for agents, these facts generally exclude the 
positional distributions of the identities of agents in the political field. A constructivist 
economy in the international field not only objects to the static reason–result relation of 
agents regarding economic facts, but it also improves agents’ positional values and inter-
subjective dispositions in the economic field. Therefore, the constructivist economy evaluates 
agents as dynamic actors who perform economic relations in accordance with their beliefs and 
identities. In other words, agents’ ideas, which originated from their constructed positional 
identities, depend considerably on their dispositions (Palan, 2013). In this way, the interests of 
agents in the economic field explain the socially constructed nature beyond the structural 
deterministic nature of economic agents. In the constructivist economic approach, agents gain 
autonomous roles in defining their ideas and values. This autonomy improves the importance 
of human interactions and interpretations regarding their ideations and practices. Economic 
ideations are reproduced practices which originated from the socialization of agents’ 
experiences into the interaction processes. In this way, agents become active elements of 
economic reproduction in the construction of mutually represented realities. Interestingly, 
although Bourdieu highlights structural interferences in the habitual representation of agency, 
he does not exclude the externalization of agents’ unique capacities in the economic field. 
Social structures influence agents via the scarcity or abundance of economic capital in agents’ 
capital allocations. These influences create distinctive economic roles which distribute the 
positions of agents in the international economic field. Consequently, agents of the economic 
field internalize economic distribution in habitus over time, but also externalize economic 
actions in the social relationships of the field. An internalized structure is always followed by 
a structuring process of externalization in which outcomes are not determined. Therefore, 
agents in the economic field are for Bourdieu simultaneously structuring beings who take 
advantage of positional strategies in order to struggle for the allocation of economic 
resources. In short, agents are not static representatives of certain rationality, but they are 
dynamic actors of potential changes and differentiation via struggles on externalization in 
their positional distribution in the economic field (Bourdieu, 1995a). 
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Constructivist international political economy also develops a distinctive 
understanding of how to understand interests derived from the ideas of economic agents 
despite their material or factual representations in the objective world (Risse & Wiener, 
1999). Classical rational politics rests on the struggle over certain determined economic 
interests among the actors. In this understanding, structures embody determined and clear 
interests which produce similar strategies to realize expected outcomes in economics. From a 
classical rational perspective of economics in the international field, agents are fully informed 
and motivated with regard to the potential ways of successful engagement with economic 
tools. They know how to deal with potential economic hardship, and act in accordance with 
the potential outcomes of certain economic behaviours. At this point, uncertainty in economic 
production/reproduction is taken into account by the constructivist ideation of the 
international economy (Shelton, 2015). Agents’ ideas, values and identities are not factual 
productions, but they are subject to change over time. The changing nature of ideas and 
identities affects to reach a possible standard of rational outcomes in economics. In other 
words, ideas and values impair any certainty in economics because actors produce their 
economic behaviours in line with their identities, which leads to different outcomes in the 
same economic issues in the international economy. Constructivists show that the 
motivational force behind the interests of agents supports uncertainty in economic actions, 
because economics depends on non-materialistic tools which require agents’ individualistic 
ideations of economic consideration in the international field.  
In line with the considerable emphasis on the inter-subjective characteristics in the 
production and reproduction of actions, constructivist economics embodies the importance of 
produced norms in the international field (Seabrooke, 2007). Agents’ beliefs and ideas on 
economic interests are constructed in an inter-subjective environment. Due to the social 
construction of economic norms between agents, uncertainty in the non-materialist presence 
of economic factors leads to instability and crisis. The economic actions of agents are 
restricted by inter-subjective understandings of similar situations in the economics of the 
international field. The objective factors of economic reality are substituted by collective 
interpretations of actors. Therefore, constructivist economics embodies non-materialistic 
factors of economy beyond materiality, but, owing to the existence of norms, the uncertainty 
of non-materialistic inclusion in economics results in stability. At the same time, these norms 
are not identical to the legal rules of the international field of economics even though legal 
rules may support a normative constitution in international economics. In this way, agents, 
having different ideational bases, ideas and identities, obey the informal inter-subjective 
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presences of norms and, therefore, norms lead to inter-subjective stability in the production 
interests and appropriate actions for produced economic interests in the4 international field.  
 
Bourdieusian distinction of economics 
A potential distinction in the Bourdieusian interpretation of economics is to position 
interactions and inter-subjective relations in economic consideration. Interactions are based on 
the existence of a cause and effect relation in the practical world of agents. In this way, agents 
are firstly theorized as self-conscious entities. Besides this, the conscious actions of agents are 
thought to produce effective results regarding the productions of other agents in the same 
economic field. By ignoring such an interactionist approach, Bourdieusian economics takes 
into account structural embedded history, independent from the interactive intervention of 
agents (Bourdieu, 2005). In accordance with this, objective economic relations are possible 
before agents construct conscious relations. Objectivity is subject to the existence of a history 
of actions which links the dispositions of agents into the economic field beyond the 
consciousness of any inter-subjective production of agents. To assign excessive meaning to 
interactions rules out the practices of agents, consisting of the non-interactive processes of 
accumulated history. Having a certain social position or amount of accumulated capital 
characterizes agents’ identities and economic dispositions, which define their preferences in 
economic capital in accordance with the dispositional legitimacy of accumulated history 
(Ibid.; Bourdieu, 2000). Being in a certain position in the economic field results in the 
production of identical histories for different agents in the same economic field. Similar 
histories produce homologous dispositions and actions in the economics field, and they are 
subject to dispositional legitimacy in the distribution of positions and capital. Having a certain 
social position and capital accumulation in economics is predetermined by resembling 
histories before agents interact their dispositions into the practical constraints of the economic 
field. The distribution of economic capital in different positions develops out of unconscious 
legitimate similar histories, which are the objective relations beyond interactions. In this 
respect, interactions are social trajectories which enhance the struggles against embedded 
legitimate history because interactions create potential redistributions in the economic field in 
opposition to the existing legitimacy of history. As a result, agents’ objective relations 
resembling histories characterize economic actions before interactions construct conscious 
struggles between the competing agents in the economic field.  
Interactions apprehend the structuring characteristics of economic capital, but they 
trivialize the structured forces that produce agents. Structured historical accumulation 
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produces agents who produce and reproduce the ‘objective relations’24 of economic actions in 
accordance with their structured distinctions. Bourdieu’s objective relations are distinct from 
interactions because they are based on the positional distribution of agents, which objectifies 
the achieved amount of economic capital. The positional distribution of agents unconsciously 
relies on structured structures. Cognitive actions in the economic field embody structured 
structures which represent differences in the positional distributions of agents. By occupying a 
social position in the field, agents characterize their economic ideations before they produce 
their interactions. The occupied positional distribution imposes bodily experiences of 
differences (Bourdieu, 1986). These bodily experiences are the product of symbolic struggles 
of history which agents embody without consciously constructing structuring structures of 
interactions. In this respect, states, as political agents of economic capital in the international 
field, are subject to structured objective relations in accordance with their positions. Indeed, 
the positional distribution inevitably makes agents internalize different logics of structure 
before agents engage with the conscious interactions of economic capital. Objective relations 
are not reducible to interactions at any stage of historical accumulation. In this respect, the 
political identities of states can be defined in many different ways, but structured structures in 
which states survive impose certain languages and dispositions for agents. Today, 
independently of economic systems in the international arena, every state is guided by the 
language of neoliberal economics because the embodied social body of the state produces 
neoliberalism as the indicators of economic differences and hierarchies. In another words, 
states’ positions in the international political economy are defined by the existing structured 
accumulation of history before they make a practice of different positions by way of 
economic interactions in international relations. Thus, the state is dominated by a definition of 
neoliberal identifications because their structured dispositions provide positions which are 
created by the neoliberal distribution of differences in economics.  
In line with the Bourdieusian resistance of interactionism, it is plausible to say that 
Bourdieusian study acts with suspicion towards the central productive roles of norms in 
constructivist economy ideation. The constitutive role of norms in Bourdieusian study is 
substituted by the tendencies of habitus, which are objectified by the actions of agents in 
interactive processes. The tendencies of habitus are always found as deposited forms in agents 
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 Objective relations here not only indicate actions between different positions but also highlight 
position taking which carries out how to reflect understanding of occupied positions and preserve these 
positions: see Towney, (2014); Bourdieu & Wacquant, (1992). 
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(Shotwell, 2011). In this way, agents behave in accordance with convergent dispositions, 
labelling their differentiation and power in the positional distribution of identities. Although 
economic capital is irreducible to conscious interactions, it is not fully independent from these 
interactions. The economic decisions and actions of agents are subject simultaneously to a 
combination of the unconscious embodiment of structures and the interactive representation 
of objective conditions. Dispositions, leading to production of economic decisions, rely on the 
embodied differentiation of positions, which is reproduced by agents’ relational conscious 
processes (Bourdieu, 2005). Existing social bodies influence agents’ dispositions and, 
therefore, agents produce differences before conscious interactions take place in a field. 
Convergent experiences of historical accumulation lead to similar beliefs, which are 
independent from the productivity of interactive processes, relying on the existence of norms. 
Thus, in order to describe the unconscious embodiment of dispositions, Bourdieu illustrates 
the inclusionary roles of doxa in comparison with norms. Doxa unconsciously imposes a 
common sense of structural divisions, which socially legalizes the unequal positional 
distributions before agents construct interactive processes of economization. Rarely for 
constructivist norms, doxa are structurally taken for granted and subjectively describe the 
accumulated amount of economic capital in the international field. In the international field, 
doxa influences states’ economic decisions and cooperations before states consciously discuss 
their bilateral and multilateral economic actions.  
An important distinction of Bourdieu in economics is the study of culture as an 
inseparable part of economics. Bourdieu is actually innovative in rethinking whether the 
distribution of economic capital originally centres upon constitutive objective processes. 
Indeed, the distribution of economic capital fundamentally emerges from subjective cultural 
characteristics. As discussed above, doxa forms a taken-for-granted common reflex for agents 
(Deer, 2014). Agents in the same field inevitably become parts of a common reflex, 
determining the positions of agents in field (Lainé, 2014). However, the language of common 
reflex also defines the degree of contrariety between cultural characteristics and economic 
capital. More precisely, doxa subjectively enforces agents to define their objective positions 
and differences via certain definitive reflexes. The degree of compatibility between these 
definitive doxic reflexes and cultural structures indicates an objective advancement in 
positional distribution and economic capital allocation for states in the international field. In 
particular, Bourdieu’s early empirical research illustrates that capitalism, as the means of the 
divisions and economic differences of accumulated history, influences every individual 
member and class of the field (Bourdieu, 2012). Although the dispositions of agents define 
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their objective positions and relations via capitalism, the subjective cultural habitus of 
culturally disadvantaged agents in the hierarchy does not contain cultural subjective 
dispositions, according to the doxic reflexes of capitalism (Bourdieu, 1987). In the field of 
international relations, these implications of Bourdieusian study suggest to us that the 
obtaining and maintaining of a better hierarchical position in the embodiment of economic 
capital do not depend on objective advancement in materialist relations and accumulations. To 
the contrary, hierarchically better-positioned agents should save their monopolistic roles in 
cultural attitudes, which create a distinction in the practical experience of economic relations. 
In other words, states, having a suitable cultural habitus for the doxic reflexes of capitalism, 
always maintain their hierarchical advancement over culturally less-advantaged states. Today, 
all states define their identities and positions according to the capitalist system of vision and 
division. However, only some of them have the cultural altitudes of capitalist production in 
order to produce appropriate dispositions regarding economic actions in the field. In other 
words, states definitely struggle under the rules of capitalist production, but some of these 
states are able to have capacity regarding appropriate capitalist economic culture in order to 
reproduce differences and distinctions in state identities. Therefore, the possession of physical 
economical capital is less important than possession of capitalism’s symbolic disposition 
because possession of appropriate capitalist dispositions lead to control over the hierarchy of 
competing positions in international relations through domination of the methods of 
classification in a capitalist system. In this way, in the identities of states, having a high GDP 
or economic resources is not always classified with a higher position in the hierarchy of 
competing positions in the international field. Even a considerable increase in capitalist 
productions, as experienced in China, does not comparatively increase the relative political 
value of state identity in international relations. China in practice becomes a part of the doxic 
norms and hierarchy in which classificatory means are designed and produced by the 
European and Anglo-Saxon puritan culture of capitalism. Besides this, states, having 
classificatory means of capitalist doxic reflexes, can also reproduce identity in struggling 
positions of hierarchy even after great economic catastrophes, such as Germany experienced 
after the Second World War. As a result of this, in order to differ from the capitalist 
distribution of hierarchy in state identities in international relations, states have to reproduce 
distinctive ways regarding the classification of the means of capitalism and its doxic reflexes 
beyond the physical means and capacities of economic capital.  
The other significant distinction of Bourdieusian economics is derived from its 
structural constructivist approach to the field. Bourdieu not only relies on the delegation or 
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social construction of structures but also emphasizes that the dispositions of agents are 
constituted by accumulated history (Kauppi, 2005). Agents produce economic habitus, which 
is independent from their conscious interactions. In this respect, beyond any material 
distribution of social interactions, economic structures depend on vision and division 
capacities, which lead to domination over the classification characteristics of accumulated 
history. The accumulated history of economic capital results in a similar economic habitus, 
where classificatory identification is subjectively dominated by certain agents (Bourdieu, 
2013). Accumulated history indicates the role of the existing field regarding the tendencies of 
actions in practice. In this way, Bourdieu emphasizes that interactions and exchanges between 
agents do not explain whole infrastructure of economic capital, but the field, as the practical 
arena of structure, should be taken into account in order to understand historical nature in 
socially constructed interactions. As a result, states in the international field have determined 
positions according to historically accumulated economic culture before they campaign for 
the exchange processes of the international economy. The international economic field is 
always embedded in a certain economic culture, producing habitus that defines which states 
indirectly decide and impose the economic strategy of other states. The economic habitus of 
states is not a rational or interactional phenomenon, but it represents the cultural accumulation 
of states into the economic realities of the international field. Therefore, reproduction or 
change of economic capital is derived not only from interactional production in economic 
relations of states, but also from the dispositions of economic culture. Consequently, 
economic capital is fundamentally subject to symbolic productions which link the social 
realities of the field into positional distributions of state identity in international economics. In 
line with this explanation, it is plausible to say that economic habitus after the 2000s is not 
compatible with the economic realities of neoliberal culture. For instance, contrary to the 
theorization of economic construction, economic capital did not result in any significant 
change from the identification of Chinese identity in international relations, but it changed the 
symbolical economic habitus of China in accordance with the neoliberal culture of 
accumulated history. Neoliberalism represents the accumulated history of economic culture, 
which influences China’s dispositions to impose economic norms. China does not rationally 
define its economic habitus, but it reproduces its economic dispositions in order to produce 
reasonable strategies as ‘economic reason’ against the realities of the international field. In 
this way, China embodies the collective history of the economy into its individual history 
because the embodiment of objective structures leads to the social structuration of 
neoliberalism into the economic habitus of states. As a result of Bourdieusian study, it can be 
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said that economic capital in the international field is embedded in symbolic exchanges, and 
states produce dispositions which create reasonable strategies rather than totally conscious 
rational actions. On this point, I will examine the concept of neoliberalism in accordance with 
Bourdieusian study in the following section.  
 
Sense of limit and sense of reality in neoliberal functionalization beyond modernity 
The subsequent widening of the gap between recognized realities and misrecognized senses is 
considerably stimulated by neoliberal policies which aim at changes in the identities and 
political agents of states. Through a Bourdieusian lens, I will go beyond the classical 
international relations discussions on the institutional achievements and the market 
organization creating channels for multiple gains (Keohane, 2002; Liberman, 1996) or its 
fractions as commercial and democratic peace theorization (Mitchell, 2012; Doyle, 2005). 
Here, I will mostly rethink neoliberalism in terms of Bourdieu’s agency–structure 
engagements. I try to achieve a critical approach to the understanding of globalization and 
neoliberal economics with regards to social distribution regarding the redistribution of wealth, 
rights and the class structure of neoliberalism. In this respect, events and changes occurring in 
the contemporary world have brought into question neoliberalism and its spatial bearer of the 
globalizing world. Neoliberalism has been developing in line with the disengagement of 
modern state identities, with the propose of gaining an advanced domination of objective 
realities, and designing the fall of existing state identity in a new social stratification, or 
constructing a new identification of power allocation on the basis of a globalizing 
arbitrariness. The basis of neoliberalism is the construction of a new naturalization, and 
specifically how the new naturalization is being reproduced in line with the characterization 
of political identity. By looking at this given structure, neoliberalism is seen as an answer to 
the representative sense of limit for agents because it answers many questioning points of the 
political identities from classification and boundaries to collectiveness and distribution in 
economic life in a new improving social stratification. Therefore, it is important to see how 
neutralization is constructed by the theorization of neoliberalism. 
In the first place, neoliberalism dissociates economy from all existing social realities 
(Bourdieu, 2002). It firstly tries to change the meanings and visions of social stratification in 
the subjective world of the agents. When neoliberalism changes these meanings, it benefits 
from two important steps. Institutionally, the economy and state boundaries become 
dissembled. Secondly, the agents are being attached to more inclusive economic borders 
beyond state identity (Scholte, 2005). The first mechanism affects the distribution of wealth 
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globally because it changes the conditions for the allocation, sharing, production and 
consumption of capital on a global scale. The second mechanism affects the social 
stratification on a global scale because it creates new opportunities, spaces and social roles for 
the existing political orientation of state identity. These two mechanisms are the answers to 
the perceived inability of state identities to offer a useful theoretical neutralization which 
relies on globalization. However, under the favour of the globalizing world and its 
redistribution of institutions and agents, neoliberalism reinforces the deliberate realities of 
globalization in line with the creation of its political identification of actors. Unlike the state-
centred economy, neoliberalism creates new codes, institutions and social classes, maintaining 
that state collectiveness is not sufficiently appropriate to the global materialization.  
In line with social stratification, neolibearlism has been creating another collective 
sense of limit, or a ‘systemic feature of advanced capitalism’ (Sassen, 2011, pp. 22–23), 
whose borders and distribution are broader than conventional nation states’ identities. 
However, neoliberalism is not the sum of systemic objective metaphors and no one can 
predict whether it has reached an advanced peak of capitalism. Neoliberalism is a new 
challenge of the existing social and subjective stratification. In order to affect the existing 
dominant social stratification, neoliberalism produces potential ways to engage. Firstly, the 
new identities and their social stratification give more optimistic or desirable hopes and 
opportunities for the future. Secondly, they make the border of existing state identity 
unworkable, nonfunctional, inoperable, inhabitable, incapacitate and unrecognizable for the 
interests of the new global collectiveness. These two functions were originally governed by 
the boundaries of modern states. Originally, states both provided the whole social good for 
individuals and their social classes, and constituted a sense of limit, to say that the 
international arena is anarchical and uninhabitable without state borders. Now neoliberalism 
theoretically provides these two functions both influentially and spontaneously.  
Neoliberal functionalization is seen in many areas of economy, from production to 
distribution and social sharing. The new instrumentality of state identity reinterprets the 
distribution of production, labour, capital and wealth. Neoliberalism relocates production 
procedures in a borderless understanding of globalization. Formerly, everyone engaged the 
production procedures in order to increase the national welfare as much as their own wealth. 
However, new production procedures are not interested in any moral duty concerning a rise in 
the national wealth. Because of weakening national moral ties and identities, individuals do 
not consider the long-term national profits of these production procedures because habitual 
limitation given by state identity does not concretively constitute political collectiveness any 
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more. This process is nothing short of the instrumentalization of state identity in accordance 
with the new reformation of political collectivity (Finger, 2002). In accordance with this, 
images of products are becoming more important than the nationality of products and, 
therefore, individuals unconsciously pay ‘image fees’ for the new products of globalization 
(Veseth, 1998). These image fees are related to a sense of limitation and the new construction 
of neoliberal social stratification. They actualize invisible limitation in order to 
symbolize/emblematize certain products as the labels of certain nobility. Neoliberalism marks 
products by invisibly stratified class codes and that is why the usage of certain products shows 
which class of the new social stratification an individual is included in. In other words, social 
stratification cannot be formulated by nationalistic nobility and role in production. Rather, it 
constructs its sense of limitation by way of the products which an individual can continually 
use and reach.  
Global capital apparently causes many controversial issues in the globalizing market, 
such as working conditions, working hours and lack of social insurance (Ibid.), but there is no 
objective responsible to impeach because the new political power does not necessarily 
accommodate in a certain territorial border. Contrary to state identity, a power understanding 
of the new social stratification never directly engages the governance procedures of any 
political authority. It just has very developed lobbying and information and pressure 
mechanisms by which the state is forced to regulate coercively in the labour market. In this 
way, the classical definition of state identity is under attack by a new sense of limit because 
neoliberalism is free from the political pressure and condemnation of internal classes of states. 
It is an ‘invisible hand’ for conventional state authority because national state identities lose 
the capacity to produce a sense of limit and, therefore, national stratification becomes a sub-
assembly of global stratification. The dominants of social stratification control the new social 
collectiveness by way of a distinctive rational consideration in comparison with an irrational, 
ethnic and ontological consideration of the states. The state’s political identity becomes less 
connected to the localities and ‘more fluid – less fixed static node and more and assemblage 
of flows’ (Short, 2001, p. 175). In practice, this is mostly supported by transparency and the 
domination of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be controlled by the nation state identities but 
mostly implies the common values, tastes and expectations of humanity, which implies a new 
normative transformation in the international field. In order to defend their identities, states 
should emphasize the differences from each other but, contrary to this, neoliberalism mostly 
indicates both the similarities in the international field and the differences in the internal 
structures of states. These make considerable inroads into states’ identities because the 
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individuals firstly understand that conditions outside the state borders are not anarchic as it is 
claimed; then they see that their conventional identities are not inseparable after they see the 
different ethnic entities within the same national identities. Thus, the rationality of 
neoliberalism undermines the ontological sense of limit of state identities.  
Neoliberalism also changes the distribution of capital, property and wealth (Unger, 
2001). National identities attribute considerable resistance to the contemporary distribution of 
capital not to the structure of capital regime per se, but, rather, to the flow and reproduction of 
capital as they tend to be implemented in globalization. The new global flow of capital aims 
to depict how the chronic problems of nation states, especially issues regarding 
restricted/bordered markets, suppliers and consumers of the nation state, could be addressed if 
capital and wealth were free access and circulated quickly in any market on the globe. 
Therefore, the new system provides not only a kind of unlimited market, but also a production 
opportunity based on short-term returns without using any factor of production apart from 
capital (stock markets) (Stiglitz, 2010). As wealth increases its fluidity, national states lose 
control over the national distribution of wealth, which deteriorates social policies. In 
particular, the loss of state power in the field of social policies results in very destructive 
effects on state identity because these social policies pretend to equalize the wealth within 
boundaries. These social policies originally formed a misrecognition of the social classes 
within the nations. As a result, national state identity loses a very important mechanism to 
defend its social stratification.  
Whenever there is an increasing arbitrariness regarding the meanings of identities, a 
dominant theory, such as contemporary neoliberal expansion, always comes into existence to 
define the interpretation. The dominant interpretation is not the reality, but an arbitrary reality, 
formed by the dominant classes of social stratification, supported by the sub-classes of the 
same social stratification and functionalized by the misrecognition of the agents with regards 
to the perception of their old national and new global identities. In this respect, it is highly 
visible that many promises of neoliberalism resulted in rather severe situations for the socially 
incapable classes. Despite the neoliberal claims, neoliberalism has not achieved a more 
transitive and comprehensive social stratification. On the other hand, the stabilization of the 
economy, dynamics of growth, developmental issues and income disparities have deteriorated 
in comparison with the political nature of the modern state (Krugman, 2007). Therefore, 
beyond the optimistic sides of the frame, neoliberalism functionalizes some negative and 
controversial mechanisms to impose the inoperability of state borders. For example, 
neoliberal invasion has already created millions of hopeless individuals, as the new global 
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slaves or refugees, who have already broken their ties with their territorial national 
boundaries. In this respect, to isolate these people out of the borders or intercept the 
movement is seen as an impossible action in the national borders. The other political 
medium/state response may be the revitalization and accentuation of national identities. 
However, this way is so dangerous, and conduces many social and political traumas. For 
example, the accentuation of national identities and national immigrant minorities in society 
resulted in a dramatic increase in the support of the radical right-wing revivalism. 
An interesting function of neoliberal emancipation is related to the means of collective 
ideas. The nation state identities in the neoliberal process lose their essences to impose the 
ideas which emphasize existing national accumulations. National identities are established for 
the sake of totalizing institutions, as national economies and armies, that are based on national 
sentiment, with the assumption that if national security, law, borders, survival and interests 
are attacked, the individual identities of every citizen totalize quickly so as to defend the 
national presence. The national identities in the national social stratification are based on a 
totalized sentiment of state, but this collectiveness demands extraordinarily extensive 
propaganda, the investigation of knowledge, financial instruments which are very expensive, 
and inoperative policies in the neoliberal world. However, neoliberal approaches attempt to 
outline a more embedded response, replacing the intangible and citizen-based description of 
the total with knowledge among all individuals affected by a given procedure of globalization 
(Scholte, 2005). The aim of knowledge-based collectivity is generally issue-specific, and the 
conversation depends on very quick knowledge and information dissemination, which is 
provided by the means of technological improvements in the neoliberal world. Contrary to 
national collectiveness, neoliberal identity pretends to defend universal and up-to-date 
responses to specific issues, allowing little room for nation-specific interpretations, past 
experiences and the historical affinity of citizenship (Bourdieu, 2005). In short, similar to 
Martha Starr, who describes in her work the function of the Economist’s role in the 
globalization of identity, knowledge and power, neoliberalism renders knowledge 
accountable, accessible, arbitrary and mistakable (Starr, 2004). Owing to this quick 
accessibility of information, neoliberalism anonymously and heterogeneously fires up the 
internal nature of state according to its specific interests. Neoliberal collectivity is more 
heterogeneous, individualistic, territorially borderless and universal in comparison with 
uniform, territorial and bounded national collectivity.  
Neoliberalism also takes the control of crisis and transition (Duménil & Levy, 2011). 
It changes the characteristics, frequency and composition of crises. The crises between states 
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are becoming regional and territorially limited issues. Besides this, in accordance with the 
economic benefits/interests of gross capital owners, state crises are suppressed or fuelled. 
More importantly, the new global crises are more universal, complex and heterogeneous. 
Interestingly, the most unsolvable national crises cause wars, which end after one side 
conquers and comes up a solution at the end. However, neoliberal crises cannot be clearly 
identified. The causes of crises may not be clearly determined or visible and these crises may 
have many unclear consequences. Moreover, the impacts of neoliberal crises affect many 
different states simultaneously. In this respect, neoliberalism makes benefits of persistent 
crises in order to maintain domination. The universal crises are essential to transferring the 
economic values from state control to the new neoliberal political stratification. While states 
had drawn essential experiences from the political and economic crises, these experiences 
were merely the fundamental cure in the process of reshaping the larger institutionalized 
global economy and its territorial proliferation. They are far from being institutionalized into 
a meaningful sense of reality. On the other hand, they are still highly functional in practising 
the appropriate policies of neoliberalism. In this aspect, after the 2008 America-centred world 
economic crisis, it was supported that the state authority had to undertake the liability 
regarding the private financial sector’s deficits. The US government paid a great amount of 
private-sector deficit under the name of ‘corporate welfare’ (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 38). This is 
mostly seen as a neo-empowerment of state identity and power or a ‘return of the state 
authority’. However, this is nothing short of the false consciousness of neoliberalism or the 
sense of reality, which originated from the state identity of modernity, because the state 
payment of costs weakens state economic tools and flexibility in order to distribute 
sustainable economic wealth and economic accumulation. In this way, state functionalization 
on the interference of future crises weakens sharply.  
Neoliberalism has increasingly imposed its theoretical ideation, especially since the 
1980s. It has created a great neutralization as an extension of the ‘universalization of 
particular characteristics’, which is based on the economic field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 226). 
This economical neutralization superseded the dominant position of the traditional political 
fields of the state and suppressed the other social and cultural fields simultaneously. The 
neoliberal application of the subjective field of individuals is not simply a programme of 
economic liberal practices, but a theoretical indoctrination which tends to reproduce social 
arbitrariness for the benefit of new neoliberal social stratification (Ibid.). The new theoretical 
indoctrination firstly engages a ‘de-familiarization’ from a sense of reality of existing national 
stratification and a ‘re-familiarization’ or natura
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stratification. The experience of establishing identities is being substituted by a new 
subjective field powered by a neoliberal theorization. The global distribution of classes, which 
gave rise to the arbitrariness of neoliberalism, does not mean that the economy-oriented 
domination of neoliberals does not invade the political field of national identities. Rather, the 
domination techniques of the new stratification are indirect and heterogeneous. Neoliberalism 
creates individuals of stratification in substitution for the citizens of the state identity.  
Neoliberalism also means the indoctrination of new power relations in the objective 
world conditions. This power relation of neoliberalism does not firstly dominate the concrete 
economical field. Rather, it is subjectively embedded in the sense of limit. The establishing 
mechanism of the sense of limit in nation state identities was the ontological sentiment of 
nation, which was substituted by global information technology and knowledge in the 
neoliberal era. In other words, the ontological national domination mechanism of a sense of 
limit changed into objective informational exchanges under the name of ‘structural 
adjustment’ (Ibid., p. 230). Thus, sense of limit, regardless of states’ territorial boundaries, is 
taking a suitable time adapting to the new social stratification of neoliberalism. The former 
social stratification of the state is less likely to compete in a sense of limit than the neoliberal 
reinterpretation of the agents’ identities. In this respect, the misrecognition of a new neoliberal 
sense of limit supports a new institutional reconstruction which represents a new sense of 
reality of the individuals. The new social stratification of globalization is mostly a process for 
producing individuals within a wider borderless world. The economic capital of neoliberalism 
produces new institutional bases to impress the arbitrariness and economic reconstruction of 
the new domination on the new produced individuals. As a result, the new individuals are the 
products of the new neoliberal understanding of social collectiveness. After neoliberalism 
atomizes individuals, contrary to nation states, it does not provide the same territorial space 
for every individual. Rather, the individuals are granted different social spaces in accordance 
with their functional differentiation from others and their economic accumulation. In this way, 
social space becomes very complex and heterogeneous for individuals. Besides this, a 
neoliberal sense of limit fulfils a new legitimacy for individuals to define their identities. The 
individuals cannot rationally legitimate their identities, regardless of the new understanding of 
global capital, production, the global market, neoliberal humanitarianism, the global labour 
market etc. These interpretations are based on a sense of reality and produce the identities of 
political subjectivity. In conclusion, neoliberalism creates a new theory for more atomized 
individuals beyond the citizenship and state borders. It imposes a different sense of limit 
which provides a new set of tastes, norms and perceptions for the interpretation of modern 
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state identity. The neoliberal sense of limit legitimizes a new set of global institutions, which 
changes the perceptions of states regarding sense of reality. The collectivity perspective of 
neoliberalism uses economic capital as a base and neutralizes state stratification in order to 
achieve redefinition in a collective body of state. That is why neoliberalism is becoming a 
process of transforming political identities from state to a more heterogeneously bordered and 
complex structure.  
 
Discussions on the neoliberal imagination of field 
The main propose of this part is to understand the neoliberal engagement of territoriality and 
state via the globalization process. Contemporarily, neoliberalism weakens the unification of 
the territorial boundaries, which means a removal of all existing limits of state functionality. 
In this aspect, neoliberalism and globalization, as its spatial functionalization, 
refers to an economic policy aimed at unifying the economical field by a whole set of juridical-political 
measures, designed to remove all the limits to that unification, all the obstacles to that extension, most 
of which are linked to the nation-state … In other words, global market is a political creation 
(Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 224–225)  
Similar to the elimination of former institutions by the bourgeois class in modernity, 
neoliberalism eliminates the interests and institutions of state identity to achieve a 
distinguishing domination of new social relations beyond state borders and boundaries. The 
existence of state borders is a functional tool and an arbitrary political interpretation of new 
neoliberal economic capital because the existence of state boundaries theoretically creates a 
strong sense of equality which pretends to insulate state internal economic classes from the 
new global economic class and its domination. In practice, it only insulates the state from the 
outside; it cannot prevent neoliberal expansion from territorial boundaries. The state loses its 
structural and institutional power to penetrate the global and institutional advance of the 
neoliberal field, but the new economic classes of neoliberalism interpenetrate state borders 
easily via the neoliberal expansion of economic capital. Thus, the relations between the 
former economic capital of state and the economic capital of neoliberal globalization are 
asymmetrical and rely on inequality rather than more equal opportunities in the economic 
field. 
In line with – especially – the neoliberal transformation of the economic field, it is 
important to answer how the identities will take part in a globalizing locality or localizing 
global of the economic field. There are a number of different perspectives working on the 
defining characteristics of neoliberal globalization. One of the prominent perspectives with 
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regard to the issue evaluates that neoliberal globalization objectifies a homogenization which 
interprets the whole market and its apparatus into the same collective representation. This 
impression approves that, after the universal domination of globalization, identities will be 
based on a more homogenous interpretation (Norberg-Hodge, 1999, 2003). Besides this, the 
second reflection regarding the characteristics of the neoliberal globalizing field indicates that 
the neoliberal world creates different effects in different localities. This means that ‘the 
universal’ and ‘the particular’ create intertwined interactions and, therefore, they gradually 
resemble each other. This perspective refers to a process of ‘glocalization’, which shows the 
heterogeneous characteristics of the spatial distribution of new identities that achieves a 
particularization of the universal and universalization of the particular simultaneously (Cox, 
1997). The process of neoliberal expansion is seen as a differentiation of territorial identities 
because the effects of neoliberal expansion are perceived in many different ways according to 
the peculiarities of different localities. Beyond these two perspectives, another considerable 
perspective claims that neoliberal expansion does not create homogenization or heterogeneity 
of the different local identities because neoliberalism does not synthesize or integrate the 
values and identities of states. Rather, it combines different local identities. In this way, 
neoliberal globalization constructs a new identity, which includes a variety of peculiarities 
from all localities. Thus, the neoliberal territorial expanse of globalization is nothing short of 
a hybrid organization of existing political identities, or – more appropriately – neoliberal 
expansion on global scale is a ‘hybridization’ of former values and identities (Hedetoft & 
Hjort, 2002; Woods, 2007).  
It is plausible that all of these thoughts reflect some aspects of the neoliberal 
characterization of the economic field. However, these implications focus on descriptive 
observations in the objective world, but they do not see the prescriptive characteristic of 
globalizing identities, constituted by a particular nobility of domination. The particularization 
of ‘the universal’ is ambiguous because the meanings and scope of ‘the universal’ are very 
controversial. In line with Bourdieu, ‘the universal’ is nothing short of the arbitrariness of the 
neoliberal sense of limit beyond state boundaries. Quintessentially, this study follows the idea 
that ‘the universal’ is formed by theory, created by the arbitrariness of the domination of new 
global stratification, naturalized by the new global economy-centred institutionalization in the 
objective world, and practised by the atomized individual agents and collectivization in the 
global stratification of subjective and objective fields. Neoliberal globalization as a political 
creation does not resemble the values of all of its members. It is plausible that the 
globalization of particularity is a peculiar characteristic of the neoliberal field of practice, but 
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this particularity is just a representation of domination because only capital allocation of a 
certain domination is sufficient to get free from any delimitation and to infuse into the 
institutionalization of symbolic capital in the international field. As a result of this, the 
particularization of globalisation into different state identities can only present the same 
dominant values and its globalizing doxa of relations.  
In this respect, in line with the consideration of Bourdieusian economics, it is claimed 
that the globalizing identity is mainly involved in a new globalizing ‘re-collectivization’. 
States are mostly experiencing a unification and coexistence of identities because they are 
dominated by the same economic rules, objectives and institutionalization in the different 
territorial localities and regimes. Homogenization approaches ignore the differences of 
localities, but the new re-collectivization considers that differences are a constitutive element 
of the new vision and division as long as their constitutive objectives target the same 
expectations, which are subjectively imposed by the neoliberal sense of limits. In addition to 
this, as is implied above, the heterogeneity approach of neoliberal territoriality stumbles in 
seeing the construction and meaning of ‘the universal’. Many differences, such as gendered, 
regional and ethnic differences in state identity, still exist, but globalization does not directly 
take aim at such sub-structures. It divides these sub-identities into small parts, such as low-
ethnicity and local minorities. Thus, the older superstructures, such as the state justice in the 
territorially defined borders, lose their impact on the agents (Fraser, 2007). In other words, 
although the values are interpreted in different ways in different social collectiveness, they 
claim to obtain the similar superstructure and objectives which are provided by neoliberal 
economic identification. In this way, globalisation re-collectivizes territorial values in 
accordance with the neoliberal encroachment into state territoriality. As long as these sub-
forms abide by the fundamental economic rules and expectations of the new global 
stratification, state identity will locally have the flexibility to interpret the super-structural 
institutions such as democracy in accordance with local objectives. This transforms the 
subjective perception of state, which interprets its identity in accordance with the new sense 
of limit of the neoliberal globalization because neoliberal globalization is a political creation 
which aims at the domination of a new global economic stratification via the elimination of 
the limits of state identity (Bourdieu, 2005).  
Historically, every process of unification, or every new homogenization, is connected 
to the monopolization of a new set of powers which constitutes a distinctive form of former 
domination. State identity is just a recent form of a distinctive homogenization which is 
pictured by modernity and its theorization. In this way, a distinctive homogenization is always 
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constituted by the naturalization of homogenization between the imposition of dominants and 
the disposition of dominated social factions into the same political collectiveness. Therefore, 
collectivization on the basis of subjective capital is always followed by a collectivization or 
homogenization in the economic field, as has historically been observed in the foundation of 
national economic markets. However, as indicated, the differentiation between imposition and 
disposition or between vision and division is the sine qua non of a successfully founded 
domination. The harmonization of imposition and disposition creates a false consciousness 
about the practical positions of agents owing to the fact that the subjective capital of 
collectiveness is determined by the imposition of some social groups over others not equally 
ready to compete within the same competitions. False recognition is based on this 
unconsciousness regarding unequally distributed symbolic capital between the agents. 
Subjective inequality eventually results in a disadvantaged situation in the economic field for 
dominated agents because subjective domination transforms into an objectified institution 
which inevitably produces unequal engagements in economic capital. All agents should be 
part of competitions in economic field, but only the producers of domination obtain qualified 
capital allocation to produce asymmetrical economic benefits. Looking at the homogenization 
of modern state identity, it can be seen that the economic success of the former aristocratic 
domination was not based on advancement in economic apparatus, but it was instead related 
to the advancement of subjective capital because subjective domination constitutes a 
distinctive nobility which is transformed into institutional practices. Therefore, when nobility 
transferred to the bourgeois, the older form of political subjectivity inevitably lost its 
domination. As a result, every collective harmonization of political identity is a product of 
distinctive domination in the economic field (Fraser, 1997).  
Neoliberal institutionalization in the economic field does not rely on the 
harmonization of all actors’ visions, but it consists of arbitrariness and particularity in a 
dominant or a group of dominants. In this respect, the identification of political identity takes 
on a new meaning. Originally, the political identification of medieval kings was defined by 
territoriality and its functionalization in the practical field. National identities developed this 
territorial identification of the medieval king. On the other hand, the modern state also built 
on a value-based identification in addition to the territorial definition of identity. In this way, 
in addition to territorial definition, the value of nationality becomes an inseparable definitive 
characteristic of modern state identity. As modernity changed the medieval definition of 
political identity, neoliberal globalization tries to change these definitive characteristics of 
modernity. The neoliberal definition fundamentally tries to get free from territorially defined 
 129
political identities. It tries to constitute a pure value-oriented definition of political identity via 
eliminating any territorial delimitation and its characteristics, which deteriorates participatory 
arenas for struggles of decision making and justice (Fraser, 2007). The value-based system of 
neoliberalism conceptualizes political identification, which depends on an advanced 
engagement of democracy and unlimited market economy under the rules and jurisdiction of 
universal dominant particularity beyond the state’s territorial legislative power. Therefore, the 
new vision of division in the neoliberal economic field is based on an accumulation of a 
certain kind of value system which enhances the positions of political actors and states in the 
international field. This value-based definition of identities is eventually distributed into a 
kind of organizational process which affects the decision regarding the definition of identities. 
Indeed, European unification characterizes this value-based identity definition of 
neoliberalism. Historically, Europe has interpreted with a more territorial definition than by 
using value-based characteristics. As a result, it is easy to define the territorial borders of 
Europe. On the other hand, historically, European identity, based on a common value system 
between the territories, is not as obvious as its territorial, geographical, historical borders. 
Although territorial European identity is more descriptive, the European Union was formed in 
accordance with a consideration of a certain value system, the values and principles of which 
many member states in the union are achieving – or have achieved post facto. As a result, the 
European Union has defined its identity in line with the value-based divisionary identification 
of neoliberalism. 
Re-collectivization implies that the localities recognize the expectations, stratification 
and objectives of global capitalist domination because potential differences in the objectives 
of localities and regulations basically do not intend to achieve any other structural allocation 
beyond neoliberal arbitrariness. Therefore, methodological differences in achieving the global 
objectives are acceptable for the neoliberal definition of collectivity. The basic understanding 
is firstly to hammer the classification and objectives of globalization into the subjective field 
of state. Re-collectivization is the natural result of neoliberal globalization because every 
improvement in a certain territoriality depends considerably on other territorialities. For 
instance, a state’s expectation of its gross domestic product mostly depends on the purchasing 
powers and economic decisions of other states, and states’ sovereign interrelations are not 
capable definitions with regards to their functional positioning in the global stratification of 
neoliberalism. In order to define the delimitation of the new collectiveness, neoliberalism 
takes advantage of cooperation, dialogue, territorial fairway and common values and common 
global problems because it tries to maintain its dominance in a common sense of different 
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localities. Consequently, harmony between unequal collective agents is achieved by stresses 
on common values and created language, such as such as the global sense of humanity and 
everybody’s environmental conscience. The differences are prerequisites of the new global 
stratification and its division. As is claimed, if every territorial space of the world achieves the 
same homogeneous structures, the new global capital cannot profit from the differences in 
labour prices, market efficiency and consumer tendencies which can change from a territory 
to another. Contrary to national welfare states, the new global capital domination does not 
only absorb the surplus value within a restricted territory. Rather, it absorbs the relatively and 
functionally created surplus of all the territorialities. As a result, the global domination of 
capital does not homogenize values of identities. Rather, it tries to achieve a functionally 
well-operated re-collectivization between the identities.  
Some approaches show that state identity actually supports globalization – or, more 
precisely, ‘the state and global have been substantively mutually reinforcing’ regarding 
governance in relation to identity (Scholte, 2005, p. 148). They evaluate new global 
solidarities/new forms of sub-identities; gender groups, age groups, religious identities, 
immigrants and diasporas are the proofs which show that the importance/dominance of 
national state identities is continuing and contributing to the hybridization of identities. 
However, the biggest advancement of neoliberalism is to atomize the identity of the state. The 
more globalization atomizes the existing structure of state identity, the more the world 
becomes governable for the global capital market. Therefore, these sub-identities are rational 
results of the atomization of the class structure in the state. States are nothing short of 
functional organs to make legal changes for the global common market in their own 
territories. They gradually lose their financial counteraction capacity in opposition to the new 
global stratification. The new sub-identities mostly come into existence in order to form 
opposition beyond the state territories because they prove that state does not have the capacity 
to save the new collectivization of political structures.  
Lastly, the new global structure changes the relations between responsibility and 
power. Originally, sovereign national states were very centralized powers and, therefore, they 
had absolute responsibility to distribute public goods. However, neoliberal stratification and 
its dominants substitute state functionality and the power of arbitrariness. The new global 
stratification created its new collectivization of unequally positioned political identities 
(Bourdieu, 2005). Meanwhile, it also restructured its new classification of identities and 
power allocation globally. Most importantly, neoliberalism does not take advantage of a 
subjective, ontological and theoretical sense of equality in order to populate its identities and 
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classes. The unequal and arbitrary distribution of integration is a basic functional tool of 
global economic capital. The differentiation of institutional structures is also the arbitrary 
politics of neoliberal economic capital because inequality and differentiation in institutional 
structure are essential to produce added value. The important thing is to save the single global 
market and its rules. In this way, economic capital subdues collectivization in differences and 
inequality via global autonomous organizations. These organizations also impose and defend 
the fundamental rules of the single global market. The state becomes a functional part of the 
policies of these institutions because the state lose its functions of domination without having 
control of its own economic capital within its territorial borders. Domination of global 
economic capital obtains power and its arbitrariness, but it does not undertake all the 
functions of state identity. In other words, contrary to state identity, the new global capital 
dominates the power, but it does not undertake the responsibilities (for example, new 
neoliberal economic capital is not interested in social welfare policies). The nation states have 
to pay these benefits, but nation states are not capable of welfare politics without economic 
capital. Due to the failures of nation states regarding welfare politics, the reaction of the 
atomized citizen increases and the agents discredit their national identities in favour of 
globalizing collectivization.  
 
Neoliberalism and collectiveness of state identity 
Neoliberal collectivization on the base of the globalizing economic field is a political creation 
which is substituted for the former political creation of the national state on the basis of 
modernization. More precisely, modernity as the theoretical concept of the national state is 
under attack from a new collectivization which is theorized by a new spatial expansion and its 
unifying principles of economic policies. Therefore, neoliberalism promises a new collective 
identification of political subjectivity on the basis of economic, political, symbolic and 
legislative collectivization beyond the delimited collectivization of states. It is not plausible to 
expect that such an expansion in the economic field and its objective institutionalization 
represents the whole set of values and dispositions of all of the collective political agents or 
states into the international field of globalization. As modernity and its identity construction 
of states were represented and framed by Western symbolic values and cultural supremacy, 
which established and imposed their own imagined institutionalization and organization of 
political identity in the international field, neoliberalism descriptively constitutes a 
particularity of a certain domination as the collective representation of equality within a wider 
unified economic field of globalization. In this respect, neoliberalism indicates a distinctive 
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naturalization which changes the functions and characteristics of the former 
institutionalization of the state. In order to achieve a successful domination, neoliberalism de-
territorializes the dispositional understanding of state institutionalization. In this way, 
neoliberalism impairs divisions on the basis of the democratic welfare state engagements of 
modernity within territorial defined borders and improves a stakeholder democracy of 
globalization which imposes a new collective emancipation from the delimitation of state 
identity. In this respect, neoliberalism tries to impose a misrecognized particularity of 
emancipation on the dispositions of agents, which constitute the possibility of democracy, 
welfare and unlimited exchanges within a globalizing economic field.  
Economic capital is the productive element of all kinds of capital, and other kinds of 
capital can be reproduced according to their interrelation with economic capital. The 
functionalization of economic capital, therefore, is subject to the ‘conversion’ capability of 
different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Neoliberal marketization tries to change the state-
centric conservation capacity of economic capital in relation to the other kinds of capital. The 
basic structural objective of neoliberal expansion is to create atomized individuals and 
eliminate any collective links of states. In order to achieve this, neoliberalism tries to get free 
from state-centred interests, citizenship, social stratification and identities. When neoliberal 
expansion does not directly target state identity, it supports and brings out the low identities 
and differences within the territories. Thus, neoliberalism had to impose the rationality of 
stratification, which relies on new symbolic dispositions beyond state identity. The new 
stratification is likely to depend on the objective actions of atomized individuals whose social 
positioning is likely to be independent from the territorial interests of the state. In this respect, 
social positioning will be determined by the capacity and success of individuals regarding the 
pursuance of competition and accumulation globally. Individuals and their social groups, as 
citizens, families and citizens, always mobilize on behalf of ontological and subjective ties of 
their collective identities. When they mobilize on behalf of the state, they cooperate for the 
benefit of their nations and social classes in addition to their own individualistic interests. 
However, the new global stratification needs individuals who rationalize their identities in 
accordance with a pure economic logic and the mentality of the single global market. 
Consequently, the existing social collectiveness within state identity is seen as the biggest 
obstacle and competitor to achieve neoliberal expansion.  
Initially, the single market of globalization tries to separate social realities and the 
economy. This process reached a peak when privatization policies became widespread 
because the state lost commend over many socially important functions and means which 
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form the interference mechanism of the welfare state. Consequently, state identity mainly 
intervenes in social disputes and restlessness via negotiating neoliberal capital affiliations. 
States do not freely invest in the collectiveness of their classes and local markets, because 
class stratification within state territory loses its function in the global market. In this respect, 
the objective reality of the social world is not compatible with the subjective expectation and 
objective institutions of individuals. In other words, individuals still have social rights and 
spaces in the territorial nation state identity. However, the neoliberal economy deliberately 
tries to put these social collective entities out of commission because the loss of former social 
collectiveness probably creates a ‘social anomia’ for all the collective entity of state identity. 
The state’s classes do not find appropriate spaces in the former form of social stratification. 
As a result, when the existing habitus does not answer actual structures, the vision of state 
economic capital is questioned by new forms of dispositions formulated by neoliberal 
expansion. However, at this point, Bourdieu makes an institutional preference and advocates 
that European social democracies are the basic structural entities for achieving emancipation 
and reviving public interests. In other words, social collectiveness and collective institutions 
can only be protected by the European social democratic welfare state model. He relies mostly 
on social distribution and the social welfare policies of the social democracies. He believes 
that social democracies can create spaces for threatened social collective institutions in order 
to stand up to the neoliberal destruction of collectiveness (Bourdieu, 1998a). 
The function of salvation or the emancipation of social collectiveness is considerably 
prejudicial to the logic of new global single marketization. The social collectiveness of state 
identity provides a space to mitigate the problems of internal social groups. In this respect, 
social democracies and welfare states were constructed in order to achieve this emancipation 
mechanism of social groups. Without the ‘social’ and its social collectiveness, individuals 
were isolated in the pure market domination, which dominates the fields of accumulation all 
over the globe. However, not only does this domination not tries to get free from the pressure 
of the ‘social’, but also global neoliberal polices increasingly aim at dominating the fields of 
distribution (Teeple, 2000). As a result of this, the state is not easily involved in the direct 
subvention of social classes and spaces because these policies are increasingly opposed by 
neoliberal social domination. As it was witnessed during the 2008 global financial crisis, 
despite the fact that the biggest victims of the crisis were the new atomized individuals, the 
subventions were not directly allocated for the benefit of the emancipation of individuals.  
The symbolic violence of the modern political identity created a ‘common sense’ on 
the basis of a division in accordance with sovereign state identity. However, new rising 
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structural inequalities aim to change the vision of structural violence in the subjective sphere 
of individuals because knowledge is produced and distributed by the neoliberal expansion 
beyond the knowledgeable power of state. The new global economy and its global market 
create new structural violence for individuals beyond their affiliation with state identity. 
Neoliberalism also extends the borders of the former structural violence in a new global arena. 
The new economic functional means of the global market improve the success of new 
structural violence via global-scale unemployment, income distribution and capital fluidity. In 
this way, the states are imposed to subsidize ‘the deficits’ of global neoliberal expansion 
because new economic capital imposes that the new distribution is not achieved by direct 
welfare subsidies of social classes and individuals. This also affects the roles of families on 
the consumption of their members because the new global power has better knowledge for 
producing things according to such groups as age and gender (Bourdieu, 1998a). Therefore, 
the result of dissolving state identity may result in a more de-socialized world than that which 
knowledge of globalization reveals to us. In other words, the ‘social’ is considerably 
disassociated from its roots as classes, families, citizens and its collective form of state 
identity.  
Beyond the neoliberal theorization of the globalizing economic field, the territorial 
limitlessness of new economic capital in descriptive world actually provides a dispositional 
habituation process for domination in order to influence the subjective habitus of dominated 
states and their territorial positions regarding the doxa of intended neoliberal identification. 
Symbolic and objective deficiencies in the capital allocations of dominated states retain these 
dominated states from competitive membership of new global exchanges and struggles. 
Domination embodies all of the required subjective, objective, juridical and informative 
capacities to struggle in the limitless world of economic capital. However, the theoretical 
freedom from all territorial and institutional limits creates a practical deterioration in the 
collective bodies of disadvantaged states in the international field. Because of the subjective 
and objective capacity deficiencies of these dominated states, they cannot operate with 
unlimited rights and institutions in accordance with the dispositional and institutional 
superiority of domination. Therefore, it is correct that the neoliberal economic field abandons 
limits for every state, but, in practice, dominated states do not have the requisite capital 
allocation to compete in the positions of domination. States’ territorially secured economic 
spaces actually function as the emancipation mechanism of modernity, which de-escalates the 
symbolic violence of states. On the contrary, neoliberalism substituted the emancipation 
mechanism for states with a universally unified field of practice which creates a deeper 
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divisionary symbolic violence for the political identities of states because the new 
collectivization universalizes particularity and the one-sided values of domination, which 
results in ‘integration within inequality’. In order to constitute the asymmetrical exchange 
system of economic capital, new global domination has improved its institutionalization in 
every aspect of the international field. Indeed, the neoliberal expansion of the economic field 
enhanced its legislative power and accomplished the capacity to form international law. As a 
result of this, the international law-making capacity of globalizing domination improved its 
penalizing functions in states’ internal laws, forming symbolic violence within the globalizing 
collectiveness of the economic field. 
Structurally, neoliberal globalization is the systematic destruction of social 
collectiveness in international relations (Bourdieu, 1998a). All types of social collectiveness, 
from national states to family and classes, are potential counters of the new global 
marketization. The spaces of the former institutional collectiveness are narrowing. When the 
new global stratification substitutes institutional bases of state identity, it utilizes the functions 
of states by way of certain policies and global establishments, such as privatization and WTO 
regulations. Functional policy harmony is supplied by supranational or – more precisely – 
global regulations which are based on a new normative domination in state habitus that 
guarantees a single global market with free and safe movement of goods, services and money. 
This new normative domination inevitably creates social and economic risks within state 
borders. However, due to the non-territorial distribution of neoliberal economic capital, the 
new normative institutionalization of global neoliberalism does not contribute to social 
responsibility/liability for state identity. The actions of states’ – and non-states’ – ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ practices are failing because they have not achieved a well-founded 
agenda.25 That is why the state is just seen as a policy mechanism to guarantee more finance 
and revenues, and why it functions as a kind of ‘risk bearer’ (Fuchs & Kratochwil, 2002). For 
instance, when a state obtains a loan from a global financial institution, the institution can 
express a preference in decision making in all policy areas: social distribution, 
individualization, privatization and the functionalization of the risk-bearer function of the 
state.  
Institutionally, the former social collectiveness of the state identity is linked to the new 
rules and laws which depend on the individualistic policy arrangements of the new global 
                                               
25
 For more information, see Vogel (2006). 
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stratification. Neoliberal stratification constructs its own legislative bases and, therefore, 
states try to regulate their own internal laws in accordance with the values and norms of the 
new single neoliberal market (Bourdieu, 2005). The former international structure of the state 
was based on objective and recognizable procedures between the mutually equal entities. The 
state as a social collectiveness had responsibilities for its sub-collective identities and also for 
a clear policy agenda against all other equal states. However, the states now have duties 
towards many global power centres. The subjective recognition of states is determined by 
credit rating agencies rather than other state peers. Thus, the loss of social collectiveness also 
results in a loss of fundamental institutional and legislative bases of the former social 
collectiveness. More seriously, the ontological collective and subjective equality of the 
citizens of the states removed severe medieval institutions of slavery in the international era. 
Due to the individualization of globalization, a more severe form of global slavery came into 
existence in a neoliberal economic capital distribution. In the neoliberal social stratification, 
individualized and socially annihilated identities can easily become parts of global slavery 
and marginal identities, which are constructed by a new interpretation of symbolic violence in 
state identity. 
The mentality of neoliberal economic capital creates considerably different borders 
and boundaries for individuals according to their relations with globalized capital, because the 
new neoliberal globalization is seemingly boundary-broadening (Rosenau, 1997). In other 
words, the new global stratification redeploys the objective and subjective boundaries of 
atomized individuals in accordance with the affiliations of social collectiveness. Subjectively, 
states originally pursue the determined objectives and collective social aims for citizens. The 
state was based on long-term profits, cooperative/collaborated responsibilities and social 
solidarity in a mutually recognized international space. The responsibilities of citizens 
compromise the duty towards their social classes, family and potential future generations of 
the same national identity. By contrast, the new global economic capital pursues short-term 
profits and is free from responsibility to any collective affiliation, identity or future generation 
because new neoliberal expansion does not have any collective boundary. Objectively, 
individuals are categorized according to the degree of individualization and the position of 
short-term profits. Every category in neoliberal globalization has its own borders and 
boundaries. Individuals can obtain a wider space if they seek more individualized short-term 
profits. As a result, the state had to remove borders for very wealthy capital owners, who are 
free from the fundamental prerequisites to be a local citizen in a particular state. Individuals 
under the pressure of loosened state collectivity are most likely to be a part of a local 
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workforce of global affiliations in more restricted borders. The other bordered category is the 
professional and highly educated workforce. If individuals have potential to increase and 
contribute their neoliberal economic capital, they can functionally be free from boundaries in 
accordance with their abilities. As a result, the new global stratification utilizes individuals in 
relation to capital and short-term profits.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CULTURAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Defining cultural capital in the international field 
International relations among states characteristically depend on both objective power and 
interests and subjective norms and values. The formation of units in international relations 
rests on a homogenization of identity by way of different historical formations. The creation 
of state boundaries relies on different normative and practical interpretations of structures. In 
practice, in medieval Europe, the king’s feudal units were unified by the holy idea of a mass 
retaliation called crusades. In the same way, modern states have homogenized their identities 
by means of assimilation, nationalization, genocide etc., which are linked to many objective 
power relations and legitimize the state as the new political units (Donnelly, 1998). 
Subjectively, a normative set of values always forms the general rules to be the standard units 
of international relations. Norms mainly represent the principles of interactions among those 
units. Accordingly, the Westphalian construction was the first attempt to underline the 
normative environment of the modern state, but its constitution-based institutional nature was 
substituted by a new nation-based institutionalization due to a historically changing 
interpretation of political identity. The production of a new political identity always 
historically precedes the structures on the eve of every new institutionalization. This 
normative construction evolved in time and described the international systems as the 
international system. At this point, neither objective geographical redistribution nor subjective 
normative reconstruction comprehensively explains the changes in the identities of political 
subjects. My goal in this part is to bring Bourdieu’s cultural capital into the international 
relations field. It is claimed that cultural capital precedes and produces state identity both 
normatively and objectively.  
According to Bourdieu, cultural capital means all kinds of inherited, institutionalized 
and objectified apparatus of agents which credit the agents with knowledge of the capacity to 
produce meanings of the social world and to become subjectively conscious regarding the 
identities of the objective world (Bourdieu, 1984, 1973). In this way, cultural capital is a way 
of monopolization which achieves a common sense of identity and, more particularly, its 
standards. Cultural capital is a functionality to produce, at the least, a minimum agreement for 
all agents. This means that cultural capital is produced in order to create a future because the 
agents only evaluate the structure by way of a standardized perception of the subjective world 
(Ibid.). Monopolization and standardization seem to underpin the styles of relationship in the 
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field and to show that there is a standard way which subjects of a particular structure 
recognize. In this way, international relations not only means simply a kind of territorial 
objective differentiation but also indicates a monopolization of created standards that 
distinguishes the positioning of agents in the structure.  
Cultural capital firstly indicates a consensus on how the agents understand each other. 
This consensus is largely derived from defined standards of identities. However, consensus 
based on standards is not an agreement of cooperation or coexistence. It impresses 
theoretically utopian knowledge upon the agents because it changes the self-evident origins of 
the structure. In this way, consensus creates pre-organized and pre-supposed knowledge 
regarding the objective world. Knowledge is transferred to all agents by means of habitus and 
dispositions. Habitus and dispositions are unconsciously practised by the agents because they 
are represented as the only way to create profits in the objective world. Cultural capital 
underpins knowledge and the recognition of the relationship, which standardize consensus. 
Cultural capital about the moral and objective intentions of the agents represents the social 
position of the authority, providing the monopolization of justificatory recognition and the 
imposition of legitimacy (Ibid.). In other words, agents are unconsciously liable to deliberate 
interpretation and they become parts of the monopolized knowledge of cultural capital 
because habitus represents knowledge which imposes that the agents should be parts of the 
same dispositions in order to have a defined social position. Social position is needed to create 
new profits. In this way, particularity of authority’s knowledge becomes the monopolized 
standard for everyone and particular profits are generated in order to pursue the social 
positioning of cultural capital.  
The existence of agents and institutions in international relations is generally portrayed 
as a production of shared norms and values (Ruggie, 1993; Finnemore, 1996b; Reus-Smit, 
2001b) or the nature of power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001; Keohane, 1989). The first 
reflection depends on the normative construction of ‘international’, which creates common a 
basis for setting identified standards for the identities of agents; the second is linked to an idea 
of the struggle for power. Beyond this second paradigm of structuralism, as the modern 
system has been practising since the constructive normative frame of Westphalia, the modern 
state identity was seen a product of the standards of constitutionalization or social interaction. 
In light of both structuralism and post-structuralism, the creation of the modern national 
identity of states is seen as a result of a process based on the achievement of the struggle for 
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power, the accomplishment of common standardized perspectives or a ‘functional necessity’26 
(Buzan, 2004) to reorganize the globalizing relationship of the political units. However, 
beyond the objective necessities in interactionalists’ claims and shared norms and values in 
constructivists’ perspectives, Bourdieu underlines the roles of cultural capital, habitus and 
dispositions in the formation of identities (Fowler, 1997). First of all, agents in pursuit of their 
goals are based upon their subjective understanding of necessities, needs and conditions, 
which is derived from their dispositions. From this point of view, the reproduction of identity 
is preceded by dispositional and habitual processes rather than normative, functional or 
rational understanding. That is why it is claimed that, owing to the fact that agents can 
produce meanings and interpretations by way of their pre-given dispositions, cultural capital 
plays the dominant role in forming the identities of agents in different historical terms. 
  
Cultural capital and production of identity beyond social construction 
It is mainly argued here that shared ideas and norms are not the primary origins of the 
institutionalization of national identity in international relations. However, constructivist 
international relations studies are usually based on generic structural fundamental institutions 
to define state identity in states’ societies (Ruggie, 1992; Wight, 1977; Reus-Smit, 1999). In 
this way, they identify national state identity by way of a fundamental institution: sovereignty. 
The institutionalization of nation state identity is derived from this generic institutional 
structure. In this way, the state socializes into this normative environment and learns how it 
can be a recognized part of the society of nation states or modern international relations. In 
other words, states form the generic norms and then they produce secondary institutions such 
as sovereign territory and multilateralism in order to define the features of recognizable 
identities. This constructivist approach is generally incapable of explaining the 
structuralization of fundamental institutions because it emphasizes sovereignty as the sole 
generic root of subjects, identities and institutions. Similar to the ontological roots of 
structural theories of international relations, sovereignty itself, becomes an ontology in the 
constructivist explanation of the roots of state identity, because sovereignty itself needs a kind 
of common understanding or cooperation on the basis of territorial and constitutional 
structures. More precisely, modern states as the agents of national identity do not create a 
sovereign understanding without having any sovereign practice or imposition of dispositions. 
                                               
26
 For more information and perspectives, see Suzuki (2009). 
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Some constructivists try to overcome the deficiencies of pure generic sovereignty as the 
fundamental root of the national state by claiming that sovereignty should be understood as a 
more complex ‘constitutional structure’. In this aspect, they think that sovereignty is 
supported by shared ideas about the moral purpose of the state (Reus-Smit, 1997). Both 
subjective sovereignty and its constitutional objective institutionalization are derived from a 
shared moral belief of the state agents. The weakness of this consideration is to think that 
modern states form their identity because of the fact that they have the same moral sentiment. 
First of all, morality is not a constitutive element of identity. Rather, it is generally involved in 
the description of identity. Moreover, we cannot define whether moral values or shared 
standards of morality precede identity or vice versa. More importantly, morality is a very 
subjective basis for defining how to objective structures are standardized and institutionalized.  
It is argued here that the institutional bases of modern state, including sovereignty, are 
derived from a constantly accumulated set of habitual rituals called cultural capital. In other 
words, the identity of political subjects is based on a historically accumulated set of cultural 
capital. This is considerably different from the constructivist understanding of state identity. 
In the first place, ideas can only decide or determine the procedural process; they cannot have 
any impact on habitual reproduction. Cultural capital is always constructed before the subjects 
define their identities in a certain way. In this aspect, the constructivist perspective is 
plausible in that states can create certain kinds of generic constitutional common structures, 
but these generic constitutional structures do not interpret how states define their identities 
according to national sentiment. Otherwise, states are seen as fully rational entities creating 
common a moral and constitutional apparatus, but this becomes a vicious cycle of other 
structural theories. From the Athenian political structure to the medieval political identity and 
modern national states, it is not possible to state a common moral purpose shared by all 
political agents. However, all of these different political organizations, which are represented 
by different identities, arise from a kind of cultural capital which forms political identities 
immediately before procedural cognitive processes come into existence. Morality, or a belief 
of shared purpose, is not free from the determinative habitual existence of cultural capital 
(Ignatow, 2009). In this respect, in order to gain certain political identity, the agents are not 
rationally or morally structured entities because cultural capital provides a meaningful arsenal 
for achieving a shared belief regarding their identity. Thus, identity construction has 
intertwined links with constitutional processes with regard to positioning (recognition among 
the members of the same sort of identity) and cultural capital with regard to the habitus of 
agents (unconscious conducts of agents). 
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In the same way, the construction of identities is relatively free from any ideational 
conscious process. It means that identity is fundamentally formed by unconscious habitus 
imposed by cultural capital. In relation with this, agents’ actions are ‘pre-reflective’ strategies 
(Swartz, 1997). These pre-reflective strategies of cultural capital have meanings beyond the 
objective ideas of the agents. They objectify the ideological and social expectations of a 
certain identity allocation which interprets the rationality of actors or the degree of rationality 
that is necessary to recognize the legitimacy of embedded power relations. That is why to 
obtain an identity is unconsciously derived from the ‘hierarchy of values’ (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1990, p. 102), which establishes unequal power relations and the legitimated system 
of relations. The standards and judgments of the identities in the same system harmonize with 
the hierarchy of values that creates the ‘rational agents’ of the pre-reflective relation system. 
In other words, identities become rational members because they produce hierarchical values 
in the objective world. The objective interests of power relations unconsciously transform into 
the subjective and pre-reflective aims of the agents, which achieve integration according to 
hierarchical values. Because of the hierarchy of values, identity dignifies some values and 
impairs some others in order to fulfil the social positioning of unconscious cultural capital. 
This process signifies the socialization of cultural capital, the rationalization of agents and the 
reproduction of order. Ideas indicate the rationalization of the agents when they give 
meanings to identities but they do not primarily produce identities. Rationalization is based on 
pre-given dispositions that reproduce social positioning and stratification. Thus, cultural 
capital reproduces unconscious dispositions which rationalize the hierarchy of values in 
accordance with a certain power allocation. Afterwards, dispositions objectify the hierarchy 
by way of the agents’ pre-reflective ideations and practices.  
Social interactions and shared ideas objectifying the reproduction of collectivity and 
identity stem from the symbolic representation of social order (Ibid.). Thus, political 
organization and its identity depend on the representation of symbolic power in the objective 
world. The objective world is the field that materializes shared ideas and institutions 
assembling the individual identities into the same symbolic bases. On the other hand, the 
subjective field precedes objective structures and it produces symbolic power that reconstructs 
the categorization of the social world. Categorization connotes the imposition of cultural 
capital, which embodies the arbitrariness of symbolic representation when political agents 
produce their identities. In other words, when the political agents – the states – share some 
ideas and institutions they are liable to arbitrariness of cultural capital. The arbitrary power of 
cultural capital cannot be realized by the individuals, as the practitioners of political agency, 
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because it represents the meaning of legitimacy in order to be a recognized identity in the 
objective field. The self-reflective logic of cultural capital interprets ‘the rational field’ of 
different groups in the same categorization. In this sense, the identification of the agents’ 
‘social self’ is never completely reduced to conscious ideas. The legitimacy of arbitrary power 
is related to the constitutive characteristic of subjective habitus and it only discloses itself by 
way of the subordination of social structures in accordance with cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1993b). Thus, ideas do not function as the mechanism of a shared belief regarding the moral 
purpose of social being. The symbolic power of cultural capital unconsciously imposes the 
belief of categorization and social positioning onto the objective field. Then, the agents relate 
to each other on the basis of cultural capital. This produces legitimacy for agents in order to 
achieve recognition in the objective world. In this respect, cultural capital operates two 
important functions to give meaning to identities: firstly, it stimulates the agents who 
construct themselves in relation the other, because some structures become rational and/or 
legitimate in comparison with others. Second, it consciously imposes domination because the 
agents embody the necessity of domination under the subordinated field of cultural capital.  
At this point, some important interference should be done with regards to state 
identity. The political identity of the state is defined according to the individuals and classes 
who represent their own presence by way of the symbolic representation of the political 
society. That is why the political identity of the state always represents a subjective form of 
symbolic power. This symbolic power is embodied by national sovereign rationalization in 
the post-Westphalian political construction. In line with the Westphalian system, from 
absolutism to nationalism, the state, as the highest entity of political identity, is categorized 
according to the new symbolic power. This symbolic power presupposes the interpretation of 
objective truth. It defines legitimate actors and recognized behaviours of the actors 
simultaneously before constitutional institutionalization comes into existence. Symbolic 
power about the political identity of the state forms constitutional rationales and foundations, 
providing meaningful categories for the identification of political identity and social 
positioning in the objective field. That is why there is no moral purpose of the state that 
enhances normative functionality for the institutionalization of a certain identity. The identity 
of political authority or the state can only be produced and reproduced by symbolic power. 
Contrary to the common understanding of the constructivist paradigm, objective 
constitutionalization of the political identity and its sovereignty are just spatial 
implementations of symbolic power, and their ‘common sense’ is not related to a normative 
ideation of right action or morality. Rather, the political agents unconsciously form their 
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identities according to given categories and construct their social positioning in terms of these 
categories because they become parts of same universality and they form quasi-moral 
legitimacy (Lamont, 2000). In this way, the state can struggle for objective power without 
problematizing its own identity. Here it is essentially argued that the constriction of state 
identity does not presuppose any ideational conscious moral purpose, but it is produced by 
power relations. However, the power relations are not related to a physical manifestation of 
power, because the state, as the basis of physical violence (Gerth & Mills, 1991), cannot 
institutionalize in the subjective fields of individuals. Therefore, the objective 
institutionalization of the state cannot be explained by morality. The recognition of 
institutions such as national armies is subject to a more intertwined symbolic power relation. 
In order to be a part of a national army, individuals firstly need to define themselves by way 
of a categorization based on nationality, which is provided by cultural capital. To this end, 
instead of conceiving of state identity in relation to a commitment to the same moral good and 
of constitutional structuralization, Bourdieusian reflection on identity construction evaluates 
the political identity as a fraction of cultural capital which unconsciously imposes categories 
that individuals apply in order to produce moral purpose and common sense (Lamont & 
Lareau, 1988).  
  
Cultural capital, morality and distribution of identity in international field 
In line with the constructivist understanding of state identity, it can be plausible to say that the 
state defines its identity in relation to other states according to a Bourdieusian point of view 
(Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Wendt, 1992; Jackson, 1990). However, constructivists have 
some illusions when they claim that the state defines its identity according to the social 
engagements with each other. Basically, neither a constructional, norm-based structure nor 
morality derived from a socially constructed sovereign understanding is an appropriate 
principle for achieving any ordered social relation or agreement, imposing legitimacy to 
define the identity of agents in relation to others. Here we should reconsider the meanings – 
or, more precisely, the functionalities – of morality, sovereignty and recognition. Firstly, 
when one tries to ground identities by way of morality, one trivializes the socially 
constructive structuralization of identities. Identity becomes a fraction of the unsocial 
presence of moral values. However, here it is argued that morality is a set of values originated 
from cultural capital, which creates a relational positioning of the agents within the same 
structure. Morality is always in relation to a subjective totalization/cultural capital on the basis 
of the ‘rightful actions’ of agents. The agents take advantage of cultural capital in order to 
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understand the social world. Cultural capital comes off imposing socially objectified 
positioning, which interprets the meaning of actions in relation to each other. Cultural capital 
is fundamentally a social relation for defining the value of agents according to other similar 
entities.  
Essentially, the construction of the identity of the state, as the modern political 
identity, is derived from cultural capital rather than morality. In this respect, cultural capital 
produces three distinguishing features in comparison with the moral purpose of state identity. 
First of all, state identity is mostly based on the unconscious symbolic production of identity 
rather than a conscious moral purpose of the state. Ideas and agents do not automatically seek 
to achieve an ordered life or a social good. Socially contingent processes try to claim that the 
agents are conscious to achieve a cooperative understanding of the material world because 
they produce similar purposive structures in order to define their identities (Reus-Smit, 1997; 
Wilmer, 2002). Cultural capital challenges the assumption of contingent social practices by 
showing that the social self is always and continuously a bounded subjectivity of the 
arbitrariness of cultural domination (Swartz, 1997). Thus, material interactions of agents have 
very fractional effects on the social reproduction of identities because the agents’ 
consciousnesses only achieve how they cooperate on the basis of shared ideas and identities, 
but the social contingency of identities is not plausible in understanding how the agents form 
these shared ideas. This means that the socially contingent beliefs of identity production 
regarding how the identity of the state is reproduced have not originated from agents’ 
conscious ideas with regards to the solving of the cooperation and stabilization problem of 
sovereignty. State identities are historically reproduced in different social and cultural 
environments but the state is not a conscious entity which seeks a constant stabilization, 
organization or morally ordered institutionalization for the mutual understanding of 
identification. The transformation of state identity is to reproduce the domination of cultural 
arbitrariness in the objective world. In this respect, it is unconsciously practised by the agents 
because the agents have a certain amount of cultural capital that interprets identity in relation 
to the structured domination. Thus, the agents cannot define themselves without a given 
interpretation of cultural capital. The state, as the political identity, is the centre of symbolic 
capital, which generates the socialization and materialization of cultural capital that the agents 
embody in a given domination, or, more precisely, a representation of domination in social 
life. At this point, the concept of the ‘developing state’ is a relevant point to indicate how 
cultural capital and its arbitrariness unconsciously dominate the definition of state identity in 
the objective world. Differentiation regarding the allocation of cultural capital in a dominant 
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social order leads to the differentiation of identity, which reproduces political 
institutionalization. The domination of arbitrary cultural capital produces a distinction to 
influence the definition of identity (Bourdieu, 1993c). There is a substantial correlation 
between the existence of cultural capital’s articulated distinction, which constitutes identities, 
and the formation of unconscious representation within a structuring structure which is 
preceded by a structured domination in habitus. In this respect, cultural capital imposes that a 
certain kind of political organization is more advanced than any other because it has 
appropriate capital allocation in order to achieve a distinction in social habitus that 
reorganizes domination. Due to the accumulation of cultural capital, the capitalist mode of the 
state produces a distinction in the objective world and, similar to the individuals and their 
classes, it categorizes states, as their political institutionalization, according to their allocation 
of given cultural capital. All of the individuals and classes have a relational positioning which 
defines their identities according to a distinctive form of domination. In this way, the states do 
not problematize the classification named ‘developing state’ because they unconsciously 
accept their positioning and social function in a greater social system called international 
relations.  
Secondly, state identity is reproduced by way of the dominative force of cultural 
capital rather than a cooperative understanding of self-identity. To claim that political identity 
differentiates because of different historical contexts and institutionalization simultaneously 
discredits the correlation between the reproduction of political identity and cooperation on the 
basis of the moral purpose of political identification. The production of political identity is 
always materialized by a misrepresentation or misrecognition of history, which pretends to 
organize the same moral purpose for the objectification of identities (Lovell, 2007). In other 
words, competition for domination creates conditions for the misrecognition of political 
identity, and this maintains the socialization of morality for everyone. The struggles on 
identity fundamentally result from the dominants of the order, which have the social position 
to shape cultural capital. Because of misrecognition, the dominated individuals or classes 
define their identity relationally. In this way, individuals perceive that the misrepresentation 
produced by power relations/domination or the arbitrariness of social order is a naturally 
achieved phenomenon of their ideas regarding the constructed world. When all of the 
individuals misrecognize their identities and define them by way of necessities for 
cooperative morality (Shannon & Kowert, 2012), they unconsciously produce two important 
results. In the first place, they reproduce the domination of their identities and the 
legitimization of domination. Then, they also produce structures again.  
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The state, as the most developed form of political identity, is the practising field of this 
misrecognized construction. Different forms of social totalization on identity are represented 
as the common values of all social classes, but they have actually originated from the 
continual struggles of cultural capital between the different factions of dominants. 
Differentiation in political identity historically never changes the social order of domination. 
Athenian political identity created a structure based on the dominated and the dominant. The 
dominated parts of society defined themselves in relation to the given order, and they 
accepted their pre-reflective positional rationality in Athenian democracy. Medieval political 
identity was grounded on the holistic values as the centre of political identity (Reus-Smit, 
1999), but this also did not change the social order supported by dominated–dominant 
relations. Similar to the other historical variables, states’ national identities are also built upon 
dominated and dominant relations. Although political identity changes in the field according 
to historical variables, the social positioning and arbitrariness of the social order continue in 
different forms. In accordance with Bourdieusian sociology, it is plausible to say that the 
political identity of the state is historically shaped and changed by the interrelations and 
competition of dominant social classes because political identity cannot be produced without 
the reproduction of cultural capital in individuals’ habitus. Cultural capital is just one sort of 
capital that social and political dominants have to accumulate, but it is strategically important 
in defining the characteristics of the political interpretations of identities. Cultural capital, as a 
functional part of individuals’ symbolic capital, unconsciously imposes the recognition and 
legitimacy of domination on political identity (Bourdieu, 2000). This creates historical 
variables such as the holistic values of medieval political identity or the national sentiment of 
modern state identity, which constitute political identity according to the arbitrariness of 
domination.  
Contrary to the constructivist agenda, institutionalization does not theoretically 
differentiate from one historical political identification to another. Historically, for all of the 
different kinds of political identities, from early historical forms to the nation state form of 
modernity, institutionalization depends on a degree of arbitration, a set of misrecognized 
beliefs regarding the moral purpose of a certain identity, a degree of sovereign self and law-
like verbal or contractual construction in practice. Thus, it is not easy to define how the 
identification of political identity has been changing from one historical stage to another, 
because, despite the differences in practical implementation, the fundamental frame of 
totalization and a certain institutionalization is historically based on the similar theoretical 
orientation. When one focuses on the dominant–dominant relations instead of dominant–
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dominated relations, it can be seen that the fundamental differentiation of political 
identification rests upon cultural capital. The main struggle arises from a contestation of 
different dominant groups on cultural capital (Emirbayer & Williams, 2005). In this way, the 
differentiation of political identities originates from a relational change in the representation 
of the historical variables which continuously reproduce the political identities in everyday 
life. The historical variable is the power which structuralizes the misrepresentation of the 
constructed understanding of political identity. It prevents the dominated groups having any 
other independent representation of identity. The historical variables also define the scope of 
moral evaluation which organizes the characteristics of sovereign political identity. In other 
words, the individuals do not have any conscious ideational and moral evaluation on the scope 
of the state’s political identity, but morality is linked to created historical variables which are 
reproduced by the struggles of different dominant groups on the representation of historical 
variables. When the allocation of cultural capital differentiates between the dominated groups 
of society, it improves or impairs historical variables; this changes all of the institutional, 
territorial and structural organization styles of political authority. In order to understand the 
representation of political capital in relation to political spatiality such as the state, one should 
reveal how cultural capital is distributed in accordance with political, social and economic 
capital in the objective world. In this framework, while historical variables impose a moral 
quasi-equality for all members of the same political identity, they also structuralize arbitrary 
inequalities. This process is related to the Bourdieusian concept of ‘classification struggles’, 
which puts pressure on the political identities of individuals (Goldberg, 2008). The 
phenomenon of classification struggles is the definitive power of social and political division 
and identification ‘to make and unmake groups’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 221). Therefore, the 
construction of political identity not only forms representation but also produces the divided 
groups in the objective world. This function of classification struggles shows that there is no 
group independent of political identity, because a constructed identity always precedes the 
construction and division of groups and the individuals have a social position according to 
this pre-given identification. The modern political identity of the nation state is produced and 
reproduced by this power. The nationalization of political identity and the territorialization of 
the modern state are the bases of dominant power relations with regards to the representation 
of historical variables. Nationality became the historical variable of modernity as a 
consequence of the classification struggle between the dominant factors of societies. The 
changes in the combination of political, social and economic capital between dominant social 
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factors created a new cultural capital based on the notion of nation, consisting of a new 
habitual representation regarding the interpretation of the social world.  
The other important peculiarity of identity is that cultural identity is based on 
hierarchical distribution rather than equitable apportionment. Ideas and objective fundamental 
institutions are important functions to interpenetrate the whole society in the objective world, 
but identities cannot produce any independent structure owing to the habitual limitations of 
classification struggles. Ideas are main factors in objectifying the moral sense or historical 
variable of cultural capital. In this aspect, the dominated individuals of the same political 
identity do not have any determinative power on cultural capital because a degree of 
classification empowered by domination always precedes the formation of political identities. 
This point leads to a very important peculiarity that the structural and constructivist agenda 
does not generally underline: to have power over cultural capital means that one also has the 
function of reproduction. The dominant power reproduces its arbitrariness by way of cultural 
capital. The power of reproduction is essential for the legitimization of political order because 
it enhances the construction of social and political hierarchies for the continuation of 
dominated classification struggles. In this respect, the power of reproduction is a fundamental 
root of objectified political identity due to the fact that it changes not only identities but also 
defines the combination of different forms of capital in dominant social groups. Changes in 
the composition of capital allocation are as important as the amount of capital for dominants 
(Sayer, 2005). The most functional peculiarity of reproduction is to obscure the objective 
function of identity, which distributes relational roles and capital both unequally and 
hierarchically. That is why cultural capital not only produces interpretations of the political 
self but also constitutes the basic forms of political divisions. It means that cultural capital is 
the basis of both the production of perception, such as nationality, and form, such as territorial 
state, simultaneously. Any other capital forms, such as political, economic or social, do not 
produce and obscure the hierarchical structures of political identities without having the 
reproduction power of cultural capital. As a result, when one considers the political identity of 
the state, one should observe the hierarchy problems of a particular structure rather than 
cooperation problems, because the institutionalization of a more civilized political identity 
requires the reorganization of hierarchy, which reinterprets sovereignty in order to achieve 
cooperation problems in practice. Thus, nationalism, as a historical variable of modern 
relational domination, ultimately becomes an arbitrary and conscious means for domination, a 
moral purpose and an unconscious principle for the dominated identities in relation to each 
other.  
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In particular, on this point, some Anglo-Saxon sociological research underestimates or 
misreads the Bourdieusian understanding of reproduction. They evaluate that the 
Bourdieusian understanding of reproduction is deterministic and stable rather than dynamic 
and changeable. They focus on the identities of dominated factors in relation to the 
domination, but they miss out the internal categorization struggles of domination (Guillory, 
2000). On the contrary, changes are the inevitable results of the Bourdieusian reproduction of 
identity, but these changes do not affect the stable foundation of two interrelated functions: 
domination and cultural capital. When the struggles of domination on the allocation of capital 
opt for a new schema of classification by means of cultural capital, the other sub-identities of 
the same political constitution firstly internalize a new classification in their habitus; they then 
externalize them by way of objective actions. From the spiritual doctrines of the medieval 
political organization or state to modern national states, it is clearly seen that many 
fundamental institutional changes occurred because historical variables were considerably 
reproduced. However, these institutional changes have never removed the construction of 
domination on the basis of a new classification in modern political states. Similarly to the 
others, the modern state identity is based on a certain categorization, inclusion/exclusion and 
domination, which are continuously being reproduced in the field of political, social and 
economic capital by cultural capital.27 Changes of political identity firstly transform the 
relational hierarchy and the distribution of power within the dominant social classes, from 
intellectuals to political and economic arbitrary powers; these changes then produce a new 
social positioning in the reproduced political domination. Following this, cultural capital 
imposes a sub-structural interpretation of reproduced domination that is gradually embodied 
by the habitus of individuals. Afterwards, the dominated social classes define their positional 
identities according to the unconscious arbitrariness of domination.  
Interestingly, the political positioning of intellectuals from medieval political identity 
to modern national identity is an objective illustration to justify the processes of 
inclusion/exclusion, change, continuation and reproduction of political identity. For instance, 
the relational positioning and division of intellectuals transformed between the medieval and 
the national state. Their roles in the division of power, the combination of capital and the 
relational definition of identity changed according to nationalism as the new historical 
variable. Further, their power of arbitrariness regarding the domination of individuals’ habitus 
                                               
27
 This instrumentalization of cultural capital is called the power of sociodicy by Bourdieu (2003b). 
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differentiated into ‘a superior degree of universalization’ (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 23–24). For 
instance, the clerical intellectual’s role in the field of cultural capital was more prominent than 
nationalist intellectuals of the French Revolution. All in all, their political functions had 
transformed into new roles or fields of practice; that is why their positioning gained new 
meaning according to the new allocation of arbitrariness and the domination of a nationalist 
relational division. This means that the field of the new historical variable produced a new 
functional harmonization obscuring the unequal distribution of political identities in the field 
of the dominant social classes. The functional theme of categorization is produced by the 
internal struggles of the dominant social power; the sub-identities of the dominated 
individuals and classes are then reproduced by this functional frame. The functional roles of 
the peripheral dominated individuals regarding the reproduction of identities are imposed by 
the new domination because of the misrecognition of the objective world. The dominated 
social classes will always be in a struggle to change the division or construction of political 
identities, but they do not produce anything without engaging the given cultural capital which 
has already been imposed by the apparatus of symbolic capital.28 However, the dominants of 
political identity reorganize themselves according to the changing condition of the objective 
world. They produce the positioning and power of domination by way of the 
inclusion/exclusion of different social groups into the field of domination. In this way, the 
peripheral dominated identities do not have any significant effect on the production of their 
political identities, but their struggles in the objective world create a conditionality for the 
dominants to reinterpret cultural capital and to reproduce political identities respectively. In 
short, change is fundamental peculiarity of the Bourdieusian reproduction of identities, but it 
depends on a certain conditionality of the dominated classes and the struggles for capital 
allocation in the dominants’ social classes. Changes can only be reproduced by way of 
engagement with a certain process of domination. Struggles for the division of dominants and 
the inclusionary/exclusionary influences of sub-identities create a conditionality for 
reproduction. The arbitrariness of dominants organizes reinterpretations of cultural capital and 
imposes them. In this way, political identity organizes changes on the basis of new historical 
variables. Thus, when the distribution of accumulated capital differs in the field of 
domination, the whole political institutionalization and its identity are reproduced in 
accordance with the inclusion/exclusion process.  
                                               
28
 Although symbolic capital is mostly interconnected to cultural capital, they are not the same facts 
according to Bourdieu. For further information, see Bourdieu (2004). 
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To sum up, in line with the Bourdieusian reflection of cultural capital, it is plausible to 
emphasize that the construction of political identity is set between structural reproduction and 
social construction. It fundamentally reforms the ontology of structuralism and social 
construction. The nature of individuals is linked to cultural capital imposed by domination. It 
means that the nature of agents is not ontologically determinable but depends on the 
reproduction of domination in the social structures of different capital, organized and imposed 
by cultural capital. In the same way, the construction of institutions does not rest on any moral 
belief of political good because morality is mostly reproduced by social settings (Ignatow, 
2009). Morality constitutes the arbitrariness of domination. That is why changes in the moral 
belief of political good mean a reproduced functionality of domination or, more precisely, a 
redistributed functional differentiation of capital allocation. Furthermore, state identity is not 
primarily formed by the shared norms of socially constitutional structures. The construction of 
identity precedes the construction of social institutions. The power of cultural capital also 
means the power of reproduction, which produces and imposes a framework of political 
identities in the field of habitus. The main struggle of identity production is to produce a 
sovereign space (Ruggie, 1993), because domination can only survive at the border of a 
sovereign field. When the allocation of capital changes within the dominant social space, it 
requires a new sovereign space which is defined by cultural capital. In this respect, cultural 
capital is the functional tool of domination in order to reproduce sovereignty. Cultural capital 
always creates a historical variable in order to define the moral and normative borders of 
identities. That is why sovereignty is not only the fundamental institutionalization of the 
modern state. Rather, sovereignty is a peculiarity of all kinds of historical political 
institutionalization. In line with changed political identity, sovereignty was reproduced in the 
modern state system because the historical variables of political identity had continuously 
been reinterpreted from Westphalia to the nationalist definition of the French Revolution 
according to differentiation within the allocation of capital. In accordance with this, 
international institutionalization does not precede state identity (Katzenstein, 1996), but 
cultural capital firstly imposes a new inclusion/exclusion of identity which achieves social 
institutionalization by way of a historical variable. In other words, institutionalization in the 
subjective field of identities always precedes objective institutionalization because the 
individuals should be fully conscious about the legitimacy of identity in order to be in 
accordance with institutions. Further, the dominated individuals do not have any generative 
effect on the power of cultural capital and that is why they are continuously exposed to the 
symbolic violence of domination. A certain identity has to precede the institutionalization in 
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order to achieve legitimacy in the objective world. At this point, this paper will research how 
cultural capital forms a new political identity and legitimizes misrecognition in terms of the 
new symbolic violence in the following sections.  
  
Cultural capital and changes in identities 
In literature, Bourdieusian understanding of cultural capital has been restrictedly evaluated 
that cultural capital intermediates to maintain the reproduction of identities and its 
institutional and social determinism (Dillon, 2010). These approaches render Bourdieusian 
cultural capital an ideological apparatus of domination and elitist identities. This impairs the 
theoretical distinction in the Bourdieusian approach of cultural capital from the classical 
understanding of structural and Marxist theories. However, from a holistic point of view, 
cultural capital also generates potential revolutionist dichotomies to promote transformation 
in political identities and institutions. Bourdieu emphasizes that cultural capital transfers the 
values and interests of domination, but it also facilitates potential ways to oppose the 
symbolic domination of dominant identities (Bourdieu, 1990b). Of course, the reproduction of 
political institutionalization produces more predictable and expectable results than the 
transformation of political identities, because cultural capital was originally the symbolic 
know-how of domination in order to secure the economic and political capital of domination. 
As all structured institutionalizations of cultural capital are subject to the practices of 
structuring structure in the political field, the agents or societies of political identities also take 
advantage of the given know-how to deal with their positional distribution of political 
identities. Nationalization is one of the most dramatic and striking processes to prove this 
Bourdieusian functionality of cultural capital in international relations. The dominant 
identities of the international field originally took advantage of the symbolic capital of 
nationalism in order to stabilize their economic capital and interests in territories under the 
rule of the traditional political identity of political organizations. The structuring 
functionalization of nationalism resulted in self-reflexive questioning on political membership 
and solidarity in traditional political identities. The old positioning of solidarity and 
recognition was transformed into new national sentiment via the structuring contradictions of 
dominant cultural capital. In a nutshell, embedded cultural capital proceeded to transform the 
political identities of states, which also transformed and deteriorated the embedded economic 
capital and interests of domination within these new nationally positioned state political 
identities.  
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From a Bourdieusian perspective, changes in the identity of political subjects 
originated from struggle and dominance of symbolic power and its cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1984). The objective existence of objective economic capital only defines positions in the 
objective world, but the power of cultural capital forms the meaningful naming of distinction 
and its institutionalizing nobility in the field because cultural capital contains the appropriate 
tools for creating vision and division in accordance with the structured disposition of 
domination. In this respect, the identity of the political subject – the state – is determined by a 
distinction which is empowered by the symbolic expansion of cultural capital (Appelrouth & 
Edles, 2008). In the international field of practice, this distinction transforms into a 
meaningful understanding of state identity described by its associational tendencies, security 
visions, political values and interests, because these describe the positions of states. This 
identity of distinction also characterizes the peculiarities of power relations between the 
dominant and dominated members of the political identities of the states in international 
relations. The states dominating structured cultural capital in the international field not only 
struggle to maintain their prominent roles in determining the symbolic disposition of states, 
but also influence the differentiation of political identities in order to take the potential 
differentiation of division under control in accordance with its reproduction practices. The 
changes in the political identities of the subject or state come into reality when the dominant 
principle of political differentiation does not succeed in imposing its vision of division in the 
international field. Here it is theoretically beneficial to remember the Congress of Vienna to 
emphasize this functionalization of cultural capital on the reproduction of change in the 
political identities of states. The Congress was a prominent historical objectification to 
illuminate the imposition of values regarding vision and division in the international field. In 
the Congress, the dominant political identities tried to defend the structured position of 
symbolic values, which were based on a traditional vision and division beyond nationalism. 
However, as Bourdieu discussed, the identities of political identities can only produce 
meaningful positions in an interrelational context (Swartz, 1997). In the same way, the 
relational production of the structuring world produced contradictions at the Congress of 
Vienna, which resulted in rivalry between the subjective values of nationalism and socialism 
in transforming the political identities of states. In the Congress, the symbolic power of 
cultural capital became the battlefield for power struggles aiming to conserve the traditional 
division of identities in the field. In this way, the essential point of the Congress was to secure 
the symbolic domination of identity division rather than economic or any other objective 
capital and its profits. In this respect, nationalism, for example, did not fundamentally focus 
 155
on a redistribution of economic capital, but imposed a new style of political membership 
which was opposed to the dominant vision of division. In a nutshell, the Congress of Vienna 
did not secure the structured dominant values of division because structuring structure forms a 
new political membership in terms of nationalism, which transformed states’ relative 
positions in relation to domination in the international field. 
 
Forms of cultural capital and international field 
At this point, to get the main contributive points of Bourdieusian cultural capital in 
international relations, it will be theoretically appropriate to focus on the embodied, 
objectified and institutionalized forms of cultural capital respectively. In a Bourdieusian 
evaluation, objectified capital refers to dispositions in relation to all bodily presentations and 
behaviours of subjects which conduct a genuine dispositional existence of mind–body 
products without a proper conscious stance (Bourdieu, 1984). Owing to the fact that embodied 
capital derives from very rooted unconscious traces of structured structures in bodies of 
subjects, it is not easily altered by subjects, in contrast with objective economic capital and 
values. As has been previously discussed, I presuppose that all kind of political subjects, from 
primitive political organizations and clans to the modern state, assemble a similar 
functionality with individuals in a society as the totalized social identities of a wider practical 
field. Therefore, all political subjects relatively position their identities under the existence of 
a certain domination and stratification (Bourdieu, 2012). In this respect, states inevitably have 
certain embodied capital which constitutes their unconscious dispositions for their perceptions 
regarding their own identities and positional identity classification for the perception of other 
states in the international field. Embodied capital most particularly manifests itself in the 
positional distribution of state political identities. The state, as a social and political subject, 
naturally depends on a field for practising its own capital advancement. This territorial 
distribution of state identity naturally conducts certain habitus and its practices (Swartz, 
2013). Having a territorially recognized space in the East, the West, the Middle East or 
Central Asia is linked to different structured dispositions which are free from the rational 
thinking processes of states. State identities in these different localities instantaneously 
embody peculiar expressions and behaviours which are linked to the penetration of structured 
structures into state identity. As states are unconscious regarding the natural existence of their 
localities in their identities, they cannot instantaneously change the embodied guidelines of 
their identities. This natural existence of embodied capital is also derived from the use of 
language (Lin, 2008) when states interact with other states. The socialization of a state within 
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a determined territory over a long historical period contributes to a characteristic use of 
language, which makes state behaviours predictable in certain relations of international law 
because the use of language creates a normative internal rationale of behaviours in 
accumulated history. The use of language always bears the traces of the structured embodied 
manner codes of the state. The tones of language show states’ embodied capital and their 
bordered positions in the international field. The use of language reveals the guided tones of 
states in the application of certain concepts, such as democracy or human rights. The usage of 
these concepts in relative relations characterizes states’ embodiment of structures.  
Objectified cultural capital is another important form in cultural capital and state 
identity relations. The identification of objectified cultural capital is easier than the definition 
of embodied capital because it basically originates from international law in the practical 
field. International law fundamentally characterizes the objectified forms of cultural exchange 
for state identity in international relations. The capacity of states regarding the utilization of 
international law points out their accumulated international capital in state identity. 
International law mainly presents itself as an accumulated form of history, manifesting the 
materialization of former experience, relations, dispositions and theories, which pretends to 
connote autonomous form beyond state consciousness. In other words, although international 
law, as objectified cultural capital, is seen as an independent form of relations, it represents 
the dispositions of past nobility and distinction on the appropriation of cultural capital. Of 
course, in contradiction with embodied capital, it is possible to improve relative advancement 
in collecting a better accumulation of objectified cultural capital in exchange for obtaining 
social and economic capital (Jackson, 2010). However, if states do not have proper 
dispositions concerning international law, they can only position their identities, which does 
not achieve the accumulation of objective capital in the identities of states. A state identity 
lacking the concept of human rights can internally have a recognized function in a human 
rights mission of the United Nations, but there is no connection between this state position 
and the accumulation of objective capital because the embodied capital of this state lacks 
appropriate language and the symbolic foundation of the concept of human rights in the 
historically embedded cultural capital of its state identity. In this respect, owned social, 
political and economic capital can provide better opportunities to consume the objectified 
cultural capital of international law, but it does not increase in the accumulation of objectified 
cultural capital if states do not have proper language concerning objectified cultural capital. 
For example, in order to obtain non-permanent membership status in the United Nations 
Security Council, a state can take a position using its relative political and economic capacity 
 157
in the process of elections. However, structured nobility and the distinction of international 
law, as objectified cultural capital, historically and conceptually promotes security in the 
name of a structured domination. The definition or redefinition of security in the international 
field is given to a certain domination under the representation of permanent membership 
status of the UN Security Council by international law. Therefore, the positional involvement 
of states in security does not transfer the values of cultural capital, which facilitates states’ 
relative capacity to get involved in the definition of security in the name of all other states in 
the international field. 
Because of the stratified structures of state identity in the international field, 
objectified cultural capital cannot be distributed equally. Bourdieu emphasizes this via 
distinguishing the ‘legitimate culture of class societies’ and the ‘culture of little-differentiated 
and undifferentiated societies’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 228). Objectified culture could only 
produce the value of capital for all the members of the field, and the accumulation of 
objectified capital could be relatively equal among the states if all of the states in the 
international field were involved in historical actions for creating the products of objectified 
capital. In this respect, an objectified form of culture in the international field indicates a 
value of capital for certain dominant state identities, and points out the legitimization of 
domination for the other states in international relations. This means that objectified capital 
only functions as capital for certain state identities, but it also refers to the legitimization of 
domination for the other states. The values of objectified cultural capital are also not 
distributed equally. Therefore, dominated state identities lack the means to take advantage of 
objectified capital appropriately. International law, as objectified cultural capital, is a product 
of the historical acts and practices of structured dominations and its political subjectivity. It 
embodies the material and symbolic considerations of dominant identities. In line with the 
values of international law, the state reflects a more functionalized and bureaucratized form 
regarding historically rooted demand and the symbolic creation of domination (Swartz, 2013). 
Furthermore, international law not only bears the traces of the historical value heritage of 
domination, but also imposes a bordered space for other identities because the lack of values 
restricts the ways of obtaining embodied capital. State identities, being deprived of the proper 
embodiment of structured cultural capital, are also devoid of the legitimatization and 
recognition means of state identities. To obtain legitimacy and recognition in the international 
field, international law determines the proper ways for every state, but these functions of 
international law serve only as objectified cultural capital for some dominant states’ identities 
in accordance with their historically structured cultural capital. The components of 
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international law are mostly and fundamentally tailored by the historical experiences of 
certain states or their political subjectivities. These structured experiences become the 
blueprints for recognition of the equal political subjectivities of all states in the same 
international field. Therefore, international law functionalizes domination and its distribution 
of stratification via creating differences between the ownership of objectified cultural capital 
and the participants of structured cultural capital in the international field. 
International law always manifests itself by way of determined principles of structured 
structures (Arend, 1999). States construct their relative relations according to the produced 
meanings of international law. In other words, state identity consumes the standardized 
meanings of the structured world of international field (Kratochwil, 2011). States take 
advantage of the principles of international relations, which actually guarantee the objectified 
cultural capital of dominant state identities. For instance, in order to accept an engagement of 
states as international agreement, this agreement has to accord with principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. Otherwise, even if the sides are comfortable with the conditions of agreement, it is 
not recognizable in the structured cultural capital of the field. This rule is a basic necessity of 
having recognition in the international field. However, originally, the principle derived from 
the characteristics of European historical experiences of political subjectivity. In this respect, 
this principle of international law functions as objectified cultural capital for certain European 
states. At the same time, the other states, having less-advantageous positions in the 
international field, have to use the same objectified cultural capital for recognition despite the 
fact that they lack this objectified capital. As is exemplified, the cultural capital of dominant 
state identities in the international field objectifies itself into other state practices because 
other states have to comply with the created principles of others for recognition. 
Consequently, objectified cultural capital forms meanings of recognition on behalf of 
domination, and distinguishes international stratification beyond the conscious sovereign will 
of states.  
Furthermore, Bourdieu defines another important form of cultural capital, named as 
institutionalized cultural capital, which is derived mostly from the relative practices of 
subjects in the field. The institutionalized form of cultural capital fundamentally concentrates 
on institutional recognitions of practices (Bennett, Savage, Bortolaia, Silva Warde, Gayo-Cal, 
& Wright, 2009). It is a practical implementation of objectified capital in the field of 
institutional engagements which guarantees social positions (Bourdieu, 1993a). In line with 
our study on the political identification of states, I assume that all kinds of institutional 
relations and practices of the international field become involved in the institutional capital of 
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political subjects. It is important to understand how the identity of a certain state can affect the 
applicable values of the institutionalization processes in comparison with other states in the 
international field. In this respect, all regimes, agreements and institutional cooperations of 
states produce and reproduce institutional capital in international relations. The 
institutionalized cultural capital of state identity determines the exclusion or inclusion of state 
positions into a certain institutional field of international relations. In line with Bourdieu, 
institutions in international relations represent a particular embodied value system which 
forms political closure for the identification of state identities and positions. By bestowing a 
privilege regarding the institutional membership of states, institutional cultural capital 
distinguishes the value of a certain state identity from all other state identities. Each institution 
in international relations requires a certain degree of value systems for membership. 
Institutionalization in international relations contributes to the domination of power relations 
by distributing institutional capital between states. In this way, institutionalization in 
international relations enables states in dominant positions in the international field to 
determine the membership of institutions because they have the key institutional advancement 
in institutional capital. However, the other states in dominated positions in international 
relations have to prove their qualifications regarding the required institutional capital of 
certain institutions. This differentiation between dominant and dominated positions in 
institutionalized capital can be seen in the fundamental institutionalization of the European 
Union. The basic mentality of the union is to affiliate the states which have institutionalized 
cultural capital. Afterwards, in order to be a part of the same institutionalization, the other 
states are expected to show a considerable amount of qualification on many different 
institutional and practical areas.  
According to Bourdieu, institutionalized cultural capital also opens up an opportunity 
to distinguish subjects by way of comparing their qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986). In this way, 
states’ objectified and embodied cultural capital is involved in distinguishing the process of 
state positions in relation to other states. Institutionalized cultural capital indicates the 
ownership of appropriate dispositions and qualifications, which is recognized in the 
institutional practices of states (Swartz, 2013). All institutional practices among states are 
based on structured principles. In order to be a part of the UN system, states necessarily need 
to obey standards and requirements for the recognition of their positions and identities. 
However, by obtaining recognized identity in the UN system, a state also conforms to a 
standard understanding of the international security agenda, a bounded space for certain fields 
within the UN institutional field, such as the permanent membership status of certain states in 
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the Security Council. In this respect, because of the institutional practices of the international 
field, states obey a distinction of domination in order to obtain stable recognition. The 
distinction is derived from the state owners of institutionalized cultural capital, who have all 
the required principles of institutionalized capital, and contender states, who struggle to show 
their appropriateness for obtaining institutionalized cultural capital. Consequently, because 
ownership of institutionalized cultural capital guarantees the dominant positions of states in 
institutional relations, these states can have also the flexibility to oversee or violate principles 
of institutional cultural capital. Looking at the institutional example of the UN, it can be seen 
that domination institutionalizes itself by way of the retention of violence. In UN practices, 
the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq without the institutional involvement of the UN 
Security Council prove that ownership of institutionalized cultural capital also distinguishes 
itself from other dominated states via the ownership of the violation right in institutional 
practices.  
 
Domination of legitimacy and symbolic capital in the contemporary democratizing 
international field  
Cultural capital embodies the potential to change state identity by way of changing the 
dispositions regarding structured categorizations in the international field (Katzenstein, 1996; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). If the struggles of states regarding cultural capital change the 
positions of domination, this can result in a new vision of division for the interpretations of 
states’ identity. In such a case, the political identities of states are to be reinterpreted in 
accordance with the new categorization of divisionary symbolic dispositions (Lane, 2006). In 
this aspect, symbolic struggles in international relations are fundamentally political struggles, 
targeting the reproduction and transformation of vision and division which change the 
structured dispositions of state identities. At the end of struggles, if the categories of vision 
and division are substituted by new divisionary dispositions, this can create a total 
transformation of political subjects. On the other hand, all struggles of the international field 
do not substitute the structured dispositions of vision and division. In many cases, the political 
identities of states can only reproduce the practices of embedded domination in international 
relations. In this respect, both the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution should be 
seen as struggles for vision and division. They both tried to dissociate the structured 
dispositions of domination regarding the vision of division. However, only the French 
Revolution accomplished a new nation-based division in accordance with the national 
association of the political identity of states. By contrast, the Russian Revolution ended up 
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with the reproduction of structured domination because the Russian Revolution could not 
relatively achieve the cultural capital to impose a new identity of state political subjectivity in 
line with its class-based vision of division. As a result, a transformation in the political 
identity of states leads to success when struggling state identities achieve an appropriate 
amount of cultural capital in comparison with structured domination. 
In order to maintain domination in the international field, dominant states continually 
have to rule the production processes of cultural capital, because domination has to reproduce 
the identities of states. Therefore, domination controls cultural capital in order to have 
legitimate naming in the dispositions of dominated states (Bourdieu, 1989). However, 
struggles in the legitimate naming of identities result in further constraints on the positions of 
dominated state identities. In order to reproduce further constrains, domination of the 
international field increases the intensity of symbolic violence (Springer, 2011) to which 
dominated states are exposed. As the intensity of symbolic violence enhances, the 
international field frequently overcomes crises because the existing dispositions of states do 
not quickly fill new positions in the international field. The contemporary globalization 
process and its neoliberal functions cause such frequent crises in the international field 
because they intensify the existing symbolic violence of domination on the dominated 
identities of states. In this respect, neoliberalism not only functions as a reproduction of 
structured domination but also intensifies the power of the existing symbolic violence in the 
international field. The neoliberal functionalization of domination imposes new symbolic 
closure by way of the neoliberal democratization processes beyond its economic practices in 
the practical field. Although domination can be seen as successful in reproducing itself, its 
symbolic violence of legitimate meaning abandons dominated states’ identities because the 
dispositions of states cannot immediately satisfy the dispositional requirements of the new 
symbolic violence. Contemporary examples prove that the democratization process of 
dominated states as symbolic violence transforms into the de-functionalization of 
conventional state identities. Neoliberal democratization destroys the social collectiveness of 
existing dominated states and creates a nihilism for social collectiveness which can be 
substituted even by terrorism. In this way, although states which are dominant over cultural 
capital and its symbolic violence do not intend to do so, they unintentionally abolish the 
conventional dominated identities of states, which are vital for the continuation of structured 
domination. This inevitably leads to a struggle for legitimate naming by creating a new 
political collectiveness beyond the classical dominant and dominated sovereign state 
structures in the international field.  
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Eventually, in order to reproduce the states’ existing identity stratification, cultural 
capital should be compatible with practices in the international field. Otherwise, a potential 
transformation in the political subjectivity of states becomes inevitable. In this respect, as 
discussed above, the symbolic violence of contemporary practices weakens this compatibility. 
Theoretically, these transformations depend on very different variables, affecting the political 
association styles of state identity. Basically, this may be a redistribution of the stratification 
between dominants in the international field. In other words, transformation may depend on 
internal de-functionalization and the struggle of domination when the existing distribution 
does not refer to subjective dispositions and the objective practices of agents (Scott, 1996). 
Some – dominant – identities of the international field may try to position their identities in 
accordance with other dominants via a new political collectivity of identities. Despite the 
homology in domination on the basis of subjective capital and field compatibility, some 
members of dominant political identities can enhance cultural capital in comparison with 
others and, therefore, they can try to position themselves in accordance with other structured 
dominants in a new social stratification. In fact, neoliberal globalization has been creating a 
new political homology in the new styles of dominant association or classes in different 
dominant states which try to transform modern state identity and collectivity in accordance 
with their contemporary advancement in cultural capital and its legitimate meanings. In other 
words, new groups of dominants, influencing the governmental function of dominant state 
identity and bearing resemblances of differentiation, are trying to abandon the structured 
domination of national collectivity for the benefit of their new legitimacy. The political 
association in this new superior form of former domination desires a more fluid and transitive 
international field for their legitimate meanings beyond the borders of state identity 
(Tittenbrun, 2013). In addition, the transformation via struggles among the dominants may be 
derived from struggles between dominant and dominated states. Relative improvements of 
dominated states in economic or social capital may change the dominant exchange rate of 
different capital. For instance, the accumulation of a considerable amount of economic capital 
may increase social capital or weaken the affectivity of cultural capital in the international 
field. This is seen in practice in the Chinese position in the cultural capital of domination. 
Despite the categorization of Chinese political identity, China improves its neoliberal 
capitalist engagements with other states for the benefit of economic capital. The Chinese 
approach fundamentally impairs the structured dispositions of cultural capital in international 
relations. The Chinese separation of economic capital and ideological identity renders the 
objective cultural capital of domination obsolete. In other words, the cultural capital of 
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domination in the international field loses its essence because the Chinese do not actively 
invest their capital to struggle for dominant cultural capital. This makes many principles of 
objectified cultural capital and many institutions of the international field meaningless.  
 
Democratization as symbolic violence in the international field 
My aim here is to understand the extent of the democratization process of state identities in 
the international field. As theoretically framed above, there is a considerable adaptation 
between the democratization processes of developing states and the reproduction of 
domination in line with the supremacy of cultural capital. The functionalization of 
democratization in international relations creates distinctive dispositions in different state 
identities because democratization maintains the justificatory elements of structured 
domination in a field (Forst, 2015) where the gaps between stratified political subjects – states 
– are tremendous. In such an international field, the instrumentality of democratization differs 
in accordance with the positions of states. Because of the structured superiority on legitimate 
meanings, democratization functions as cultural capital for states’ positioning in the 
domination of the international field. On the other hand, because of the inability of conscious 
disposition producing processes regarding structured cultural capital, the democratization 
process leads to further symbolic violence of dominated state identities. Indeed, to think that 
the democratization process distributes identities of states equally and enables access to 
cultural capital for every state corroborates states’ misrecognized dispositions with regards to 
their positions. In a nutshell, democratization as the cultural capital of neoliberal domination 
creates a legitimate culture which guarantees a certain legitimate domination in international 
relations.  
Liberal democracy is a qualification for a state to have a dominant position in 
international relations. This is actually derived from a distinction mechanism of cultural 
capital to illustrate what counts as a state’s legitimate identity (Wacquant, 2005). In this 
respect, democratization, as the cultural capital of domination, becomes legitimate violence or 
symbolic violence for dominated states in international relations. In accordance with the 
position of dominant states in the international field, democracy characterizes the embodied 
capital of dominant state identities (Nye, 2013). Dominant states transform this embodied 
capital into an objectified form via a functionalization of international law in the area of 
democratic values in neoliberal theorization. In the end, the objectified forms of the 
democratization processes are imposed into the identities of dominated states via instruments 
of institutionalized capital, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which institutionalize 
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domination in terms of symbolic violence and democratization engagement. In this way, the 
neoliberal imagination of democratization actually overturns the social collectiveness of 
developing or dominated state identities because it destroys the dispositions regarding the 
solidarity of dominated states (Wacquant, 2004) without having relevant the cultural capital of 
democracy. The objective principles of political collectivity in any of the developing or 
dominated states are still quite primitive or uncertain. The collectivization principle of 
nationality is mostly fractional in these dominated state identities and, therefore, nationality as 
a vision of division becomes an operational tool to achieve relative recognition in the 
international field. In this respect, the democratization process discloses weaknesses regarding 
the principles of collectivization in developing state identities. In practice, nearly all of the 
practices of democratization in developing state identities failed in the contemporary history 
of international relations. More importantly, as is seen especially in many crises in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, democratization processes not only deepen the 
deficiencies of developing countries regarding the principle of political unification but also 
create new crises between the different principles of collectivity, such as ethnicity or religion, 
in dominated state identity.  
Another core question here is to problematize whether states in dominant positions 
really support a successful neoliberal democratization process of developing or dominated 
state identities. Democracy as cultural capital gives a distinctive position in the international 
field which rewards dominant state identities with a distinctive role in the stratification of 
international relations. Democratization as symbolic violence maintains the distinction of 
structured domination in the legitimate understanding of democracy. In this way, the 
neoliberal engagement of democratization practices in the developing field of international 
relations creates a pursuance of a legitimate meaning of democracy. This legitimate meaning 
functionalizes symbolic violence, which vitalizes the demand for a distinctive position of 
domination (Samuel, 2013), because only dominant states in international relations have 
sufficient cultural capital to distribute the stratification of identities according to the 
democratization process in international relations. The symbolic violence of democratization 
also stabilizes misrecognition on the sine qua non position of domination in the distribution of 
state identities. In this way, the symbolic violence of neoliberal democratization process 
produces two important results for roles of domination in the international field. Firstly, it 
guarantees the functionality regarding the redistribution of stratification of state positions in 
the international field. Secondly, it monopolizes the further production of symbolic violence 
by stabilizing the structured distinction of democracy. Distinction emphasizes the capacities 
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of dominant states with regards to valuing the democratic functions of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1984). On the other hand, it is important for dominant state identities that all other 
identities of states should pursue the same values and standards for the improvement of their 
political identities. As the Bourdieusian vision emphasized, this is a standard necessity to be a 
part of the group identity. In order to define international relations as a political field, the 
international field is subjectively expected to consist of a group of state identities which share 
similar experiences, values and expectations. State identities, having similar experiences, 
compose the political field of international relations. Therefore, dominant states impose 
democratization to strengthen the group identity of the international field via emphasizing 
similar experiences in practice. In this way, dominant states contribute a popularization of 
democracy in the process of democratization because popularization creates a low culture of 
democracy imitations, thereby maintaining the supremacy of dominant states in the definition 
of the legitimate meaning of liberal democracy and democratization. In this way, the 
popularization of democracy reproduces symbolic violence in accordance with high culture 
and low culture differentiation of democratic values.  
The popularization of democracy not only highlights the distinction in the ownership 
of cultural capital, but also implies differences regarding the functionalization of democracy 
in dominated and dominant state identities (Layoun, 1997). Due to a lack of cultural capital 
regarding democratic representation, dominated states function as consumers of structured 
democracy understanding. Dominant states occupy a relatively well-defined and durable 
position in accordance with the amount of owned capital (Swartz, 2013). The positions of 
dominated states in the international field are subjectively obliged to verify their positional 
competence and effect institutional improvements in democratic representation. In this 
respect, the dominant states of international field utilize democratic values for the integration 
of dominant identities on the basis of appropriate language regarding the abstractions of 
meanings and subjective tones of structured violence. On the other hand, dominated states in 
the same political field, as the consumers of structured democratic values, are mostly prone to 
fulfil the structural necessities connected to their recognition in a practical space. Therefore, 
they do not associate their political judgments to abstract meanings of any moral integration. 
Dominated state identities embody popularized meanings and principles of democracy in a 
particular historical space. In a nutshell, the necessity-driven perception of democracy 
imposes a disadvantaged state of international space onto simple consumers of the 
understanding of dominant democracy. The democratization process in this framework does 
not produce a distinctive way of expression and distinctive idiosyncratic democratic values 
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for dominated states. Their constant consumer positions of dominated states in the 
international field constrain them from being parts of the democracy debates which produce 
structured structures of the understanding of future democracy and its dispositions.  
Bourdieu is also considerably relevant for the reinterpreting of the progressive process 
in nature of democratization. More precisely, Bourdieusian study in international relations 
creates discussions to understand whether contemporary democratization concept really is a 
process and progress in the international field. The implementation of contemporary 
democratization in the international field justifies the positions of dominant states in 
democracy debates because it creates an endless process of democratic transformation which 
does not result in any significant improvement for the democratic bases of dominated state 
identities. As discussed above, democracy is related to the necessities of recognition for 
dominated states. Therefore, dominated states collect the most practical principles of 
democracy in the democratization process of the international field. However, democracy is 
mostly a symbolic tool to maintain dominant states’ control of cultural capital. Consequently, 
in order to maintain symbolic violence via a continuous democratization process, dominant 
states come up with different definitions of democracy at different stages of historical 
accumulation. In other words, domination in the international field changes the agency of 
social collectivity, which forms and organizes the appropriate use of values in the political 
identities of states (Wacquant, 2005). As revealed in the history of political accumulation, 
democracy is defined by different concepts of domination, such as protective democracy, 
liberal democracy and neoliberal democracy, in different historical social accumulations of 
domination, which attribute value to different social collectivities as the guarantor and 
operator of democratic presences in state identities. Protective democracy supports political 
collectivity on the basis of institutionalized governmental bodies. In this respect, they idealize 
the collectivity of nation on the basis of their practical understanding of democracy. This 
consent of national totality is substituted by liberal democracies because the social collectivity 
of liberal democracies is derived from civil societies within and beyond the borders. On the 
other hand, the neoliberal engagement of democracy distributes political collectivity on the 
basis of privatized cross-border associational institutionalization in similar groups. 
Neoliberalism destroys all kinds of conventional collectivity regarding the definition of 
former democracy representations. As a result of this historical evaluation, the continual 
evaluation of democratic orientation and collectiveness helps domination to maintain its 
distinctive loyalty in international field. Conversely, these continual changes of democratic 
orientation preclude the progressive optimism of democratization practices in dominated state 
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identities because the dispositional principles of democracy transform into new forms before 
disadvantaged or dominated states successfully embody the democratic principles of a certain 
democracy definition. Therefore, democratization not only imposes the embodiment of 
predetermined democracy meanings but also puts unequal embodiment of political 
collectivity formations into action (Wacquant, 2013).  
The symbolic violence of democratization also legitimates the power of dominant 
states regarding judgments on the democratic identification of dominated states. The states 
which have the cultural capital of democracy judge the dominated states’ identities. The 
dispositions of dominated states unconsciously promote the democratization process because 
of the judgments of domination regarding their positions in the international field. Becoming 
part of the democratization process actually results in the advertisement of democratic loyalty, 
which rules out dichotomies between the political identities of dominant and dominated state 
in the international field. These dichotomies actually depend on the conceptual theatrical 
bases which originated from different values in democracy and democratization.29 Democracy 
is the value of liberalism which aims at guaranteeing fundamental rights between citizens 
within a territorially bounded political field. However, democratization is a product of 
neoliberalism, which targets the guarantee of relative gains and accumulation of individuals 
and groups beyond any territoriality and citizenry definition. Therefore, territorial 
differentiations are crucial to maintaining dominance over the structures. Eventually, 
democratization will function as the symbolic violence of otherness which produces relative 
and competitive loyalty in order to continually reproduce the symbolic violence of control.  
  
                                               
29
 For more information, see Parry & Moran (1994). 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Background of the concept of social capital 
Individuals, as fundamental social agents, single-handedly produce restricted material and 
intangible benefits/qualifications. They also try to obtain other kinds of capital allocation. At 
this point, social capital most basically defines all kind of achievements and qualifications of 
individuals produced by cooperative social exchanges, links and memberships. The 
background of social capital rests upon the thoughts of de Tocqueville regarding union-based 
society and associational life (de Tocqueville, 2003). Although it was firstly used at the 
beginning of the twentieth century in sociology literature, it became a strong concept in the 
second half of the twentieth century. In that period, it generally implied the importance of 
social exchange and cooperation. It is claimed that society needs well-constructed 
communication and exchange links to achieve self-development and trust among its members. 
In the early period, social capital originally referred to human capital because it tried to 
explain the value of cooperation, which could simultaneously enhance economic capacities 
(Jacobs, 1961; Schultz, 1961). Therefore, early studies suggest that social capital – or, more 
accurately, human capital – can construct a productive relationship and exchange networks 
which can enhance human productivity in other fields, such as economics and politics. 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the economy-centred human capital focus 
on social capital definitions was substituted by a more inclusive understanding of social 
capital which tried to include all intertwined relations of social capital (Bourdieu, 1995a; 
Coleman, 1988). The efficiency of social capital might depend on many different 
interrelations and exchanges, from economic to cultural capital. In this process, social capital 
became a considerably debated and referenced concept in sociology. The subsequent 
theoretical direction of the concept was interpreted by way of two categorizations. The first 
category generally argued that social capital is the sum of resources which help actors to 
construct the exchange networks and relations with other actors (Knoke, 1999; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Portes, 1998). This categorization was generally interested in the 
productivity of personal relations for individuals and their society. The second categorization 
was interested in collective relations, rather than individualistic relations and productions. It 
tried to understand relations within a wider, complex and intertwined objective world of 
exchanges (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995). 
However, afterwards, some scholars tried to take advantage of two concepts interchangeably 
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and simultaneously when they interpreted their conceptual definitions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).  
The developing concept of social capital has drawn the attention of scholars in 
different fields of social sciences to constitutive and cooperative functions of the concept in 
social exchange processes because it potentially enhances trust, collaboration and benefits in 
both individualistic and social exchanges of modern social structures (Rose, 2000). New 
studies have generally observed that economic and political capital may not be enough to 
reproduce and maximize gains and interests. It is seen that economic and political capital are 
reproduced in a wider complex relations web and, therefore, social agents – both individuals 
and groups – need to have some other requirements to have a corner in social relationship 
webs. Economic, political and even cultural capital is a fundamentally inseparable part of the 
exchange webs embedded in societies. The agents should be able to improve interaction, 
relation and recognition in their societies. Consequently, it is understood that the agents can 
productively produce benefits if they invest not only in economic and political capital but also 
in social relations, concerns and interests. In this respect, social capital explicitly creates a 
productive basis for individuals to produce their own benefits. At the same time, social capital 
implicitly establishes social cooperation, recognition, respect, trust and collective identity. In 
accordance with these interpretations, the concept finds meaning in very individualistic points 
of view that describe the individualistic gains of the agents (Burt, Cook, & Lin, 2001); and, 
therefore, a variety of societal points of view that imply the normative, socially collective and 
cooperative sides of the concept (Fukuyama, 1995).  
In sociology, the research of Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu has 
been instrumental in understanding the conceptual differences, interpretation, scope and 
effectiveness of social capital. These three scholars interpret the objectification of social 
capital differently in social world. Putnam strongly argues that products of social capital, such 
as cooperation, civic engagements, collective trust and associational life, are evidence that 
social capital is a very positive and productive necessity in social life (Putnam, 2000). On the 
other hand, Bourdieu clearly argues that the process of social capital is mostly based on 
unequal distribution, separation, social positioning and division. He basically claims that 
social capital is a resource which stands by powerful social agents to maintain their social 
positioning in comparison with less-powerful social agents in the same field (Bourdieu, 
1986). Coleman takes a relatively neutral position between Putnam’s positive representation 
of social capital and Bourdieusian inequality and social capital relations. According to 
Coleman, social capital is a neutral resource in social structures that organizes the 
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interactions, collectivity and social exchange processes of individuals (Coleman, 1990). In 
this aspect, the potential yields of social capital vary from inequality to the support of social 
collectiveness because the productivity of social capital depends on how individuals engage 
the processes of social capital. 
Contrary to the social capital research of Coleman and Bourdieu in the educational 
field, Putnam fundamentally stressed civic engagements in the social networks. He argues that 
the active participation of social networks creates trust and reciprocity, which lead to social 
benefits and collectiveness (Field, 2008). Putnam thinks that social capital consists of two 
distinctive categories: bridging and bonding social capital. These forms serve different 
necessities of societies. Bridging social capital brings together different heterogeneous 
members or groups of society in order to produce common benefits. Bonding social capital 
creates strong unification and homogenous representation to maintain the solidarity of identity 
(Ibid.). However, he is likely to support bridging rather than bonding social capital because 
extreme solidarity causes the political alienation of individuals to their identity, but bridging 
social capital enhances social voluntariness with regard to the cooperation of individuals and 
the civic representation of identities. Contrary to Putnam, Coleman is not interested in the 
political functionality of social capital; he tries to combine sociology with economics in 
relation to social capital (Field, 2008). As implied, he mostly claims that social capital is a 
neutral resource. However, he also thinks that social capital can enhance the gains and aims of 
both powerful and disadvantaged social agents simultaneously. According to Coleman, social 
capital and objective structures are intertwined. More precisely, social capital forms some of 
the functions of social structures. Social agents establish their actions on the basis of these 
social structures. At this point, Coleman’s and Bourdieu’s understandings of social capital are 
based on a fundamental difference. According to Coleman, different kinds of social structures 
are supported by different kinds of social capital and, therefore, agents take advantage of 
relevant social capital when they produce relationships (Coleman, 1990). In other words, 
agents are fully conscious regarding their identities and interests because they have complete 
knowledge with regards to which structures are suitable for certain social capital. However, 
Bourdieu clearly argues that agents are not fully conscious with regards to their own actions. 
In short, Coleman constitutes his understanding of social capital on the basis of three 
elements: trust, obligations and norms (Lesser, 2000). In a certain structure, agents constitute 
trustful engagements, which result in forming recognized objective obligations. Afterwards, 
respective norms are created in order to maintain respect for obligations in structures.  
 171
In the chapter on social capital, this research fundamentally tried to focus on the 
applicability of the Bourdieusian social capital concept in the international field. It focused on 
the capacity of Bourdieusian social capital and reconsidered the re-construction of the 
political identities of agents in the international field. Therefore, the main focus of this part is 
to identify potential interrelations between the production of social capital in habitus and the 
objective construction of political identities of agents including individuals, groups, 
associations of groups and states. It is argued that social capital and the construction of 
political identities are intertwined and, as a result, social capital has certain functions in 
identity production processes. In this respect, the main theoretical engagement of the study is 
the constructivist theorization of identity. Constructivist stress on agents’ consciousness and 
interpretation regarding their own ideas and identities is questioned in this part. While this 
research goes along with the constructivist stress on interpretations, it dissents with respect to 
the ignorance of structures and the overemphasis of individuals’ interpretations in the process 
of identity construction in the international field. In accordance with Bourdieusian social 
capital, it is argued that interpretations are not conscious and they are subject to the historical 
production of structure or structural relations. Thus, interpretation is a secondary stage of 
identity construction after the imposition of structural dominations in habitus. As a result, this 
study explores the productivity of a ‘structural constructivist’ perspective to reconsider the 
issue. In this way, this chapter firstly engages the structural roots regarding mutual 
recognition and social capital. Secondly, it rethinks how social capital reproduces inequality 
and the division of identities in the international field. Afterwards, it discusses the roles of 
social capital regarding the hierarchical distribution of political identities. Lastly, the chapter 
tries to depict how social capital supports the reproduction of identities in a globalizing 
international field.  
 
Social capital recognition and the division of identities beyond social constructivism 
In a social field, the exchanges of social agents are explanatory to maintain the collective 
identity of social self. Social capital helps social agents to gain access to a certain sense of 
belonging. A sense of belonging exists exogenously and it is exclusive of the consciousness of 
social agents. Forms of exchanges are not formed by the procedures of actual structures which 
are not originally natural products of agents’ conscious ideas and preferences. Rather, forms 
of exchanges are historically grounded experiences. Every externalized interpretation 
produces internal evaluations based on ‘its own language’ and ‘the present and even the past 
state of its occupants’, which lead to ‘the unconscious unify of a class’ (Bourdieu, 1984). 
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Hence, they are unnatural and unconscious interactions which define the rules of membership 
in advance. In this way, agents are not passive practitioners of a given habitus or their own 
conscious ideas, but rather they are subject to their internalized forms of unnatural historical 
beliefs. Conscious beliefs cannot affect the actualization of this habitus because they are 
represented as natural phenomena in order to be recognized members of social spaces. The 
whole process of social exchange is a more intrinsic construction and/or reconstruction 
because social agents want to embody collective identity which forms and reforms the rules of 
participation. In other words, social capital socializes the identities of agents via the agents’ 
own internalized dominative symbolic productions.  
Social agents as legitimate bodies consciously try to construct safer, legal and socially 
stable spaces for their presences (Shilling, 2012). In order to achieve this, social agents 
unconsciously take advantage of their bodily internalized social capital. Agents actualize an 
internalized sense of belonging which expresses the rules of membership or recognition 
(Bourdieu, 1985). Social capital, producing continual social exchanges, connects agents to 
certain identities, but this process leads to a degree of institutional relation webs because 
institutionalization is a necessary factor in imposing the characteristics of external relations 
into the habitus of agents. Owing to this function of internalized social capital, when agents 
struggle to be a part of a common identity they also embody and represent the means of 
domination because they actualize collective social capital, which speaks on behalf of a 
certain social, political and economic domination of power. Agents consciously want to be a 
part of collective identities because these identities provide recognition, which is essential to 
access the benefits of the fields. In this respect, relationships between an internalized sense of 
belonging and the functionality of recognition mainly structuralize social existence and 
reproduction of hierarchical domination, which do not have any direct connection with the 
agents. Hierarchical domination mainly obtains the productive power of mutual recognition, 
which is the most influencing factor in the struggle for influence in the accumulation of social 
capital.  
In substance, Bourdieusian social capital has the potential to give distinctive 
explanations for the political identity of agents in international relations. Bourdieusian study 
produces thoughtful arguments in order to explain social capital and mutual recognition 
relations beyond the constructivists’ ideations. First of all, the state is a field of practice, an 
identity of classification or a political localization where ideological productions take place 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 2013). The correlation between state interaction and 
social construction loses its meaning when one evaluates the state as one field among others. 
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Contrary to the constructivist agenda, defining subjects and societies as the products of 
reciprocal construction (Onuf, 2012), social interactions do not lead to a conscious 
construction of ideas and identities, because agents always struggle to survive in a politically 
defined space in order to be a part of a collective identity. These agents construct their 
identities via practical sentiments in habitus rather than conscious ideational social 
agreements or constructions. Social institutions are just a practical set of rules to objectify the 
allocation of social capital. Ideas and identities cannot create social interactions if a field, as a 
structure, requires the reconciliation of a certain practical use of habitus and subjective 
predisposition. The agents seek to actualize their capital allocations, which are given by the 
habitus of the field. It is plausible that this process results in the social construction of ideas, 
but the ideas mostly originate from the inherent field of social capital. The agents originally 
do not aim to create socially constructed identities, but they want to improve the inherent 
feature of their social capital given by the field. In this respect, the modern state and its 
political localization and nationalistic identification depend on social interactions, but these 
social interactions are mostly involved in inherent social capital. The agents become part of 
the totalized state identity on behalf of inherent social capital. As a result, there is a reason–
result relation between field/structure and identity/idea/social construction. The political field 
of the state provides a certain social capital allocation or ‘symbolic universalization of 
particular interests’ for the agents who do not produce their identities without engaging this 
social capital when they constitute their ideas in the objective world (Bourdieu, 1996b).  
Having an identity also means a degree of ‘vision and division’ which occurs beyond 
the conscious social interactions because the political structure, the state, can become 
meaningful as long as it creates positional differences in the objective field (Ibid.). Social 
positioning in structures leads to an accumulation of a certain asset in comparison with other 
positioning (Burt, 2001). These positional differences are formed by the differentiation of the 
agents’ inherent social capital. The agents unconsciously gain identities when they struggle 
over the reproduction of their inherent social capital in the field. In order to be parts of a 
totalized identity, agents recognize the inherent division or differentiation of social 
positioning. Similar to family identity, where family members recognize positional and 
functional differentiation, individuals and groups recognize positional and relational 
differentiation when they obtain certain national identities. Therefore, structures define or 
impose how to give meaning to identities by way of the unconscious recognition of division. 
When agents become members of the same social exchange processes, they also reproduce 
social division in the field. Thus, social capital is structured by the existence of division 
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because it not only produces ways of empowerment in the field but also unconsciously 
achieves social positioning or division in identities.  
The unconscious recognition of division and the allocation of identity relations also 
mean that power is an indispensable phenomenon for understanding the representation of 
identities. Constructivists generally evaluate power as the inter-subjective representation of 
meanings in the international field (Hopf, 1998; Guzzini, 2005). Contrary to constructivist 
implementation, the inter-subjective representation of power does not help us to understand 
the whole process, because the subjectivity of the agents is subject to the unconscious 
representation of a certain social positioning, and structure imposes a different habitus in 
accordance with social positioning in the objective field. In other words, positioning in 
structures affects the meanings of the subjects which are not within their conscious 
knowledge. Thus, political locality/state and state power are derived from the unconscious 
dominance of habitus, which influences and organizes the whole processes of division in 
social capital. The distribution of social capital is never equal because the power of symbolic 
capital differs in different political territorialities. Some parts of agents have a better 
representation of social capital in comparison with other members of the same identity 
construction (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Every member of the same identity in the field has a 
collective sort of internalized capital, but their possessions of social capital are not pari passu. 
In order to trace the power relation of identity construction, agents do not consciously and 
rationally need to struggle for material power relations, but they are always subject to the 
inherent division of social capital and its unequal distribution in any totalized identity. In this 
respect, state identity as a politically collective field of identity depends on a structurally 
inherent division empowered by symbolic capital. This division is fundamental in order to 
maintain the monopoly on the legitimate representation of social identity, which imposes a 
non-material power relation into the constitutive processes. Institutionalization results in the 
successful embodiment of social capital because institutionalization means the construction of 
mutual recognition, which requires the division and acceptance of functional spaces in the 
allocation of social capital. The institutionalization of social capital represents a particular 
social division of totalized identity because symbolic power relations impose the 
representative dominance of certain individuals and/or groups who simultaneously have the 
better social capital allocation and right of identity representation on behalf of others. 
Therefore, power relations are the very presence of identity construction and mutual 
recognition, but these power relations do not consist of the material interests of agents. Power 
relations are fundamentally credited by social capital and imposed by a division which is 
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unconsciously recognized by the agents in order to be a part of a common identity throughout 
the process of exchanges. 
State identity, as a social entity, functions as a common identity in the territorially 
defined political space. Similar to any other social identity construction, it is a production of 
internal division and, as a result, the differentiation of social capital. In the same way, modern 
states are local agents of a common identification of a wider exchange web which represents 
their unique institutionalization of mutual recognition. This process structurally engages the 
reproduction of inequalities, exclusion and inclusion; it then interprets a constitutionally 
normative language for the institutionalization/recognition of objective structure (Cleaver, 
2005). When state identity achieves recognition of other similar entities it is also 
unconsciously involved in division. State identity struggles to improve its capital allocation in 
accordance with the strength of its social capital. However, similar to the internal structure of 
the state, symbolic power is not distributed equally among the states and, therefore, some of 
them have a better symbolic power of structure to speak on behalf of others. In other words, 
social capital is unevenly distributed between the different states in a wider field of exchange 
called international relations. Similar to the different social groups in the internal political 
field of local borders, states benefit from membership of a common identity in order to obtain 
mutually recognizable characters in the international field. However, similarly, individual 
states are imposed on by an inherent symbolic capital which defines the capacities of their 
social capital in the processes of exchanges. In this way, social interactions determine social 
capital in relation with other political and cultural capital in the international field, but 
identities are defined by power relations regarding symbolic capital, which result in the 
acceptance of division for the purpose of mutual recognition. 
Bourdieusian study figures out two important points in order to interpret the mutually 
recognized political identity of states in the international field. Initially, symbolic capital is 
not distributed equivalently among the localities. Some states have a better symbolic capital 
allocation than others. Owing to this advantage, some local identities gain a better 
combination of social capital and they obtain a better positioning in the inherent division of 
identities in the international field. In this respect, state identities are recognized as relatively 
equal, but social capital, which organizes the exchanges of mutual recognition, are distributed 
unevenly. With regards to this, the representation of democracy is an essential functionality in 
order to understand the uneven distribution of social capital. The symbolic capital of 
democracy is defined and embodied by certain localities of Western states. This bestows these 
states with the same hierarchical symbolic role and function as the father or the oldest people 
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in a patriarchic family. This symbolic role also provides a superior positioning in the field of 
exchanges in the international field because social capital can only produce positive 
engagements, such as Putnam’s imagination of associational democratic engagements 
(Putnam, 2000), rather than consequences and inequalities, if states have appropriate means of 
democracy in the fields of political, social and economic capital.30 When other localities or 
states try to achieve recognition in the international field they define their positioning by way 
of unconsciously using the same symbolic capital. This symbolic capital is not their 
inheritance but it becomes part of the habitus in historical processes. Other unequal state 
identities in the same international field are not part of the symbolic production of democracy 
but they become unconscious practitioners of democracy or democratization because, in a 
field of unequally distributed social capital, agents still obtain trust and solidarity links that 
provide access to limited or poor-quality resources (Portes & Landolt, 2000). This also means 
a kind of unconscious recognition regarding their social positioning because using the same 
symbolic knowledge results in the recognition of an uneven social capital distribution in the 
international field. States’ social capital interprets their social positioning and it also 
objectifies the false consciousness of states as if it is their own ideational creation. When 
states that have less social capital recognize the ‘patriarchic’31 role of certain Western states 
regarding democracy, they also recognize the unconscious division between the ‘relatively 
equal identities of states’ such as the Third World or developing state concepts. Although 
these states do not have any essential influence over symbolic democratic reproduction, they 
try to structuralize their identities via harmonizing their unequal social capital and democracy 
in the cause of more recognition. The Third World democracy, Muslim democracy and 
developing democracy concepts are all reasons for this unconscious division of social capital 
regarding identity.  
                                               
30
 Warren (2004, p. 18): ‘the theory of social capital in ways that help distinguish better and worse kinds 
of social capital … more political, economic, and cultural democracy exists, the more likely social capital will 
function in good ways. The argument for democracy is simple: democracy tends toward more equal 
empowerments of individuals. Empowerments are generative: by reducing vulnerabilities they act directly on the 
precursors of association, which in turn provides individuals with social capital they can use to resist imposed 
externalities. In theory, more egalitarian distributions of social capital should, reduce the tendencies for social 
capital to produce social bads such as political corruption.’ 
31
 In this research, patriarchy indicates autocratic dominance in power relation and social stratification 
beyond its popular and common usage, which refers to male domination in gender-related social and political 
studies.  
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Besides this, the fundamental objective of the Bourdieusian concept highlights the 
core role of social capital – as a ‘form of capital of obligations’ (Bourdieu, 1986, 254) – in 
shaping the characteristic and stabilization of mutual recognition (Kuokkanen, 2007). 
Therefore, social capital consists of unconscious obligations, but it does not engage any 
objective or material obligation when it constitutes its characteristics in habitus. Agents have 
a certain degree of social capital and, accordingly, they inherently become parts of the ‘capital 
of obligations’ because to obtain social capital is to embody the invisible codes of obligations. 
In line with this, contrary to constructivist inter-subjectivity in international relations, every 
identity has the characteristics of obligations before they are involved in exchange and 
institutionalization in the objective world. Agents do not produce conscious obligations, 
norms and sanctions without engaging their inherent social capital as the capital of 
obligations. Social capital, as the function of obligations, improves and regularizes the 
dynamic of hidden division and power of categorization in the construction of mutual 
recognition. Social capital paves the way for a privileged positioning of some agents in 
comparison with some others who share the same mutually recognized identities (Field, 
2008). Because of this relatively differentiated distribution of social capital, the powerful 
positions of some agents are perceived as the usual characteristics of the structure. Social 
capital, as a possession of privileged localities, also results in the misrecognized division in 
terms of organic relations with obligations in the international field. Some identities living in 
certain localities, such as the field of the European Union, possess relatively better capital of 
obligations in comparison with other identities living outside this field. Meanwhile, states 
acquire capital of obligations before they form inter-subjective meaning in the objective 
international field. This forms a relative symbolic superiority of identity for the EU zone 
regarding categorization, division and representation, which are structuralized by international 
law. International law is a considerable practising arena for the capital of obligations. The 
fundamental characteristic of international law originates from the complexity of obligations, 
which is abundant in the social capital of a particular European territoriality. Thus, the other 
relatively weak agents of the international field unconsciously try to produce capital of 
obligations and to comply with their positioning, such as Third World or developing state 
identity, which structuralizes in accordance with the privileged positioning of the particular 
Western territory. In other words, social capital unconsciously imposes obligations into the 
habitus of unprivileged identities before they inter-subjectively produce the exchanges and 
social structures (Burawoy & Von Holdt, 2012).  
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Social capital and inequality between states in the international field 
Bourdieusian study argues considerably that structures are important to give meaning to the 
actions of individuals because the agents’ unconsciousness regarding their actions and 
exchanges is only misrecognized and produced in certain structures, which are the production 
fields of obligations in habitus (Throop & Murphy, 2002). Structures in a particular field are 
fundamental for defining the value of social capital, owing to the fact that structures impose a 
symbolic division of habitus which objectifies the access capacity of different agents to social 
capital. In this respect, the unequal distribution of social capital attributes value to certain 
symbolic objectives. Following this, these objectives become obligations of exchanges and 
objectively meaningful ways to pursue interests. Because of the misrecognized recognition of 
division, agents recognize and value social capital. Habitus infuses social capital into agents 
and it also regularizes social positioning. In this way, when agents pursue their own interests, 
the unequal positioning and privileged structuralization of social capital are internalized in 
their pursuance of interests by the disadvantaged agents in the same field. The political life of 
individuals in many Middle Eastern political territorialities displays essential observations and 
traces to illustrate this inequality, structure and social capital relations. The enfranchisement 
of women is not seen as a part of women’s social capital in many Middle Eastern political 
fields. The symbolically structured inherent habitus of women naturalizes the division of 
gender in the process of exchange (Bourdieu, 2001). Because of this misrecognition, 
empowered by social capital, women recognize that their positioning in political elections is a 
privileged way for them to be esteemed and recognized members (a constitutive function of 
self-reflexivity regarding gender inequality) (Adkins, 2002; McNay, 2000) and to reach their 
interests in the process of social exchange. Similarly, taba’iyya (politically bounded 
subject/subjecthood) (Butenschøn, Davis, & Hassassia, 2000) functions as citizenship in many 
political fields of the Middle East, but, in reality, there are considerable differences between 
the identity of citizenship and taba’iyya. Becoming a part of taba’iyya does not entitle many 
of the rights and responsibilities which citizenship recognizes. However, as it is argued, the 
structural field of social capital values the obligations of independent/bounded relation in the 
political identities of individuals in the Middle East and, therefore, individuals having the 
identity of taba’iyya misrecognize the privileged positioning of the agents and interests of 
social capital. Thus, social capital becomes the means of the construction of inequality, 
division and social positioning between privileged and disadvantaged identities in the field of 
exchanges.  
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In accordance with the concept of social capital, Bourdieusian study gives us an 
intermediate objective of inequality between structural thinking and constructivist 
theorization. The constructivist agenda generally assumes that inequality is derived from 
social subjects’ own interpretations regarding objective social exchanges, which differ in their 
interpretations and perceptions of inequality (Harris, 2004; Holstein & Miller, 2003). It 
implies the relativity of inequality in accordance with social processes, subjects and the 
conscious social exchanges of individuals. This perception of constructivism infers that it is 
not plausible to research any objective definition and reasoning for inequality because it is 
always interpreted subjectively regardless of structures. However, when this consideration of 
social constructivism is rethought vis-à-vis social capital, it can be traced that possession of 
social capital is affected by structural division and its symbolic structure, which result in the 
misrecognition of the social agents regarding their own constructions and exchanges. Because 
of invisible division and unequal distribution in the symbolic products of structure, the agents 
cannot reach the relevant social capital and, therefore, the interpretations of individuals go 
beyond their consciousness with regards to their unequal positioning in society.  
The structural effect on the misrecognized symbolic domination of habitus not only 
imposes an unconscious division of agents and the unequal distribution of social capital but 
also contributes to the continuation and re-structuralization of inequality in social capital 
sharing. Social capital as the capital of obligations deepens the gap between privileged and 
disadvantaged identities of agents. The control capacity of advantaged agents over the 
obligations of social capital prevents disadvantaged agents from accumulating a better 
allocation of social capital, which is necessary to improve the exchange quality in the 
objective world (Field, 2008). In other words, beyond being a reason for inequality, social 
capital also improves the social basis for the re-constitutionalization of chronic inequality. In 
this respect, inequality, symbolic division and otherness become important and integral parts 
of structures in order to maintain the objective and interpretive domination of identities 
(Schwalbe, Godwin, Holden, Schrock, Thompson, & Wolkomir, 2000). In relation to the 
political identities of agents, the international field is a praxis space of unequally distributed 
social capital. International law boosts the efficiency of symbolic orientation and it also 
organizes obligations regarding how agents pursue their interests. For example, the 
membership statuses of international advocacy organizations and other NGOs in international 
organizations, as the agents of international field, are exclusive. Some NGOs have priority to 
be participants or members of the decision-making processes of the organization because their 
accumulated social capital and basis of social exchange give them an advantage over other 
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NGOs. The organization styles of many institutions, especially the United Nations, maintain 
these bases. Therefore, the social positioning of some organizations defines the borders and 
scope of interests for other disadvantaged organizations. Similarly, political and territorial 
division also unconsciously indicates the inequality of social capital. Classifications like the 
Third World or the Eurozone define how agents perceive their obligations and how they 
pursue their interests in the objective world. In this way, symbolically imposed divisions 
become objective exchanges in the objective world. 
The main objective of constructivism is interpretations rather than consequences and 
the results of inequality. In other words, unless agents consciously and reflectively focus on 
inter-subjective meaning and the construction of inequalities, constructivism does not try to 
find answers for the abolition of inequality in the objective field (Harris, 2006; Holstein & 
Gubrium, 2005). However, Bourdieusian study also stresses the link between the distribution 
of social capital and the incapacity of the agents regarding their own self-reflexivity of 
identity. Perceptions and interpretations of ideas lose their importance because the agents do 
not consciously control their perceptions and they exercise an imposed reflexivity rather than 
their own self reflexivity of ideas (Hoy, 1999). In this respect, a higher level of social capital 
possession enhances the agents’ self-reflexivity and control on their own interpretations. It 
also improves their capacity of exchange because higher social capital leads to better 
engagements of interests. Therefore, the capacity of social capital intensifies the reflexivity of 
domination, which bestows a deeper social classification of identities. The political identities 
of the international field mainly verify this causality of social capital. The intensification of 
social capital in a certain political field always improves privileged social exchanges, both in 
the same fields and among the different fields. The European Union has the highest intensity 
of social capital in the international field. Consequently, the enlargement process of the 
European Union is also a field of practice with regards to the reflexivity of social capital. Due 
to the privileged position regarding social capital allocation, the European Union can freely 
define the borders of the field and the obligations of capital in the field. In order to be a 
member of the same field, other states or localities need to take advantage of self-reflexivity 
derived from the European Union’s cultural, political, social and economic capital, 
obligations and interpretations. Another interesting field of praxis is immigration. The social 
positioning of immigrated social groups in host families leads to imposed self-reflexivity, 
producing inter-subjective inequality within the same field. The incapacity of social capital in 
immigrant identities generally functions as an inseparable part of imposed positioning, which 
is subject to the capital of obligations in the same political field. Integrative political policies 
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in immigrant societies simultaneously and symbolically maintain and deepen the unequal 
distribution of social capital because they are generally implemented in structures, 
regularizing inherent advancing positions and divisions in the same political identity and 
spatiality. 
Constructivism thoughtfully research how subjects, interpretations and perceptions of 
inequality are inter-subjectively constructed according to the ideation of different subjects 
(Harris, 2006). In this aspect, constructivism is not interested in labels such as subject and the 
subjectification of inequality (Ibid.). However, the inter-subjectivity of both privileged and 
disadvantaged subjects is not free from the symbolic habitual representation of historical 
structures. Not only do disadvantaged agents pursue the symbolic inherent structure of their 
habitus, but also privileged agents focus on symbolic interpretation which aims at the 
exclusion of disadvantaged agents in order to maintain their interests by way of social capital. 
In other words, the inherent dispositions of habitus create different unconscious objectives for 
both advantaged and disadvantaged agents (Adams, 2006). Therefore, privileged social capital 
owners are prone to exclude disadvantaged agents from their internal exchange of social 
capital. Appropriate strategies for the structuralization of inequalities penetrate differently into 
the habitus of different agents according to self-reflexivity, which may become a function for 
the symbolic domination of habitus (Sweetman, 2003). When they objectify their interests 
they also unconsciously produce interpretations, serving inequality and the naturalization of 
unequally distributed social capital. In this respect, it is not plausible to think that the 
institutionalization of the international field is solely the ideational, inspirational and 
conscious interpretations of subjects/agents of political identities, including individuals, 
groups, organizations and states, in the objective world. It is generally seen that the political 
institutionalization of the international field generally groups the localities, states or other 
political subjects who have similar capacities or incapacities of social capital. When 
privileged political fields define their identities in accordance with the interpretation of 
‘developed’ they also create a social closure, serving the inclusion of certain social capital and 
the exclusion of the other social positioning. The enlargement processes of the European 
Union prove that the inclusion of localities into the interpretive field of Europe is mostly 
derived from an inherent resemblance of social capital. On the other hand, exclusion also 
creates social positioning based on interpretation of ‘developing’. This also results in 
grouping disadvantaged subjects in the international fields. As a consequence, social capital 
deepens inequality and its social positioning in the international field while agents pursue its 
subjectively imposed obligations and interests.  
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Furthermore, social capital is a historical formation which transfers its symbolic 
divisions and obligations of capital to the next generations (Field, 2008). This also contributes 
to the unequal distribution of social capital because it restricts the expectations and interests 
of targets. In other words, the potential improvement of agents is suppressed in accordance 
with the perception, identification and expectation of agents’ own social groups. Social agents 
are expected to fulfil the social expectations/impositions of their social groups and inherent 
solidarity of their habitus because the habitus of social groups is formed in opposition to other 
social groups and, therefore, it produces distinctive internal hierarchies and exchanges which 
are incoherent for other social groups (Portes, 1998). In the light of these interpretations, it 
can be inferred that the symbolic structure of nationalism functions as a bearer of inequality 
for relatively disadvantaged agents in the international field of modernity. Contrary to 
privileged identities, members of disadvantaged groups have relatively very restricted borders 
constituted by strict visa regimes in the international field. This structure vitiates the influence 
of agents’ engagements with other fields. On the other hand, the solidarity of the group 
symbolically puts pressure on the identities of members. Under the restricted social capital of 
national space, agents embody imposed otherness to be recognized members of internal 
solidarity. In contrast with the constructivist stress on human ideation, nationalism is not 
simply a political institutionalization of human interpretation or an interactively created norm 
of sovereignty. Otherwise, modern sovereignty, the Westphalian order, the ad hoc conference 
system and nationality should simultaneously have come into existence. However, 
nationalism came onto the historical stage more than a hundred years later than the 
institutional changes of the modern political field. At this point, social capital gives clues to 
understand the nationalization of identities. Here social capital is the key term to understand 
the construction of national identities, because it depicts the inherent symbolic representation 
of structures in agents’ identities. In line with the concept of social capital, it is considered 
that national identity is a historical process of habitus which produces an unequal distribution 
of social capital in a new and distinctive way. Social capital is the fundamental phenomenon 
to reinterpret the style of exchanges, membership and capital of obligations. In this process, 
social capital defines the construction of solidarity, division and otherness which are 
necessary conditions to reproduce symbolic, political, economic and cultural capital inter-
subjectively.  
 
Social capital, stratification and hierarchy in the international field 
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The reproduction of hierarchy among political subjects and the functionalization of social 
capital in the practical political field have always come into existence simultaneously. A 
successful reproduction of the hierarchy depends on a redistribution of existing social capital 
among the members of the political identity (Bourdieu, 1991). Hierarchy in the existing study 
of international relations mostly observes the characteristics of the power structure, the roles 
of inter-subjective recognition and norms (Gallarotti, 2010). The existing approaches 
overlook the social characteristics of the state as an individual member of the international 
field. The state, as a social subject/organism of a certain political identity, spontaneously 
produces a hierarchy in accordance with its borders and limits of social capital. In this respect, 
international relations is not a realm of hierarchy empowered by the power structures of 
anarchy or by subjective conscious consent on anarchical structures. Indeed, the roots of 
hierarchy are founded on the social presence of the state’s political subjectivity beyond these 
structural or constructional considerations. Hierarchy is a more conscious phenomenon which 
is imposed by the social capital of states. Social capital continually reproduces the social 
limits and characteristics of powers and interests. The state unconsciously obeys the social 
limitation of its social capital before it objectively conforms to power and its normative 
constitution in international relations.  
Social capital in the international field is a subjective arsenal of domination which 
reproduces power and its political identification. Social capital distributes an unequal 
involvement into subjective materials (Hughes & Blaxter, 2007). These subjective materials 
consist of appropriate functions of historically collectivized bodies to accomplish a better 
positioning in the actual power relations of political identity (Bourdieu, 1991). A dominant 
positioning in the international field always obtains a better positioning because it takes 
advantage of well-founded networks, relations and contextual tools. A non-dominant state in 
the international field possesses a less-advantageous position regarding social capital which 
institutionalizes the conformity of objective obligations in the field because the pursuance of 
social capital also creates an infrastructure of membership in the international field. In this 
respect, social capital is a conscious strategy of domination to produce collective meanings, 
borders and functions of political identity (Swartz, 2013). In addition to this, the pursuance of 
social capital also unconsciously imposes values and expectations of the international field. A 
state’s social capital not only constitutes the borders of positioning in the international field, 
but also objectifies the structural obligations of relationship and institutionalization in the 
field. Social capital empowers and restricts the states’ abilities gain better access and a better 
position in the hierarchy of the international field. Therefore, every individual state in the 
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international field possesses the same identification of political identity, but only better-
positioned states in relation to symbolic power have the opportunity to access all benefits of a 
given political identity. 
The hierarchy of the international field fundamentally survives on the basis of 
conformity regarding membership of the field, which naturalizes inequality via formal 
equality between the agents (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). Social capital takes an active role 
in the reproduction of mutual recognition for this membership via contextual factors such as 
power and inequality in the networking styles of social capital (Christoforou & Davis, 2014). 
The networking styles of social capital characterize the valuable pursuance of states and the 
institutional requirements of objective obligations (Bourdieu, 1986). When states are involved 
in valued practices and obligations of the field, they simultaneously produce a membership of 
the international field and a hierarchy of political identities. In other words, valued obligations 
of international field actually comply with a certain positioning of domination because 
dominant subjects of the field always have well-established tangible and contextual social 
links which provide for the production of sustainable inequality between domination and 
dominated states of hierarchy in the international field. This contextual superiority of social 
capital can be visibly seen if one researches the valued obligations of a certain historical 
international field. When political identity attributes value to nationality, certain dominant 
European states have taken better positions in the international field because they have 
already obtained better positions regarding the contextual means of social capital and 
constituted networks which transmit the interests and strategies of these dominant states as 
common strategic and contextual social networking for states of the same field. In this way, 
the other states had to pursue the same strategic interests and power relations but their social 
capital is unequal; it produces less-capable networks to accomplish the valued obligation of 
membership and its recognition. Similarly, the identity of political subjectivity contributes 
liberal democracy as the valued obligation of the international field, and liberal democracy 
becomes an objective obligation for being a respectful member of the hierarchy in the field. 
However, networks and the contextual means of liberal democracy are only developed by 
certain members of the international field. The available social capital of the other states is not 
adequate to obtain appropriate durable relational networks and their contextual productions. 
In a nutshell, the dominant states in the international field invest their creditable contextual 
superiority into certain strategies and interests; they reproduce relationships and networking 
styles which defend their subjective and objective dominance of the field. Investment in the 
contextual bases of social capital results in dominance of the reproduction styles of social and 
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political relationships, which stabilizes the institutional and subjective distribution of the 
hierarchy in the international field. Objective structures are organized by values which 
provide superior networks and strategies of social capital for certain states. On the other hand, 
the other unequal member states of the same social capital space struggle for the same values 
in order to achieve the structural obligations or doxa of the international field and an 
institutional guarantee of a better recognition in the field.  
In line with the stabilization of hierarchy in the international field, social capital 
reproduces two structural practices of interconnectivity. The first of these practices is related 
to the characteristics of domination of the field. Social capital reproduces unequal 
stratification in accordance with the existing hierarchy of the field (Bottero, 2005). Similar to 
the former political subjects of history, state identity relies on structured networking strategies 
which depict the production styles of social capital in the whole international field. In this 
way, social capital functions as the inter-subjective basis of recognition in the international 
field. Every individual state invests its dispositional knowledge to accumulate social capital, 
but unequal delegation regarding the available knowledge of networks improves the 
distinctive positions of certain states because they create strategies of recognition in the 
international field by continually reproducing the valued accumulation style of social capital. 
As creators of the institutionalized delegation system in international relations, a certain group 
of states gains an inter-subjective power to delegate representation of the whole field in 
international relations and the interest of all collective representations. The power of social 
capital subjectively maintains the existing invisible domination via totalizing the 
representative strategies of recognition in the presence of privileged members of the hierarchy 
in the international field. In other words, social capital empowers the networking strategies of 
certain states as the basis of recognition in the international field, which exacerbates the 
unequal positions in the hierarchy of international field.  
The conformity on the embodiment of social capital among the states in the field 
improves the existence of autocratic distribution of political positions on the basis of a certain 
political identity. The leader position of dominant states in terms of social capital exchanges 
imposes dispositions which stabilize dominant states’ subjective representation and objective 
structural power on the definition of recognition. Social capital guarantees and maintains the 
social relation of the existing stratification, which institutionalizes the legitimacy of 
representation for being a member of the field (Susen, 2011). In other words, social capital 
institutionalizes the unconscious willingness of the states in accordance with the monopoly of 
the dominants on the social relation of states. Being a part of this institutional recognition 
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imposes the nobility of dominants, which highlights the distinction of dominants from other 
member states of the same political identity. The nobility of the dominant state or states 
achieves a power which can speak in the name of the whole international field as the highest 
representative of the political identity. In this way, the institutional delegation of nobility 
dominates social relations, which empowers the dispositions of states regarding their own 
positions in the field. The states define their positions in the field by the way of the 
representative quality of their nobility because this quality gives a better position or 
accumulation of social capital.  
The second important product of social capital is related to the relative positions of 
states in the international field. Social capital continually reproduces social stratification in the 
field of international relations. Social capital maintains a stratified system which reproduces a 
system of distinction between the dominant and the other sub-identities in the field (Bourdieu, 
1984). Discursively, all of the members of the international field, regardless of their positions 
in the domination, obtain the same styles of national identities and they are involved in the 
same sphere of international law. However, having the same types of identity practically 
guarantees the differences between the individual members of the international field. 
Continually reproduced distinction via social capital penetrates into understandings and 
images of states regarding development, growth, governance and many other state agendas. 
These agendas or policies are organized by the dominant states in the political field of 
international relations. Domination produces the beneficial characteristics and mechanisms of 
its appropriate political identification, which depicts the behaviours of the dominant 
classification (Ibid.). The distinctive representation of domination creates a number of 
characteristics and behaviours which organizes nobility or the most appropriate social capital 
of the international field. The other states of the same international field utilize these nobility, 
characteristics and behaviours of domination as guidelines because they figure out the 
identified relations which help to understand their own positions in relation to the political 
identities of other states. 
Social capital reinforces the stratification of political identities in the international 
field. Every position relies on different networks and relations, which are distributed by the 
dominant states’ exclusive monopoly of nobility (Bourdieu, 1996b). These networks are 
distributed unequally in international fields. States have restricted use of networks in 
accordance with their capital allocation. In this way, certain states have access to a majority of 
networks, but many other states can take advantage only of a restricted number of networks 
which defines their exclusion in the international field. The embedded doxa of the 
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international field or international law highlights that members of political identity take part in 
same mutual recognition and sovereignty but, in practice, social capital restricts the use of 
networks, which is necessary to enhance recognition and sovereign representation. The doxa 
of the international field inherently imposes individualistic preferences and embedded 
characteristics of domination which can only be accomplished by networking styles of 
domination. The political stratification of social capital in the international field materializes 
the characteristics of dominant political states as the nobility of whole field. In order to be a 
highly respected member of the international field, a state is expected to achieve this nobility, 
but because of a lack of social capital, the standards of nobility function as a maintenance 
mechanism for the political distinction of domination over other members of the same 
political identity in the international field. Owing to a political stratification of social capital, 
the interests and preferences of states are shaped by bordered networks of states. In this 
respect, limited access to social capital simultaneously creates an internalization of the 
external production of nobility because limited networks of states result in the reproduction of 
stratified positions which maintain the distinction of domination. Having similar social capital 
unconsciously categorizes states into certain positions, which legitimizes political 
stratification without any resistance against the symbolic form of power relations in the 
international field. In this way, the dominant states of political identity influence the practices 
of the other stratified states by means of their embedded nobility of domination. Unequally 
positioned states of the international field pursue these principles of nobility but they are 
unconsciously bound to the restricted networks of social capital. Eventually, social capital 
reproduces political stratification via the stabilizing position of dominant and dominated 
identities in the international field.  
 
Developing state and Third World concepts: dominant–dominated vision and division  
Developmental research (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007; Peet & Hartwick, 2009) and its 
conceptualization of developing states are significant examples in the contemporary 
international field to understand the functionalization of the Bourdieusian understanding of 
social capital for the definition of political identity and position. Developmental research 
generally argues that the handicaps of developing states not only depend on a lack of 
economic resources, but also rest on a lack of social capital, which results in ineffective 
networking and accumulation of political values (Christoforou & Davis, 2014). Social capital 
is seen as the objective networking styles of individuals and groups, which can be 
accomplished if states are internally involved in particular objective sustainable governance 
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processes. The developing countries concept is associated with the internal disabilities of 
states within their own territorial borders. Social capital is bordered by the associational 
qualification of societies within a particular state border. In this way, it is thought that if the 
associational qualification of internal communities of states improves, the developmental 
quality of the state will gain acceleration. Consequently, developmental studies fundamentally 
focus on the deficiencies of the state within its own borders, which depend on the structural 
constraints of groups and individuals with regards to associational networking practices.  
On the other hand, states categorized as developing have more structurally rooted 
deficiencies related to their own political identities and subjectivities beyond the internal 
societal inadequacies. As social capital materializes the divisionary identity positioning of 
individuals and their social groups, it also provides a divisionary and unequal distribution of 
networking among the states as the subjects of political identity in the international field. The 
dominant identities of state identity in the international field have a tendency to depict the 
stratified conceptualization of the developing state in accordance with institutional and 
constructive deficiencies. In line with Bourdieusian insight, the conceptualization of the 
developing state is primarily free from any institutional weakness. It fundamentally originates 
from the dispositions of states regarding their own positions and identities. In this respect, the 
conceptualization of the developing state relies on the habitual foundation of accumulated 
history, which changes into institutional and constructive perception after states give meaning 
to their identities in relation to the other states. Because of embedded structural constraints, 
social capital is found in stratified forms in the habitual practices of developing states which 
do not satisfy the needs for constructed rules of international field. The habitus of a 
developing state restricts its relational understanding of political identity because habitus 
produces dispositions which depend on the structurally limited embodiment of networking. In 
other words, under the limited networking, the objective experiences of subjects harmonize 
the conditions of existence, which unconsciously impose identical ways of expression for 
identification (Bourdieu, 1990b).  
The aim of this part is to find out the potential Bourdieusian contribution of political 
subjectivity and its identity in relation to social capital in international relations by way of the 
developing state concept. The first contribution here is to focus on objective/subjective 
structures and social capital engagement with regards to the reproduction of the concept of the 
developing state. Basically, the concept of developing states is fundamentally based on a 
reproduction of the historical developmental perception as the core phenomenon of the social 
capital and state identity interrelation. The distinction between the objective and subjective 
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structures of the developing state allow the reproduction of social capital as possession of a 
predisposed position in the field, which impairs the networking of its relative political 
identities. The perspectives of development are seen as a problem related to the objective 
structures of state identity, but if there is a correlative link between the positioning of political 
state identity and social capital it will be irrelevant to separate the objective and subjective 
structures in the conceptualization of the developing state. Therefore, in accordance with 
Bourdieusian study, social capital proves that the conceptual approaches of state subjectivity 
cannot be popularized within the economic and institutional discussions and definitions of 
objective structures in the international field.  
The positioning of political identity of the developing state is oversimplified by 
objective institutional accountable means of economy via industrialization data and produced 
GDP of developing states. Development is standardized by dominant dispositions of growth, 
and it is influenced into the positioning of developing states by domination in the international 
field. The fundamental basis in the concept of developing state is the idea of ‘standardized 
development’,32 intrinsically stratified and linked to control of the reproduction of political 
identities. Objective inquiries and the institutions of development function as doxa which 
imposes an obligatory schema to get involved in recognition in the international field. The 
standardization of development in practice consolidates the total control of the reproduction 
of an institutionalized political identity. The developmental concept of modern state identity is 
the deliberately objectified phenomenon of domination in the international field, which, while 
not unique to the contemporary stage of historical social accumulation, hushes up subjective 
stratification with respect to the ownership of social capital. In this way, social capital 
provides the institutionalization of distinction in the dispositions of a state regarding its 
position in the field, which reproduces the consciousness of standards regarding 
institutionalized developmental actions in the objective structural space of the international 
field.  
The conceptualization of the developing state relies on phenomenological dispositions 
of subjective structures, which reproduce social capital before state produces objective actions 
with regards to economics and politics. Although developing states refer in practice to a 
structuring objectivity, originally it was bound to a structured distribution of subjective capital 
                                               
32
 For a developmental agenda which is mostly contributed by IMF and World Bank perspectives, see 
Kingsbury (2012). 
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in the positioning of the developing state. Development is more structured in that stratified 
domination of the international field is represented as a structuring target which the state can 
reach in accordance with their success in objective economic and politic relations. However, 
economic wealth apparently does not graduate a developing state to a more developed 
position. Development requires a considerable amount of social networking, which helps a 
state to get involved in the required amount of objective institutional field of practices. In this 
respect, ‘developing’ means an inability to produce enough networking because of the lack of 
social capital. In order to understand the categorization of developing state identity, it makes 
better sense to look at who is bordering whom, rather than the economic wealth of individual 
states. The economic objective conditions of states do not compulsorily distinguish state 
identity and the concept of the developing state. In many cases, visa conditionality between 
the states makes meaningful sense to understand state positioning with regards to 
development, because states that have more social capital achieve an easier freedom of 
movement for its citizens.  
Potential improvements in the political and economic capital of developing states do 
not change their developing positions because indigenous styles of networking differ from the 
expectations of the international field. This means that developing states indigenously lack the 
means to pursue a successful process of collecting social capital in field. The networking 
capacity of social capital, which creates distinction in the mobilization of other agents in the 
same field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), can only be successful for dominant states of 
international relations, because social capital can only comprehensively institutionalize into 
the identity of distinctive identities as a durable potential power (Bourdieu, 1986). In this way, 
social capital, as production process of developed states within their borders, maintains a 
compatible transition of its characteristics from internal indigenous networking styles to the 
international accumulation of social capital. Thus, the indigenous associational life of a 
developed state within its border and the networking styles of the international field are 
derived from similar social capital accumulation processes. In this way, developed states 
indigenously do not confront any difficulties when they try to increase social capital in the 
international field. Because of indigenous associational practices regarding social capital, 
developed states easily transfer their dispositions, characteristics and experiences into the 
international field. On the other hand, the embodied dispositions of developing states produce 
a practical consciousness which can only produce social capital in accordance with their 
indigenous associational lives. The concept of the developing state subjectively imposes the 
roles of external structures in subjective state habitus by placing development under the 
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control of social capital before developing states produce meanings in relations to others. 
Associational life within developing state borders does not cover the expected social capital 
accumulation in the international field. These expectations are fundamentally autonomous 
from improvements in other forms of capital. The Chinese status of developing character 
highlights this autonomy, which proves the compatibility between the indigenous 
accumulation of social capital within borders and the accumulation of social capital in the 
international field. Despite a great development of economic capital in the international field, 
China is still deprived of producing the required social capital, because its indigenous 
associational life is still distinct from what networking styles demand in the international 
field. Consequently, the Chinese cannot transform their economic development into a 
meaningful power of social capital in the international field.  
As Bourdieu emphasized, social capital is an actual and credential resource which 
improves the qualification of actors when they develop their relative economic, political and 
cultural capital allocation (Lin, 2001). As a credential value, social capital not only functions 
as a stock of power, but also transfers the unequal distribution of material and non-material 
resources in the field. Because of social capital, certain behaviours of certain actors in the 
same field are seen rational and non-objectionable even though similar behaviours may be 
seen as uncreditable and irrational for other actors that have relatively less social capital. In 
the same way, with a Bourdieusian emphasis, the field of international relations exercises this 
credential feature of social capital in the routine practices of states. In practice, being a 
developing state also emphasizes that the position of the state is less secure than the states that 
have a better position in the domination. The positional insecurity of developing states is also 
seen as a potential threat by developed states in the international arena. Because of the 
credential social accumulation, no state in the same social space thinks that a developed state 
can be a resource of insecurity, thread or instability. In other words, constituted social 
networks and their credential dispositions rule out any ideation which implies the potential for 
a developed state to be a reason for threat and violence. The credential feature of social capital 
consolidates the social functionalization of developing and developed states. It assigns the 
developed state to protect security in the international field. It simultaneously compels 
developing states to think that insecurity is assigned to their identities and developed states 
have the right to be in charge of reinstating security in the name of developing states. In this 
respect, the demand for military bases is seen as natural expectation of a developed state 
within developing state borders, but, on the other hand, any similar demand from a developing 
state within the border of developed states is unthinkable. The credential feature of social 
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capital not only brings potential social networks for developed states in order to get involved 
in different actions, but also highlights the incapacity of developing states with regards to the 
embodiment of a better capital allocation. By engaging credential functionalization, social 
capital regularizes the unequal distribution of political and economic capital via the 
reinforcing functionalization of recognition for the dominant position of developed states. 
The credential feature of social capital creates further questions regarding why a 
developing state plays a part in a field which describes it in a relatively unequal way. Here it 
is logical to refer to Bourdieusian study on social class and its unequal stratification (Swartz, 
1997). The state is mostly evaluated as a social actor beyond its political rationalization and 
functionalization. State identity fundamentally tries to realize the social expectation of a less 
homogenous group of people in the international field. Therefore, state rationality mostly 
depends on a social logic which behaves in accordance with the functionalization of societal 
grouping. Social grouping takes form in the existence of unequal positioning and 
stratification, which are determined by the existence of a valid and accepted dominant core in 
the social system (Bourdieu, 1984). In the international field, states as social actors value their 
identity relatively in accordance with distinctive positions of domination. The existence of 
domination values every individual member of the field via a standardization of recognition 
and position in the field. As a social actor, states want to gain a recognized position before 
anything else. This recognized position is derived from the state’s practical sense regarding its 
identity in the objective field. Within its state border, society distributes positions unequally in 
line with a loyalty to a founded historical domination and its ruling practices. In this way, a 
state does not feel out of place when it becomes part of an unequal international system under 
the loyalty of domination. In this aspect, having a recognized identity has more primacy than 
having an equal position in the international field. Having a recognized position in the 
international field enounces the state’s practical logic regarding its political identity. Thus, 
developing states do not discuss why their identities are determined by an unequal definition 
of positions. In this way, the concept of developing states simultaneously defines a 
standardized recognition of dominated identities and stabilizes/regularizes positional stability 
and the superiority of a dominant position for developed states. Even though developed and 
developing states have a different unequal social stratification, ranging from primitive to 
modern, basically, all unequal structures of society are derived from a sum of nobility 
practices determined by dominance. In the international field, the domination of developed 
states, therefore, subjectively imposes its nobility practices, which defines the borders 
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between developed and developing via defining the understanding of development at a certain 
historical stage.  
Due to the structured unequal stratification embedded in the normative objectives of 
social capital (Christoforou & Davis, 2014) beyond material inequalities, states rest in 
restricted networks in accordance with their accumulated social capital, which is distributed 
by their capacity in the control of the assets of international law. Social capital interprets the 
positional distribution of state identities, which defines how much the state can benefit from 
the rules of structured international law. In this sense, the concept of the developing state is a 
misrecognized consensus that the developing state approves its disadvantaged use of 
structural nobility/international law in return for having a recognized position under the rule 
of international domination. The economic and political capital of a state determines the 
state’s potential to have a position in international relations, but only social capital shows how 
well a state can put into action that potential. In other words, accumulated social capital 
conceives of a qualification of the dominant state on the actualization of international law in 
the international field. Consequently, in the international field, the advancement of economic 
capital does not always interpret states’ positions in international stratification of domination. 
Despite a considerable improvement in economic capital, a state can be defined as developing 
country in line with its relative accumulation of social capital. Therefore, it is not easy to 
reposition a state in the structured interpretation of the international field, because, in practice, 
all inclusions and exclusions of state identity in the international field are structured by the 
ownership of social capital. As is monitored in the construction and expansion of European 
identity, to claim that a certain state does not have European identity means, in practice, that 
the state is still developing its social capital in order to have a considerable engagement with 
international structured law. In other words, the state cannot respond to similar issues or 
exercise the international nobility of democracy or human rights in accordance with the 
practices of stratified domination. 
Despite the structured domination of stratification in the international field, a 
Bourdieusian emphasis on the structuring feature of the objective field, social capital, also 
instigates mechanisms which facilitate the transformation of structured values and institutions 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Certainly, dominant states of the international field try to 
reproduce their nobility by means of securitizing the distinction between developed and 
developing in an unequal stratification of a wider international field. However, 
simultaneously, the structuring international field provides considerable opportunities for 
developing identities of states to accumulate social capital beyond economic capital and to 
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transform values and institution beyond a structured understanding of international law. In 
this way, even the dominant identity of international field maintains an understanding of the 
symbolic values of social capital and recognizable networking styles of the field; developing 
state identities form new styles of symbolic exchange and networking which are in conflict 
with standardized ways of international domination and the formation of political identity.  
An actualization of this change has been done through the process of the European 
Union project. The EU project has considerably changed the structured distinction between 
domination and developing in the understanding of international field. The project blurs the 
understanding of what is developed and what is developing in the objective world. It 
fundamentally changes the symbolic values of being associated beyond the structured form of 
association in international law. New associational improvements of state identity trivialize 
the prominent position of economic capital. In this way, the differentiation between 
developing and developed within the new political network trivializes because the developing 
states obtain an opportunity to compete with the developed state within the same position of 
the international field. In other words, developing states take advantage of positions in 
developed states’ domination without having the characteristics of their new positions. This 
enhances their chance to improve their social capital accumulation and to extend their 
networking capacities. Another aspect of this change in state political identity originates from 
social capital and the constructed nobility relations which institutionalize a particular 
networking (Bourdieu, 1986). The new understanding of nobility arises from how European 
identity should be perceived. In particular, an ideology-driven differentiation between the 
developed and developing political identities of states have been rendered obsolete in the 
structuring international field. The networking on new European identity has proved that the 
social capital of states changes their perspectives on ideology. The new networking is derived 
from a value-specific understanding of political identity beyond ideology and economic 
growth. The position of European identity is filled by those states who can have a 
dispositional reflex to answer the international exchanges via certain values which are 
esteemed by the dominants of the union identity. Therefore, a developed position in the field 
is shared by developing states who have the potential to answer international law by way of 
certain values beyond their economic qualification and ideological competence.  
Ultimately, to prove the potential of social capital for the transformation of the 
political identity of state, an exchange system between the developed and developing states 
and its symbolic construction in the international field should be considered. Similar to the 
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other exchange system between dominant and dominated identities in other social groups,33 in 
order to have a recognized position in the international field states take part in a structured 
exchange system in international relations. Because of the structured nobility of domination, 
the symbolic dispositions of states embody the values of symbolic capital in accordance with 
the structured rules of domination and its international law. However, the structuring feature 
of social capital reveals to us that the exchange system of the international field can be subject 
to change and transformation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this transformation of the 
exchange system become visible. In a nutshell, the embodiment of the distinction between 
dominated and dominant evolved from the First/Second/Third World to the developing and 
developed differentiation. In their new positions, developing states re-conceptualize their 
symbolic dispositions on security and recognition. Formerly, giving military bases to 
dominant political states within the borders of dominated states was seen as a natural 
exchange system in exchange for security. In fact, domination symbolically produced its 
distinction and securitization in this way. In practice, these kinds of actions were seen as 
presents to show the affiliations of states with a certain security understanding within the 
international field. The new distinction of developing states transforms this exchange system 
considerably. The US military invasion in Iraq exercised one of the practical arenas for this 
change. Although Turkey was one of the prominent actors in these sorts of exchange systems, 
Turkey did not authorize the use of its territory for the military invasion of Iraq. The new 
networking system of the developing–developed distinction and its dispositional changes in 
social capital guided Turkey to produce new dispositions for the understanding of security in 
the international field. In this way, Turkey took advantage of international law’s rule of the 
inviolability of state borders as a reference which is originally a tool of the dominant nobility 
in the international field. As a result of this, transforming the understanding of the exchange 
system evolves the functionality of the structured doxa of international law between 
developing and developed states.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to think through how it is possible to have a Bourdieusian approach 
of the state’s political identity in international relations. Drawing on the sociological tools of 
Pierre Bourdieu, it has developed a concept of structural constructivism which aims at 
bringing the intertwined coexistence of structural and ideational productions into the social 
bodies of political organizations. The political identity of the state is a collective living social 
entity which is produced, reproduced and transformed by an inseparable structural 
embodiment into self-produced knowledge, ideas and dispositions. ‘State’ here indicates a 
political agency in the field of the political sphere which, similar to the individuals within a 
society, forms an identity in relation to others. In this respect, the political identities of agents 
cannot be considered separately from the embedded structures which unconsciously influence 
the dispositions of political agency in international relations. As a result, structural 
constructivism in international relations not only considers state identity in accordance with 
conscious productions of knowledge in the international field, but also highlights how 
different agents have different limitations with regards to embedded structures, which results 
in a differentiation of tendencies in objective political exchanges.  
Structural constructivism is based on a spatial or ‘field-centred’ explanation 
(Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, the theoretical implications of structural constructivism depend 
on a foundation of structural realities. However, these structural realities are not independent 
from embedded forms of tendencies which form the qualifications of states regarding the 
production of ideation and identity. In this way, structural constructivism not only improves 
the interpretive engagements of constructivist international relations, but also avoids the 
ontological structural dichotomies of materialist and rational international relations. It is 
important to remember here that structural constructivism emphasizes a distinctive style of 
structure and identity engagements in international relations. Thus, in line with Bourdieu, we 
 suggest in this thesis that in order to produce a relevant understanding of the agency 
and identity problem in international relations, it is necessary to improve a new structure 
perspective independent from any kind of ontological theorization. By way of the sociological 
implications of Bourdieu, this thesis implies that we should avoid the inseparable 
understanding of structure in international relations. It offers to consider the separation 
between structured structures from structuring structures, which helps us to understand how 
agency and identity relations differ within the objective field of practices. The thesis 
emphasizes that materialist rationalist theories and ideational constructivist theories of 
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international relations actually focus on different structures, which results in an imperfect 
understanding of identity and agency relations. If one understands the distinguishing effects in 
the intertwined relations of structuring structures and structured relations, one can have the 
opportunity to explain the political construction of state subjectivity without any ontological 
postulate. As a result of this, the research aimed at showing the productivity of structured and 
structuring structure perspectives within the field of international relations.  
The theorization of structures on the distinctive bases of structuring and structured 
structures helped me to reinterpret the key elements of identity, such as norms, recognitions 
and classifications. This means that a Bourdieusian structure understanding in international 
relations also problematizes the fundamental theoretical implications of constructivist 
perspectives. I illustrated that the claim to moral and normative integration on shared norms 
(Reus-Smit, 1999) is disposed towards an ontological explanation of rational understanding, 
because it only evaluates what is found in structuring structures and its available spatial vision 
and division. However, the political identity of state agency not only reflects the values of 
interactive socio-spatial productions, but also embodies the historical accumulative social 
productions found in the unconscious tendencies of states. Morality and normativity are based 
on the structured effects of history as much as social interactions and exchanges (Bourdieu, 
2012; Bourdieu, 2013). To reckon upon interactions should have resulted in the equal 
positional distribution of identities in international relations. However, the identities of 
political agents are always parts of a distinguishing vision and division (Bourdieu, 1984). 
These divisional differences are not subject to the interactive processes of agencies. Indeed, a 
Bourdieusian structure understanding showed that the tendencies of structured structures form 
and affect the characteristics of vision and division in identities. The embedded unconscious 
tendencies of agents define the quality of structuring structure and agent engagements, which 
produce and reproduce values of vision and division. In this respect, beyond the conscious 
interactions of states, the structured limitations of history constitute limitations of states which 
define states’ qualities of interpretation with regards to their own identity. Therefore, 
interactions between the states always produce and reproduce norms which affect the 
characteristics of recognitions. However, limited interpretation quality between states results 
in division within the distinctive positions, although states participate in the structuring 
process of produced norms. Owing to structured structures, states unconsciously produce 
disadvantaged positions for themselves, and also allow an advantaged vision and division for 
the positions of other states within the same political spatiality of international relations.  
 198
It is clear in this research that I considered identity as the objectified forms of 
dispositions which depend on an embodiment of accumulated historical structures (Bourdieu, 
1990b). Thus, interest and interaction relations do not comprehensively explain state identity. 
The interactive processes of states are not independent from the unconscious pressure of 
historical structures. As a result, the interests of states not only indicate mutual exchange 
processes but also produce the unconscious embedded limits of states. In this respect, I have 
also developed the consideration of identity as a symbolic power which does not rely on the 
interests of states because the interests of states mostly explain the positional distribution of 
states; identity indicates how well states embody different forms of capital. Interests do not 
indicate states’ identities but identity defines states’ positions, which determine the limits and 
characteristics of the interests. Consequently, identity as a symbolic power constructs vision 
and division, which distinguish identities with regards to domination. Symbolic power in the 
characteristics of identity continually produces and reproduces symbolic violence, which 
distributes recognition between the political subjects. Symbolic violence is reproduced by 
way of orienting the unconscious dispositions and then imposing an embedded division of 
domination. Such a production process, I have argued, is necessary to objectify the 
hierarchical distribution of positions in international relations. I have also argued that 
subjects/states as the producers of their own identities never obtain identical structural 
tendencies and, therefore, the dispositions of states represent a symbolic vision and division of 
domination. In this way, because the distinctive embodiment of dispositions defines the 
positional distribution of state identity, which indicates the relative independence and 
dependence of states from the structuring symbolic violence of the international field. 
In line with constructivism, the interactions of states should be seen as a productive 
force of common practices and norms in the field of states. However, the subjective capital of 
states distinguishes the interpretive qualifications of states. In this way, my approach 
identified the functionalization of identity as symbolic power. I have argued that, while 
political identity functions as the legitimization of embedded domination for some states, it 
represents the embodiment of symbolic violence for other states within the same international 
field. I have argued that historical changes in political subjects and their characteristics of 
structure–agency relations do not transform this functionalization of symbolic violence. I have 
shown that interactions between political identities always objectify a distinctive form of 
recognition which legitimizes particular forms of symbolic violence between all of the 
subjects in the field. Consequently, the sovereignty of modern states represents a sort of 
legitimization which creates a certain vision of division and its symbolic violence of 
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domination. Therefore, identity may be subject to change but, due to the unequal distribution 
of structured structures in the identity of political subjectivity, interrelations between 
domination, legitimate symbolic power and violence will be continually reproduced in 
different characteristics and forms.  
I have shown how the Bourdieusian understanding of field must adapt to contribute to 
structure and state relations. Whilst my fundamental aim in this research is to transfer a 
Bourdieusian structural constructivist approach into the field of international relations, I have 
also considered that this approach will not achieve a counter-concept to the existing literature; 
rather, it will contribute inadequate applications of identity and structure relations in the 
constructivist understanding. In this way, I utilize a Bourdieusian understanding of field in 
order to show that international relations is a sphere which consists of many different fields of 
struggle. These different fields of struggle are distributed in accordance with the accumulated 
amount of dispositions in accumulated historical social structure (Bourdieu, 1986). The 
amount of compatibility/incompatibility between accumulated history and structuring 
objective field indicates which positions political subjects take within the sphere of 
international relations. By utilizing Bourdieu’s field approach, developed in this research 
alongside the state ‘capital’ concept of Bourdieu in relation to the political identities of states, 
I also illustrated how ‘field’ defines the relative categorization of state identity. In doing this, 
my objective was to contribute a construction of power relations in accordance with the 
characteristics of classification in different fields of struggle. 
In relation to Bourdieu’s field concept, I have discussed the similarities in field and 
agency relations between pre-modern political subjectivity and modern state identity. I have 
argued that the differentiation in political organization and subject does not change the 
fundamental fields of struggles, but as the sphere of international relations expand, the 
quantity and quality regarding relations and subjects enhance. Therefore, struggles in 
political, economic, social and cultural fields exist in every agency–structure relation 
regardless of the historical term of political engagement (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). In 
addition to this, I have also considered that distinctive subjectivity and its political field in 
history always produce a different form of nobility which constitutes relevant power relations, 
classification and domination within the international field. Consequently, I focused on the 
functionality of nobility with regards to the reproduction of political identity. Indeed, nobility 
composes forms of norm and recognition which define all organized principles regarding the 
divisionary function of political identity. In this way, modern state identity is constructed on a 
distinctive form of nobility which consists of a distinctive sovereign space and its divisionary 
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norms. However, I also discussed that produced nobility does not signify all members of 
states, because of the gap between their available dispositions and expected values of 
produced nobility. Therefore, the nobility of international relations results in obedience to 
symbolic domination and the classification of state identities. As a result of this, in the 
international field the identities of states are distributed by the symbolic violence of 
structuring nobility before they produce their interpretive interests and mutual relations. 
In order to develop the conceptual framework utilized in this research, I also 
problematized the understanding of reality in international relations via Bourdieusian 
sociological understanding (Bourdieu, 1995a). Because of the dispositional inequality 
between the states, states’ identities are linked to different positions in the field of practice. I 
argued that dispositional differences are contributed by different rules of the game as social 
realities which function as sources for political constraints or the symbolic violence of state 
identities in accordance with their positioning in the dominated–dominant relations of the 
field. On this point, I meant that, contrary to realist and rationalist approaches, the positioning 
of states in the international field is independent from the structural deterministic rules, but, 
due to the differentiated compatibility of states regarding structured nobility, realities in 
international relations are reproduced by dispositional constraints which are derived from the 
unequal foundation of structured structures within the dispositions of different state identities. 
Furthermore, I emphasized that these dispositional constraints always exist under the 
exchange system of a patriarchal balance. A patriarchal system of balance is distinctively 
reproduced in every historical system of political organization because this system defines the 
realities that indicate how political subjects exchange knowledge in accordance with their 
determined positioning and its limited engagement of nobility. In other words, the 
reproduction of patriarchal systems in different forms defines the expected behaviour schemes 
of different positioned subjects within dominant–dominated relations from primitive 
communities to the modern state system. 
In addition to Bourdieu’s field and reality understanding, I also utilized the 
Bourdieusian understanding of habitus within the field of international relations. I argued that 
habitus is the way to create a mediator role between the objective and subjective structures of 
political agents. In line with the Bourdieusian concept of habitus, the objective–subjective 
duality of international relations is rendered meaningless because habitus helps us to prove the 
unconscious mutually existing and transitive characteristics of objective and subjective 
structures. I also showed that there are ‘realities’ in the field which are not real but which 
become common sense for all of the members of states. This understanding is derived from 
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the perception of doxa in Bourdieusian study. Due to these doxic relations with structures, the 
embodied habitus of political subjects/states produces a compatible knowledge of structures 
which does not question the classified divisionary and unequal positioning in the international 
field (Bourdieu, 1995a). By utilizing habitus to refer to the compatibility of state identity and 
existing doxa of structure, this research also argued that structural domination imposes 
deterministic characteristics onto the identities of all member states of the international field. 
In line with this, I described that doxa also provides domination of the symbolic value of 
language of which all members of states take advantage when they express their conscious 
interests and actions. As a result of this, Bourdieusian doxa and habitus relations develop a 
constructivist understanding of norms, because it indicates the unconscious foundation of the 
political ‘feel for the game’ beyond a conscious foundation of normative rules in the 
international field.  
  
Theoretical implications 
The objective of the thesis was to research a Bourdieusian understanding of international 
relations, to understand the concept of state identity and to test the applicability of a structural 
constructivist perspective beyond the existing constructivist approaches, with specific 
emphasis on a Bourdieusian concept of capital in a different conceptual framework and 
exemplification. After I introduced all of the theoretical terminology and illustration in 
Chapter 2, I engaged different fields of capital, from political and economic to cultural and 
social capital, in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively. In order to objectify 
and exemplify the theoretical foundation of research, I utilized a different methodological 
concept in each chapter between the third and the sixth. After I introduced the framework of 
existing research and concepts with regards to the concept of state identity, I then researched 
all of the available Bourdieusian sociological terminology in order to find out the relevant 
conceptual means of Bourdieu on the field of international relations. The fundamental target 
was to find out middle and mediator ways between rationalist and constructivist perspectives 
in order to understand the political subjectivity/state and its identity beyond both interpretive 
and deterministic explanations of the existing approaches of international relations. Therefore, 
I reviewed all of the theoretical materials of Bourdieu in the second chapter. Contrary to the 
common tendency in Bourdieusian literature reviews, which generally evaluates that 
Bourdieu’s approaches are relevant to explain reproduction because they do not provide 
appropriate answers to how changes come into existence, I have discussed that Bourdieusian 
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study also consists of relevant theoretical knowledge to identify changes in the concept of 
political identity. In line with this, I focused on a study of change in political subjectivity. 
In Chapter 2, after I rethought the understanding of structure in order to focus on 
Bourdieusian terminology in line with structure and disposition relations. I identified the 
distinction of Bourdieu regarding subject–structure relations. In addition to this, I focused on 
how Bourdieu dealt with the objectivity–subjectivity dichotomy in international relations. I 
then discussed identity as a symbolic value. State identity, as created by the symbolic values 
of habitus, plays a significant role in constructing interests, visions and divisions. Moreover, I 
have discussed the understanding of changes in state identity. I focused on the functionality of 
Bourdieusian ‘capital’ for the reinterpretation of changes in political subjects and their 
identities. I have proved that the forms on which political recognition constructed compromise 
a number of unconscious symbolic values which objectify a certain combination and amount 
of capital allocation as the legitimate interests in order to have recognized positions within the 
political field. These forms play a constitutive role in the foundation of coercive institutional 
realities, because the distinction between the capital allocation of political identities and 
structured realities results in a division of identities in accordance with a constructed 
domination. In this way, I argued that, in line with accumulated history, how the identity of 
political subjectivity transformed into the modern state form and its state identity. I theorized 
that the modern state identity relies on changes in the embodied capital allocations of political 
subjects which transform the form and distribution of structural organizations, interests and 
divisions. In line with the transformation in the vision of political subjects, modernity created 
a new harmony of justification which renders symbolic violence and the divisionary 
positioning of structure invisible. Therefore, owing to changes in familiarized and structured 
capital allocation, modern state identity and positional distribution are embodied by states 
which have achieved a recognized positioning in a new definition of the political field called 
international relations. I have tried to show some historical proofs that, for example, religion 
took an important place in the capital allocation of the medieval feudal king’s political 
identity, but it then lost it place in the capital allocation of modern state identity.  
I have also tried to discuss the potential transformations of state identity beyond the 
international field of modernity. I have argued that the contemporary structuring field is 
experiencing a changing interpretation of capital allocation which depends on a distinctive 
style of political recognition and legitimization. When the new allocation of political 
subjectivity and its identity influenced the structuring structures, it firstly tried to render 
political identities, divisions and institutionalizations of modern states non-functional and 
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inoperable. The changing capital allocation of the modern political field is creating new forms 
of governance which objects to classical modern state subjectivity and its identity, 
institutionalization and classification of international relations. In this respect, I have argued 
that changing capital allocation contributes to the construction of socially collective identities, 
such as the EU, which represents a distinctive capital allocation in a distinctive classification 
and its field of practice. Indeed, I hypothesized that political identity in a globalizing world is 
creating a new form of nobility which constitutes a distinctive legitimacy beyond the 
sovereignty of modern state identity. This nobility of the globalizing world functions as forms 
of symbolic violence or domination in accordance with a new political vision and division in 
the international field of practice. I asserted that the new capital allocation of the post-
structural world contributes to a new harmonization of discursive doxic realities and 
dispositions of state identity beyond any constructive knowledgeable consciousness of states. 
Consequently, I also emphasized that this process renders the justification and legitimacy 
forms of modern state identity obsolete in a new supranational – as well as micro-localized – 
field of struggles.  
In Chapter 2, I also discussed the habitus and field approaches of Bourdieu in order to 
reconsider offering the theoretical framework of the research. The target was to find out the 
unconscious existences of structural and constructive elements in the formation and change of 
state identity. I highlighted that the habitus and field approaches of the Bourdieusian concept 
contribute to an unconscious transitivity between the dispositions of states and structuring 
norms of international relations. By reviewing the Bourdieusian approaches, the most 
fundamental and distinguishing basis of the research beyond constructivist understanding was 
to see the states as social entities, consisting of organized social groups, which have their own 
habitus, dispositions and capital allocations similar to other social entities within the social 
spaces. This proved that states, as the modern objects of political subjectivity, can form their 
own sense of limits, sense of reality and unconscious misrecognition, which produce their 
positioning before they practise their capital allocation within the power relations of 
domination in the structuring field. I have argued that the structured characteristics of limits 
are found in states’ own habitus; they are unconsciously externalized throughout field and 
habitus relations in structuring international relations. In this way, I tried to emphasize the 
similarities of a patriarchal system of exchanges within primitive family–clan political 
subjectivity and the modern political subjectivity of the state. While constructivist identity 
consideration in international relation focuses on the consciousness of subjects and norms, the 
Bourdieusian study of the habitus field relations provides a theoretical expansion for us to 
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understand state identity and the existence of power relations as in some way the genealogy of 
states’ own unconsciousness of self-limitation.  
After the theoretical framework, I focused on the descriptive chapters of research in 
order to examine the applicability of Bourdieusian terminology and structural constructivism 
in the practical field of international relations. The first important conclusion derived from the 
descriptive chapters is the functionality and characteristics of the bureaucratic field, as the 
bearer of political capital. Here I fundamentally discussed that political capital frames 
collective beliefs regarding the classification of states via rituals and organized forms of 
norms. In this respect, when states are involved in practical struggles, they do not question the 
classified characteristics of structure because collective beliefs have already formed the 
realities of the objective world as ethical principles of exchanges. The existences of political 
subjects and their particular identities in a defined political field means that certain interests of 
domination are successfully represented as the interests and values of all subjects, because 
this particularity accomplishes the normalization and legitimacy of unequal classified forms in 
the identities of every member subject. Therefore, I inferred that power in international 
relations is not constituted by the conscious interests of states because interests are forms of 
the habitual tendencies of state capacities regarding the objectification capacity of 
legitimization in political capital. These particularities are continuously reproduced by 
political subjects and identities at every stage of history, because, as a result of a lack of self-
reflexivity, every kind of political agency, from family and clan to the modern state, is 
incapable of producing conscious knowledge regarding positions and classifications. In 
accordance with this, I discussed how the genetics of modern international laws prove this 
lack of self-reflexivity in state identities. I also researched that the universalization of 
particularity requires well-defined political dispositions which need to have an organizational 
basis in the international field. In line with Bourdieu, I indicated the functions of the 
bureaucratic field as producers and bearers of political dispositions in international relations. 
All of these Bourdieusian descriptive tools helped me to improve a methodological concept of 
political capital by the way of the globalization discussions. Beyond the existing reading of 
globalization, particularly in constructivist international relations, I evaluated current 
globalization as a new form of symbolic violence which serves for a distinctive political 
identification, subjectivity and bureaucratic field beyond modern state identity. The most 
visible peculiarity of this new bureaucratic field is based on its capital allocation, which relies 
on economic capital contrary to the prominent roles of ideological and cultural capital in the 
capital allocation of modern state identity. As a result of this, I also reach a conclusion that the 
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changing bureaucratic field impairs doxic normative constitutions of the modern international 
field. 
Another important conclusion derived from research on economic capital proved that 
Bourdieusian political economy in international relations contributes to the existing 
constructivist international political economy. By considering Bourdieusian political 
economy, I discussed that economic capital not only contributes to economic interactions 
between states, but also relies on the structured structures which represent divisions of state 
positions. In this respect, by occupying a certain positioning in the international field, states 
objectify their dispositional tendencies of economic capital before they produce their 
conscious interactions. Therefore, I argued that the economic interests of states originate from 
the dispositional and unconscious ideations which represent states’ positioning in the 
international field. As a result of this, I also questioned whether the constructivist 
understanding of norms is unable to express the economic interests of states because the 
economic capital of states is fundamentally derived from taken-for-granted knowledge 
represented by the doxic realities of the international economic field. These doxic realities 
form the economic interests of states before they produce interactions in the international 
field. In this way, I inferred that the cultural capital of states also have central roles in 
producing meaningful economic interests because states in the same international field are 
involved in the same taken-for-granted reflexes of economics, but only few states’ cultural 
capital support compatible nobility. Indeed, states interact in capitalist forms of practices but 
the cultural language of capitalism is unequally found in the identities of states. In line with 
these discussions, moreover, I indicated how contemporary neoliberal economy impairs the 
sense of limits of modern state-based economic capital. Through a Bourdieusian lens, I 
basically examined that the neoliberal economy imagines a distinctive economic field and 
doxic realities, which aim to quash all collective bases and institutions of modern state 
identities. I also discussed that neoliberalism produces its vision and division via the new 
forms of symbolic violence which de-function the economic field of modernity.  
The other two important components of state identity in this research were cultural and 
social capital, which examined via the methodological concepts of democratization and the 
developing state respectively. In line with the Bourdieusian framework, I discussed that the 
limits and borders of state identity depend on cultural capital. Cultural capital is embedded in 
the pre-reflexive strategies of states, which contribute to the hierarchy of values. These pre-
reflexive strategies of states are called habitus, which produces inequality in the self-
reflexivity of identity. In this way, cultural capital actually represents struggles on the 
 206
legitimate interpretations of identity and its institutionalization (Swartz, 1998). At this point, I 
questioned the representation of morality in constructivist ideas, because I examined that 
morality mostly functions as the superiority of a state or states regarding the universalization 
of its particular cultural capital. Indeed, when all states define their identity by way of the 
same sovereignty understanding, they unconsciously embody certain states’ supremacy of 
cultural capital because they have to interpret their identity via certain cultural values which 
have already been accomplished by the dominant states. Therefore, the reproduction of state 
identity is always embedded in dominated–dominant relations which misrecognize 
inequalities in cultural capital as the morality of the international field. Thus, I also examined 
the role of cultural capital with regards to the reproduction and change of structured hierarchy. 
Afterwards, I discussed Bourdieusian forms of cultural capital, which helped me to 
understand how these forms are found in the field of international relations. In order to 
understand these forms of cultural capital, I took advantage of the contemporary 
democratization understanding as a methodological concept which differently functions as 
cultural capital for domination and symbolic violence for dominated state identities. In 
addition to this, I also argued that, similar to individuals in societies, states distinguish their 
identity in accordance with produced social networking and relations. Indeed, I averred that 
state identities struggle to produce better social capital allocations in the field of international 
relations. Because of a lack of networking, social capital imposes an unequal distribution of 
subjective mater ials, which results in a stratification of the states. Social capital imposes 
certain networking styles which contributes to domination (Bourdieu, 1986). Here I argued 
that, when institutionalization was based on nationalism, certain European states constructed 
better social networking because they had already embodied legitimate justifiable bases of 
nationalistic values in comparison with other states. In this way, I inferred that social capital 
interprets the nobility of certain states as the legitimate networking styles of the international 
field. I tried to exemplify these functions of social capital via a methodological concept of the 
Third World state because the Third World concept indicates a categorization and positioning 
of states in accordance with their superiority/inadequacy in the networking of social capital.  
 
Findings of the research 
The main lesson derived from this research is to see that Bourdieu in international relations 
impairs objectivity and subjectivity duality. By way of Bourdieu, it is possible to overcome 
objective–subjective duality without involvement in any ontological consideration of state 
subjectivity and identity. In particular, differentiating between structuring and structuring 
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structures is a very productive theoretical expansion to find out the intertwined coexistence in 
the process of identity production. Relying on a pure understanding of ideas and knowledge 
with regards to the identity of states in international relations results in focusing on the 
ongoing objective structures of the international field, and, therefore, this impairs the 
predetermined functionalities of structured structures on the productions of states’ interests 
and identities. Here Bourdieu distinctively shows us how to see the unconscious, unequal and 
classified foundation of states’ structuring relations. In practice, the interactions of states are 
essential to produce conscious interests and identities, but states do not have the same capital 
allocation to form the same successful and equal participation in the process of interest and 
identity productions. States have unconscious and structured forms of dispositions which 
create symbolic political categorization and positioning before they interact each other. By 
way of Bourdieu, I inferred that it is true that the meaning of ideas and identities is derived 
from the interactions of states, but, because of the unconscious and unequal distribution of 
dispositions derived from structured structures, states embody a limited amount of capital 
allocation which restrains the state from participating equally in the production of meaning.  
In addition to the finding above, this research improved a Bourdieusian perspective 
which resolves the ontological fallacy and dilemma in the constructivist perspective. In line 
with rationalist international relations perspectives, constructivism similarly defines the 
international field by way of anarchy, despite that fact that its understanding of anarchy is not 
based on a pure materialistic understanding. I found that the Bourdieusian understanding of 
field and habitus perspectives are very productive to come off this constructivist dilemma. On 
this point, I justified that the international field is not an anarchical sphere in both cultural and 
objective senses. States, as modern political subjects, are conscious about what they observed 
in structuring structures, but they are unconscious about their dispositional habitus, which 
promotes their positioning in interactions of field. In this respect, if a state lacks the 
appropriate capital allocation of habitus derived from an unconscious embodiment of 
structured structures, the structuring world of interactions produces inconvenience of 
practices, as like a ‘social and political anomia’, and, therefore, the structuring world becomes 
symbolic violence for this state. Consequently, I discussed that the inconvenience of states is 
derived from habitual limits and constraints of structured structure before they produce a 
meaning of anarchy in interactions. In this way, I inferred that structured structures do not 
materialistically characterize the nature of states, but they symbolically constitute and affect 
states’ perceptions, which unconsciously produce dispositions of symbolic violence as 
opposed to the superiority of domination in structured capital allocation. In other words, the 
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unconscious foundation of structured history in state dispositions impairs theorization of any 
ontological consideration of conscious/interactional or material/genetic understanding of 
anarchy in international relations.  
Through a Bourdieusian lens, I also found out the necessity and appropriateness of a 
structural constructivist understanding of international relations. As I discussed in the 
paragraph above, it is not possible to explain the foundation of state subjectivity and identity 
by looking only at the interactions or structures of the international field. The constructivist 
side of Bourdieusian conceptualization provides a basis for understanding the state as a social 
entity, similar to individuals living in a society, which is limited by habitus and its objective 
positioning in the field of struggles. In other words, states have habitus which affects their 
perception of interest and identities. The structural side of Bourdieusian theorization reminds 
me that states unconsciously produce structured violence, vision and division which are not 
genetic characteristics of state identity, but rather practical tendencies of the past history of 
habitus originating from a limited distribution of dispositional knowledge and doxic 
experiences into the identities of states. Therefore, Bourdieu helped me to understand the 
foundation of past experiences, visions and divisions in the conscious interactions of states 
within totally social processes without applying any ontological postulate, and also structuring 
the character of interactions for the future characterization of political identity without 
forgetting the double-structured foundation of the objective international field. An important 
theoretical result derived from this is that states do not always have constitutive control over 
their interests and ideas, because the symbolic foundation of the past evaluates their identities 
in accordance with the foundation of past domination into their dispositions. Indeed, 
interactions produce meanings of identities but only some states, which have a considerable 
amount symbolic capital, can define the meaning of identities; many others can only apply 
and use these produced meanings, which become the symbolic violence of their struggles in 
the international field. 
Another important finding of the research is to see that we should act with suspicion 
towards shared ideas of the international field. States embody pre-given and misrecognized 
tendencies of accumulated history, derived from structured structures, which are represented 
by shared ideas, and, then, institutionalized by objective norms. Therefore, social construction 
is generally interested in the construction of knowledge and its institutionalization, but fails to 
notice structural influences in the ‘construction of constructors’ and their identities. Different 
states are equipped with a distinctive and restricted amount of capital which originates from 
accumulated history. This inequality in the distribution of accumulated historical knowledge 
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and experience in state identity results in an unequal participation of shared ideas, which 
means a simple confirmation of produced knowledge rather than a co-production of the 
common knowledge of the international field. Consequently, the restricted structured 
qualification of state identity affects creators’/states’ perceptions with regards to their own 
identity. States form their knowledge in line with their limited dispositions in their habitus, 
which imposes a consensus on distinctions and divisions in the international field. Therefore, 
shared ideas also mean a consensus on positioning in the international field. For example, one 
of the inseparable principles of being a state is to have a group of people called nations. This 
principle actually represents the knowledge and experience of European states, but it is also 
confirmed by other states even though they do not take the same form of national identity. 
The UAE and Kuwait have tebaa (people) instead of citizens, but, in order to confirm the 
shared ideas of the international field, they embody a shared knowledge of the international 
field regarding nationality. Similarly, many subjects of shared ideas in the international field, 
such as human rights and free trade, were fundamentally produced by only a limited number 
of states, but these principles became the shared ideas of all members of international 
relations. As a result, shared knowledge is mainly an illusio which produces a structuring 
qualification of domination and its classification.  
A Bourdieusian international relations perspective also helps to question the 
understanding of culture in international relations. The existing constructivist literature in 
international relations interprets culture in accordance with the existence of anarchy in the 
field. However, Bourdieu conceptualizes that the existence of division and classification in 
the field depends on forms of structured nobility which distinguish some members of the field 
from all other members. Thus, I infer that nobility is a subjective state derived from a 
distinction between states’ dispositions and realities of classification and domination called 
doxa. Although nobility is successfully represented and, therefore, accomplished by only 
particular states, all of the states of the international field struggle to obtain the same nobility. 
Nobility functions as a sum of realities, which results in the legalization of a differentially 
distributed state positioning. Struggling for the same nobility also means a subjective adoption 
of domination and dominated relations because doxa unconsciously imposes a certain nobility 
of domination which is obeyed by all of the states. Consequently, this helped me to realize 
that the existence of anarchy does not depend on the form of culture that states have 
internalized in interaction with each other. Before states produce ideas and identities in 
interactive ways, they embody some structured tendencies of habitus which restrict their 
engagements with the appropriate behaviour scheme of nobility. In this respect, anarchy 
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depends on a distinction between a legitimate nobility, derived from the habitual tendencies of 
a certain culture and its states. Therefore, the struggles of nobility are related to incompatible 
habitual dispositions of structured structures in the habitus of states. In this way, ideas and 
interactions are not adequate to understand anarchy, because, without having the appropriate 
habitual tendencies of legitimate nobility, states cannot produce self-reflexive ideas and 
interests regarding their positioning in international relations. As consensus with regards to 
certain nobility continues, nobility functions as a form of symbolic violence for some states, 
having a disadvantaged position in the political interactions in the field. As a result of this, we 
cannot define any culture of anarchy by looking only at the construction of identities; we also 
see a distinction between the dispositional habitus of states and structured nobility which 
causes potential anarchy in international relations. Thus, anarchy is not only constructional 
and cultural but it is also a structured phenomenon. Democracy is a peculiar example of this 
claim. Although states principally defend democracy as a value of identity, a great number of 
these states do not operate democracy because of the gap between their disposed habitus, 
having incapable capital allocation and structured nobility; they defend democracy out of 
loyalty to a dominant group of states which have achieved appropriate capital allocation in 
international relations. 
Culture, derived from the habitual unconscious tendencies of states, is no less 
important than culture, which is derived from interactions. It is true that interactions produce 
ideas and knowledge, but they also objectify the subjective embodiment of states in the field. 
States promote the knowledge production processes of the field in accordance with their 
capital. Owing to the fact that capital allocation symbolizes structured limitations, visions and 
division, the culture of interactions also objectifies the visions and divisions of the symbolic 
field. In other words, interactions cannot directly produce classifications and divisions; they 
only objectify structured symbolic habitus. On this point, Bourdieu distinctively indicates the 
importance and limit of the self-reflexivity of subjects regarding their own identity. Realizing 
a high level of self-reflexivity results in a better positioning with regards to the reproduction 
of self-identity. Otherwise, state identity is predisposed by the pressures of the structured 
nobility and the tendencies of habitus. In this way, when a state reflects its dispositions it also 
examines the structured classification of domination. In this respect, I inferred that existing 
constructivist approaches generally focus on the structuring world, which is constituted by the 
relation of the systems of modern European culture and states; therefore, they are only 
relevant to obtaining a comprehensive understanding of European and Anglo-Saxon states and 
identities. Owing to the domination of structured habits, the remaining identities of states 
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outside the domain of European relations are unable to promote a conscious culture of the 
field. At this point, Bourdieusian self-reflexivity understanding questions the Europeanized 
constructivist understanding of the state, and, therefore, provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of culture, structure and identity relations, which indicates not only a 
positioning of domination but also examines the positioning and limitations of states in the 
dominated field of practice. In practical international relations, this inadequacy of 
constructivism is particularly observed by many structuring organs of the international field 
such as the United Nations. Although the identities of many states, culturally and habitually, 
are derived from undemocratic characteristics, all of the states in in the United Nations 
General Assembly obey and practise democratic delegation systems, because their disposed 
culture does not provide any appropriate way to promote the structuring norms in 
international relations. Consequently, a Bourdieusian understanding of culture and self-
reflexivity in structuring and structured structures explains why a state that has undemocratic 
characteristics in its habitus needs to obey democratic rules and exchanges if their identities 
are tyrannized by the characteristics of the undemocratic dispositions in their habitus.  
Bourdieusian international relations produces a better understanding with regards to 
reproduction and change in international relations. The embedded nobility of domination and 
its doxic realities impose certain exchange systems as legitimate forms of interactions in the 
international field. By way of these exchange systems, dominants legitimate their ideations of 
classification and division, which guarantee distinguishing positions of domination in the 
field. By creating defined roles subject to particular exchange forms, domination reproduces 
its distinctions as a patriarchal role in the field. Owing to the fact that states struggle to 
achieve the same nobility, which is formed by the habitual tendencies of structured 
domination, they lack self-reflexive insights into their dominated positioning in the exchange 
systems. Indeed, when the states struggle for the nobility of domination, they have to apply 
the language created by domination. In this respect, the language of domination cannot 
provide any productive tool to operate a self-reflexive insight into their own state identities. 
Consequently, states are subject to a practical sense of self and otherness before they produce 
conscious interactions. On the other hand, despite the fact that reproduction is a more 
common peculiarity in subject–object relations in a Bourdieusian perspective, Bourdieu does 
not exclude the possibility of a potential transformation of identities. Fundamentally, in order 
to enhance the changes of political subjectivity, subjects need to improve a self-reflexive 
understanding with regards to their own identities and positions. As I discussed in this 
research, Bourdieu describes such a transformation as a crisis situation in the field. When a 
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state achieves an appropriate capital allocation in order to improve a self-reflexive insight into 
habitual structured limitations and classifications, it begins to question the embedded forms of 
interactions and exchanges, and, therefore, it impairs the legitimacy of dominant nobility. 
Consequently, changes in international relations depend on a self-reflexive insight into the 
vision and division of structured structures in habitus, which results in struggles for the 
changes of institutional norms and ideas in structuring structures. 
Eventually, another very important finding of this research is that Bourdieusian 
sociological terminology is very productive for reinterpreting the existing discussions and also 
for creating a new distinctive field of perspectives in international relations. Bourdieu 
provides rich theoretical concepts and research tools which not only contribute to identity and 
state subjectivity but also answer many other theoretical questions in international relations. 
In particular, field, capital and habitus are very productive theoretical tools for understanding 
power domination and classification in international relations. Furthermore, symbolic 
violence, nobility and doxa relations are also essential theoretical concepts for reinterpreting 
the structure and agency relations of international relations, which highlight how the 
institutionalization of international field, especially norms and sovereignty, can be identified. 
In addition to this, identifying state identity in accordance with struggles on not only political 
and economic capital, but also social and cultural capital, is also relevant to understanding 
how the bureaucratic field is reproduced and transformed. Unconsciousness in disposition and 
habitus relations is important to research future expansions in the stratification of globalizing 
political identity and its international relations imagination. To sum up, beyond the existing 
international relations approaches, Bourdieu provides appropriate knowledge for evaluating 
states as a social organism, consisting of the totalized structured habitus of different social 
groups.  
 
Suggestions for further engagements 
Despite the importance and relevance of the concept of state identity in this research, several 
points of criticism may be noted. These points emphasize some limitations of my research on 
state identity. Firstly, the political identity of a state depends on the perspective that states 
behave like social entities. Because my main purpose is to research political subjectivity in 
line with Bourdieu, I did not discuss the rationality and foundation of states as social entities. 
In other words, I did not comprehensively work on why we need to conceptualize states as a 
social organism even though this is, in practice, an organizational organ of political 
subjectivity. Therefore, further research can be produced on the social characteristics of states, 
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especially in relation with a Bourdieusian understanding of the bureaucratic field. A second 
limitation is based on a historical evaluation of political identity. I conceptualized that 
Bourdieu offers better insights into the reproductions and changes of political identity, which 
can provide a theoretical expansion to research how modern state identity changes in the 
future. On the other hand, I did not consider the situation in which identity is reproduced and 
changed. It requires critical insights into the conditions of reproduction and change, which 
result in the transformation of political identities. The third limitation concerns the 
Bourdieusian concept of capital in different fields of practice. In line with the theoretical 
establishment of the thesis, I researched state identity in accordance with different forms of 
capital separately. Due to the time and structural limitations of the thesis, I did not engage the 
intertwined relations of forms of capital in the bureaucratic fields of states. Consequently, 
producing some case-based research can be very fruitful to show the intertwined structure of 
social, cultural, political, symbolic or economic forms of capital.  
In this thesis, I have offered a theoretical framework to examine, a distinctive 
theoretical approach and a Bourdieusian sociologic perspective in international relations. I 
believe that this framework can be fruitful to develop further research with regards to the 
theory of international relations. For the fundamental purpose of this research, I have a 
theoretical perspective on the formation of subjects/states and their identities in a structural 
constructivist perspective in international relations. However, the structural constructivism 
approach in international relations still requires further research. I believe that structural 
constructivism will establish a new theoretical expansion. It should be noted that such 
research not only improves constructivist theorizing, but also contributes to different critical 
perspectives of international relations which search for alternative ways of understanding 
beyond the scientific understanding of realist and rationalist theories.  
In a general sense of this thesis, I focused on Bourdieu and his sociological research to 
understand international relations as the field of practice and state identity as the collective 
body of struggles on different forms of capital. I researched state identity in relation to a broad 
conceptual framework of Bourdieu. In this way, I have argued for the applicability and 
relevance of a peculiar Bourdieusian terminology which I applied through the whole sense of 
the thesis. I suggest that future research to develop a Bourdieusian sense of international 
relations is required. Indeed, Bourdieusian international relations is very primitive and, 
therefore, it is necessary to have further research in order to have comparative findings, 
derived from different methodological studies of Bourdieu. I would suggest two distinctive 
forms of Bourdieu and international relations research. Firstly, it would be theoretically 
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productive to focus on a particular Bourdieusian term in line with a small-scale question of 
international relations such as a culture of anarchy and symbolic violence. Secondly, I would 
recommend case studies which specifically apply content and/or discourse analyses. Because 
of the limited Bourdieusian theoretical engagements in international relations, I construct my 
study on a broad terminology and theory of Bourdieu. Hence, it is necessary to have a further 
case-based study to see the applicability of this theoretical framework of the Bourdieusian 
international relations approach. I believe that many relevant and fruitful contents and 
discourses can be found to prove the applicability of my theoretical engagement of Bourdieu.  
Another interesting research question derived from my experiences in this research is 
to understand when political identity is reproduced and when it is transformed. I 
comprehensively focused on the contribution of Bourdieusian study with regards to 
reproduction and change in political identities. I argued how Bourdieusian study improves our 
understanding of reproduction and change in the political identities of states. In line with this, 
new contributions should be done in order to understand the differences between the 
conditions of reproduction and transformation in detail. In the contemporary world, especially 
in line with neoliberalism and its field understanding of globalization, a large number of 
descriptive data will be available to test the differences in the situation of reproduction and 
changes of state identity. I hope that a Bourdieusian approach would benefit from future 
advances in the questions of international relations, including state identity, and will 
complement the existing literature in the field.  
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